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INTRODUCTION 
Many have expressed the need for a clarification of 
the term "matter." Whitehead said:-
the old foundations of scientific thought are 
becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, 
material, ether, electricity, mechanism1 or-ganism, ••• all reguire reinterp~etation. 
Benjamin has pointed out that "the concept of matter is 
both the most obscure of the basic physical concepts and 
the most ambiguous of philosophical notions." 2 Jeans said 
much the same thing when he affirmed that 11 matter and mate-
rialism need to be redefined in the light of our new scien-
3 tific kno wledg e." 
Against t hese views Santayana says that "it would 
be frivolous to attempt to define it. 114 Emil du Bois-Reymond 
declared in 1872 that "with respect to the riddle of what 
are matter and force ••• ignorabimus--we shall never know. 115 
This study presupposes a faith that a definition of 
matter can be developed which will combine the findings of 
recent science and employ the methods cf metaphysics. It is 
a frank avowal of faith in a speculative method of phil-
osophy. 
1. Whitehead, SMW, 24. 
2. Benjamin, IPS, 337. 
3. Jeans, PP, 216. 
4. Santayana , ROM, 18. 
5. Frank, BPP, 59. 
i x 
A study of the k ind here attemp ted could not have 
been made much ea rlier than the middle of the t wentieth cen-
tury. s cientific discovery has been so productive during the 
first ~alf of t h is century tha t without the help of science 
it woul d ha ve been i mp ossible to have developed the hyp o t h-
e s is wh ich is here pre sented. Some of the present r e search 
i n t h e field of ato mic physics may contribute more than can 
n ow be predic te d, but it is difficult to see h ow any future 
d iscoveries will cha ng e tb e concl us ions in a seriou s way. 
Lt is well to recognize the great debt wh ich philosophy 
owes to science. Without the re s e a rches of the physicists, 
c h emists, a nd ma t h ema ticians, the defin i tion of matter would 
be diff icult to trace. Science h a s furnished a g rea t many of 
the cl ues which h a ve aided in t h is task. 
The problem of the nature of matter has occupied the 
mind of man for a long time. 1bere is a not able array of 
early t h inkers who work ed on this p roblem. Aristotle has 
p ointed out t ha t "ma tter" wa s the e arliest philosophical con-
cep tion.l Leucip pus, Democ r itus, Aristotle, ~~icurus a nd 
Lucretius all made nota ble contributions to such a study. 
Ri ght do"m to t n e present day t he re is a larg e number of 
very a ble thinkers who have g iven a ttention to this subject •. 
X 
However science may continue the invest igation of the 
nature of matter the p roblem is not nearly so serious to 
science as it is to philo sophy. The effort of t h e philosop her 
1. Aristotle, Meta., 1, 3, 983b. 
to meet this p roblem prompts him to ask what is t h e cause of 
ma tter, how is it related to process, mind, and to what is 
fundamentally real in the universe. The a.nswers men h a ve 
x i 
given to these questions result in very divergent philosophies. 
il'.h is is especially true in the case of naturalism and ideal-
ism. F~ong the systems bidding for the supp ort of man the 
two most virile seem to be naturalism and ideal ism. There is 
another influential group of thinkers who repudiate metaphy-
sics and say tbat both idealism and naturalism are attempting 
a task they had better resign. Instead they stress the need 
for a reexamination of the evidence of philosophy and a search 
for a more accurate language to express philosophical ideas. 
The issues between idealism and naturalism a re so ser-
ious in their bearing upon the entire meaning of man's l i fe 
that one needs to face the consequences of a choice between 
them with full recognition of the implications. I f naturalism 
is true then religion is without the support of a cosmic real-
ity, and it turns out to be just the fiction of man's inven-
tive mind. Naturalism also repudiates belief in personal im-
mortality. lt leaves values without coamic support making 
them purely subjective. One of the purposes of such a study 
as is here attempted is to clarify the issues between natural-
ism and idealism by an examination of the meaning of •matter.• 
A concentration upon the systems of ten philosopbers 
of the twentieth century seemed most appropriate to sift the 
findings and consider the various viewpoints v;hich have been 
expressed. There are many other philosophers who might well 
have been included in such a list but the group represented 
have illustrated the main trends of modern philosophy as it 
has profited from the advances in twentieth-century science. 
xii 
1'he definition of matter is essentially a philosophi-
cal problem. Only the freedom which a speculative metaphysics 
can employ with an empirical foundation will ever be able to 
define matter. A credo essential to metaphysics is a faith 
in a logic which is continually corrected by empirical evidence. 
A sound logic which is coherent in a broad empirical as well 
as in a logical sense is the justification which is offered 
for what is here attempted. 
1 
CHAP TER I 
MATTER AS A PHILO SOPHICAL PROBLEM 
" 1. NAIVE RP~ALI SM 
The nature of matter is one of the persistent problems 
of philosophy. It may be defined tentatively, fo r purposes of 
discussion, as the realm to which sense experience objectively 
refers. This realm claims the attention of the individual 
almost constantly. From the dawn of consciousness, a steady 
stream of sense stimuli in kaledoscopic variation, magnifies 
the impor tance of tbis kind of experience. Its proximity, 
and its relationship to most a ctivity naturally causes people 
to regard it as of p rime significance. 
" The first resp onse to it is naive. There i s a tendency 
to t h in k that experience gives first hand knowledge of matter 
itself. The coherence of this experience co nvinces one, that 
there is a. so mething which is extended, and that i s outside 
the subject himself. It is easy to concl u de that there is 
a real realm which has produced these sensations, and that it 
is objectively real. As questions are asked, it i s found 
that the nature of matter becomes increasingly complex and 
difficult. I t is clear that sense experience alone gives 
a meager account of it. Democritus saw this in his early 
investi gations and formulated a theory that explained matter 
by means of the atomic t h eory. These atoms were not found 
in sense experience. 
They were a rationalistic construction of the philosopher in 
his effort to find a coherent theory that could avoid the 
It 
pitfalls of a naive sense experience. "·The objects of sense 
are sup p osed to be real and it is customary to regard them 
as such, but in truth they are not. Only the atoms and the 
void are real."l 
From the dawn of a more critical approach to the study 
of matter in the time of the pre-Socratics to the recent 
investigations of atomic physics, men have been traveling 
2 
farther and ·farther a...,vay from the dictates of uncritical sense 
experience. What is first discovered through sense e xp erience 
is elusive as long as thought is restricted to mere sense 
experience. 
II 
2. BEYOND NAIVE REALI SM 
There are two ways in which man goes beyond the limi-
" tations of naive realism. The one is the way of science and 
the otl!J.er, that of the critical philosophy. The scientist 
discovers the reason for a stick's appearing bent in the water, 
explains a mirage, and demonstrates that moving pictures 
are not continuous, even though they appear so when projected 
on the screen. He shows that the bell on the train has not 
chan g ed its tone despite the Doppler effect which leads the 
hearer to believe that its tone does change. 
Vmen speaking of matter, the scientist tells many 
things about the structure of the molecule and of the 
1. Democritus, The Fragments in Bakewell, SBAP, 60. 
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atom and the behavior of electrons, protons, neutrons, and the 
other parts of the atoms. It is a minute world wh ich is but 
faintly penetrated by use of the sense organ s. It is so far 
removed from the complex forms of matter which ap p ear in sense 
experience that one can hardly understand the relationship 
between tt.e two. 
y 
Philosophy begins with science . in its expose of the 
deceptive implications of sense experience. It welcomes 
every explanation offered by science, but it also raises 
issues which go beneath the very assumptions of science. It 
raises questions of purpose; and causality, of freedom and 
law. 1t shows that time is a sign ificant factor which must 
be rela ted to sense experience. Change and permanence app lied 
by philosophy lead to a question about the ultimate 
cons tituents of what is found through sense experience. 
questions of value lead to a consideration of personal 
relationships. Philosophy insists that sense experience 
must be examined by both analytical and synoptic methods, 
to discover the elementary as well as organizational factors 
involved. 
When the skills of science and philosophy have been 
" applied to naive sense experience, many significant new factore 
appear. r t then becomes clear that sense experience is 
.. 
inadequate in its naive form. 
3. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
It has already been shown that philosophy and science 
have much in common. A:.t times, scientists seem wary of' the 
philosopher lest he spring s.ome metaphysical , trap and close 
all way of escape. Likewise, the philosopher seems fearful 
lest the scientist trespass on his broad pastures. Neither 
group are necessarily forced to remain in the one camp, and 
yet they seem to adhere to certa in well defined provinces of 
action. 
A scientist is limited to description. He tells as 
faithfully as possible what he observes in the empirical 
approach to a subject. Causality is limited to uniform 
se-quence. AnalyBi s is used wherever it can be applied. 
Q.uestions of value, first cause, purpose, and epistemology, 
are not attempted. Interpretations are cautiously made. 
Philosophy, surveys what science has to offer, takes 
it all as relevant data, and moves beyond the empirical, 
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into the valuational, and interpretative. It does not hesitate 
to employ the analytical, but never rests the case on mere 
analysis. lt must also co n sider the synoptic situation. 
"The truth is the whole." 1 It looks for purpose, and moves 
into the mos·t difficult of situations by attempting to explain 
first cause. In brief, science asks the questions which 
1. Hege.l, Pd'G, 81. 
seem more remote. So long as further questions may be asked, 
the task of philosophy is incomplete. lt must face those 
questions and pursue them with cour-age. 
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Not everyone will agree about the provinces of science 
a n d philosophy. some would limit philosophy to a study of t h e 
terms by which the evidence of science is formulated. Some 
would deny as did Comte that philosophy has any distinctive 
province apart from science.1 'l'he disagreements on this sub-
ject are many. Let it suffice, to say that the province of 
philosophy is to ask and attempt to answer certain · questions 
which a rise in the course of the work of the scientist, but 
are not answered by science. These questions relate to those 
ultimate explanations of things--purpose, meaning, value, 
first causes and synoptic· considerations. A philosopher attempts 
to find an explanation of the whole of experience which gives 
a coherent account of the fragments of experience. 1he 
philosopher believes tha t the scientist has not told the entire 
story about the unity and values of experience. Philosophers 
have the more difficult task of trying to c·omplete what others 
have begun. 
4. 'l'HE DISTINCTIVE TREATIBNT OF MATTER BY PHILOSOPHY 
.l:!.:very problem of science is also a problem of philoso-· 
phy. 'l'hat means that philosophy is always eager for all infor-
mation with respect and appreciation •. It is also severely 
l. Comte, CPP, 26. 
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critical of it, and scrutinizes every means by which it was 
obtained. 
Philosophy is obligated to explain all of human ex-
pe·rience. As already pointed out, the significant place 
of sense experience, and the objects to which that experience 
refers, make matter, one of the bulky problems of philosophy. 
Not only is it bulky, it has become a veritable battle line 
between the great interpreters and system builders. The problem 
cannot be evaded. The synoptic purpose of philosophy demands 
that matter be included if man is to speak synoptically about 
the vast realm of experience which confronts the lover of 
wisdom. 
The importance of this subject to philosophy is amply 
shoVim by the numerous treatments it has received by the 
majority. of those who have tried to take a complete world 
view. Not only does this attest to the importance such thinkers 
have attributed to the question, but their conclusions like-
wise are impressive. There are numerous opinions, some of 
which are in serious conflict. Heraclitus says that all is 
change. 1 Democritus thinks that sense experience will not 
reveal the nature of matter.2 Plato suggests a vague inter-
pretation of something near t :o ·. matter. 3 Aristotle's view makes 
it an eternal combination of form-matter.4 Pl.otinus calls 
-------------------------
1 .. Heraclitus, On Nature, fragments in Bakewell, SBAP", 33·. 
2. Democritus, The ~agnients in Bakewell, SBAP, 60. 
3. Plato, Tim, 5la. 
4. Aristotle, . .Meta., 1029, 25-30. 
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it evil.l Descartes thinks of it as a full member of an 
ultimate dualism.2 Spinoza makes it an attribute of substance.3 
Berkeley denies its reality.4 Kant relegates it to the 
phenomenal order which is unknowable in itself. 5 Hegel 
makes it an expression of Absolute Spirit. 6 s. Alexander es·-
.tablishes it as one of the lower levels of the emergence of 
space-time.? · Bradley calls it "appearance. n8 Santayana 
calls matter, 
••• the invisible wind which, sweeping for no 
reason over the field of essences, raises some 
of them into a cloud of dust: and that whirl-
wind we call existence.9 
Idealists regard it as phenomenally but not ontologically 
real. 1 0 More recent thinkers call it energy, or "event."ll 
Instances of this kind might be multiplieq. They show how 
varied and far from agreement are the conclusions of many 
thinkers. 
Not only are the disagreements significant but the 
conclusions to which they lead are even more so. Vfu ile it is 
true that the idealist and the naturalist will agree that mat-
ter is energy or activity, the question cannot rest at that 
place. The idealist wishes to account for the organiz~tion and 
order which is found in matter, and this leads to the hypothesis 
1. Plotinus, Enneads, I, 8, 8. 
2. Descartes, MPP, 84-104. 
3. Spinoza, ETH, 21. 
4. Berkeley, WGB, I, 301. 
5. Kant, KrV, 58. 
6. Hegel, PdG, 309-310. 
? • . Alexander, STD, II, 69. 
8. Bradley, AR, 235. 
9. Santayana, ROM, 94. 
10. Bowne, :MET, 17-19. 
11. Benjamin, IPS, 50. 
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of mind as an explanation of these facts. 1he naturalist seems 
to prefer being limited to the scientific method and his expla-
nation is tentative and lacks reference to anything of mind or 
value as a factor in understanding matter. He is very ready to 
reject any interpretation based on mind. He prefers to speak 
of the world as one of "living activity, evolution, and 
continuous process."l Just why the naturalist stresses action 
so much and then rejects the prime fact of purposive and 
intelligent elements in this activity is something which is 
hard to understand. Ultimately the issue rests with the 
idealist affirming that an intelligent being is the workman 
back of all process and development. The naturalist refuses 
to accept such an explanation though he offers no explanation 
which is better and can meet the facts. It is a serious 
situation which merits constant review and reconsideration 
of the basic assumptions as well as all the stages which 
mark the progress in the development of the thought from 
assumptions to conclusions~ In a sense, matter, and its 
interpretation is a question which is fundamental to the entire 
cultural and valuational sjlpere. The answer g iven to this 
question bears such relationship to the present civilizatiqn 
that it is well to consider what is at stake. If naturalism 
is correct, then it is necessary to reject the claims of 
1. Brightman, NAV, 98. 
Christianity. But to do this, is to reject the very source 
of what is best in our civilization. 
The best thing in present-day societies is the 
feeling for humanity which has come to us from 
the gospel and which we owe to Christianity .1 
The issue of naturalism leads to t b e problem which Trueblood 
has raised in his reference to a "cut flower civilization."2 
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It is difficult to account for our civilization without the in-
fluence of Christianity, and the metaphysical implications wh ich 
are so crucial to Christianity. If natura lism can prove its 
po~ition, then the metaphysical foundation on which Christianity 
is established will be un able to support the superstructure. 
Good as its v a luational scheme is subjectively, the question of 
value objectivity and cosmic support are essential for Christian. 
v alues. Take away God and immortality , and reduce the mind to 
a complex of material organization , and Christianity cannot 
remain effective for the in divi dual who makes this cha nge . If 
idea lism or eve n dualism is correct, then Christianity finds 
ph ilosophical support rather than refutation. 
It is not customary to answer questions of this kind by 
reference to their effect upon any existing religion. Rather, 
the investigations which regularly follow a search for the 
truth are made regardless of where that truth leads. But it 
is wise to be a ware of the social imp lications o.f responsible 
thought. 
1. Al fred Loisy, La MOrale humaine, p. 251 Quoted by 
Trueblood in PMJ~, 59. 
2. Trueblood, P MM, 59. 
Up to the las·t part of the previous century, little 
evidence was produced to resolve this conflict. In such a 
situation it very fre quently happens that investi gation turns 
out to be an unctuous repetition of philosophical credos in 
new languag e but containing no additional insi ghts. The 
d iscoveries of chemists and physicists in the nineteenth and 
t wentieth centuries have furnished many new leads., The time 
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has ,come when this information must be assimilated by philosophy 
and brought into syst ema tic relationship with all the other 
data in t h e comprehensive task tha t ever confronts the lover 
of wisdom. It should now be possible to determine the relation-
ship of this evidence to the previous solutions of the problem 
of matter, and determine wherein these divergent systems have 
been in error. 
This investigation is made in the spirit of Descartes,, 
"to divide each of the difficulties under investi ga tion into 
as many parts as possible, and a s might be nec e ssary for its 
adequate solution."1 Matter is only part of the data of 
ph ilosophy , but a co mplete treatme nt of t h is part of the 
p roblem is sufficient to lead ultimately to all of the other 
problems. 1bis is so if truth is a question of relationships 
in the spirit of Hegelian concreteness. 'lbe truth becomes 
more complete as relationships are explored more thoroughly. 
It will alway s be the conviction of many philosophers 
that science does not give an adequate account of matter. 
1 • De scar t e s , DM, 19. 
Philosophers welcome all that the scientist can offer, but 
they are not content to let the case rest at that point. The 
facts must be related to the rest of experience. 'Nhen the 
scientist has . given his last word about what his analysis 
reveals, it remains for the philosopher to raise further 
questions. Mere description is not enough. The scientist 
himself does not stop at descript ion. He formulates his 
evidence into laws and has often followed the implications 
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of h is ·evidence and discovered new facts. Philosophy attempts 
to extend the meani ng of the evi den ce of the scientist by 
tr ac i ng t he relation ships and impli cations of these facts 
as f a r as possible. It is concern ed about the question of 
values. lt seeks to und e rstand how kn owledge is ga ined. It 
i nqu ires about the nature of mi n d. It investi ga tes the cosmic 
processes a n d raises questions about purpose and design. 
It looks for first causes, and tries to discover whether 
freedo m or determinism finally rules. Ah •mys it attempts 
to see things in their totality. Vfuen all these questions 
have been answered the philosopher has the added task of 
co ns tructing an explanation or theory which is coherent 
with all experi ence, and that is able to answer any additional 
questions which f a rther investigations would require. This 
is a continuous task for our knowledge is only partial. New 
evidence may necessita te change . This mean s that the work of 
philosophy is never complete but always provisional and sub-
ject to review. In something of tb2 same spirit the scientist 
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keeps his discoveries and interpretations subject to change 
and adjustment. It is difficult to draw a sharp line of 
demarkation between science and philosophy. Philosophy 
includes more that one does not find in the sensory realm 
and its insistence on the larger synoptic view gives it more 
of the element of completeness, as contrasted with the more 
fra~1entary and immediate nature of scientific evidence. 
The relationship of mind and matter is a problem which 
philosophy has long considered. Are they two distinct realities 
or are they attributes o.f the same substance? Is it possible 
to explain mind as just the functioning and organization of 
matter? Any inherent capacity in matter which could by it-
self bring about over a sufficiently long period of time, 
the appearance of something so extra-ordinary as mental activity 
is something that any account of matter will need to consider. 
The other side of the issue is the question of whether 
matter can be explained by mind. The idealist has asserted 
this is possible. If this question could be settled many 
oth£rs would very likely be resolved. 
Scientists themselves acknowledge that philosophy may 
have methods which the scientists do not have. 
As a matter of fact, we find very often that 
the physicist, declines to work on problems set 
up in this way; yet in another corn er of his soul 
he admits that such problems might be attacked 
with other methods--not physical but "philosoph-
ical~" as they are called .1 
1. Frank, BPP, 60-61. 
In somethin g of the same spirit F. R. Tennan t sai d , 
"it is to philosophy tha t we must betake ourselves if we 
are to hope for further elucidation of the problem con tained 
in t he q ue stion of what ma tter is."l 
5. THE CRITICAL APPROACH 
1~ere is another function of philosophy which may be 
termed the critical approach. In this, an attempt is made to 
examine the concepts which have been used by science and to 
mak e clear the distinctions involved. Patrick pointed out 
why t h is is necessary. 
The demand that science should be supp lemented 
by philosophy is becoming more and more ur gent a s 
s c ience itself withdraws more and more in to the 
mysterious b a ckground of symbols and mathematical 
e quations, and forces itself to be indifferent 
to what lies beh ind the s ymbols.2 
The importance of the task of critical philosophy is 
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well illustrated in the problem which Bertra nd Russell presents 
in his definition of matter as "what satisfies the e quations 
of physics."3 It is necessary to interpret the meanings 
in the formulae of physics in order to understand the 
significance of what Russell s ays. In this respect, c. D . 
Broad is convinced that the critica l philosophy has made 
co n siderable progress. 
I. Tennant, Art. (1916}, 498. 
2. Patrick, ITP, 24. 
3. Russell, F~P, 658. 
Since the time of Berkeley and Descartes phi-
losophers have devoted much attention to the prob-
1 em of the "Reality of External World·." I 
d-o not pretend there is any agreed an swer to the 
question among them, but their inqui ri es have 
been most va luable in clearing up the meanings 
of s uch terms a s "matter," "sensible appearance," 
"sensation,..- "perception," "independence," etc. 
Any competent p hilo sop her nowadays whether he 
asserts or denies the independent existence of 
matter i s asse rting or denying so mething far 
more subtle and far better analyzed than any-
thin g whi ch Be r keley or Descartes would have 
understood by the same form of words.l 
6. SO:ME EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
No treatment of matter by ph ilosop hy is complete with-
out some consideration of the epistemolog ical problems involved 
in such a study. IJ • Science generally assumes a na1ve real1sm 
about all experience. Exp.erience is experi e nce of the object 
itself. .il/iatter is given in experience. However, the knowledge 
of ma tter or anything which comes t h rough sense experience, is 
a p roduct of both sensations and the creative activity of the 
mind in organizing sensations, and interpreting them in 
relationship to all other experie n ce. Science has ge nerally 
g ive n little attention to the epistemolo g ical p roblem. It 
takes v e ry little r eflection to reco gn ize that all experience 
of mat ter, is really an inner state of the mind. Matter is 
not known in t hat same intimate manner in wh ich self-conscious-
ness is known. Neither are othe r pe rsons known ap art from 
sense experience. If it could be b e lieved possible to know 
matt e r as one knows himself, and tha t is wha t the 
1. Broad, Ar t. (1925 j , 83-84. 
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e p istemologic a l monist of the nee-r ealist school tr i es to 
i mp ly, then there might be hopes of g a ining emp irical evidence 
of a hi gh ly i mpor tan t and revealing nature . 'lhe best t ha t 
can be done is to recog nize the d ua lism of kn owle dge. Ideas 
are pr iva te, but refer to what is objective. Ep:istemolog ical 
dualism calls attention to the fact tha t there is a definite 
so ur ce of sensory stimulus, which in this problem is c a lled 
matter. It also is a reminder that knowled ge is not d irect 
but comes t h rough a medimn of menta l a ctivity which g ives as 
an end product, the so-called data of s c ience. Hence when 
beginning such a study it must be roo o gnized that t he d a tum 
whi ch is p rese nt is a represent a tion of something which was 
responsible for a stimulus co mi ng to the sense organs. 
Ma tter is not as simple as first appearances indica t e. It 
never can be known d irectly. The clo se st anyone comes to a 
direct knowledg e of a physical u-: i n g is wha t is kn own about 
on e's own body, a n d that "direct" knowledge yields no scientific 
re s ults t hrough th is me thod of introspection alone. The 
questi on may well be a sked at this p oint . Will it ev er 
be kn own what matter is, in and of itself? The ep istemolog ical 
question shows tha t there a re limits in a ny attemp t to under-
sta n d t'he na ture of matter. The extent to wh ich t h e con-
clusions wh ich are made on the basis of present knowl e d g e of 
ma tt e r are colored i n any way by the observer himself is some-
thi ng which must be c ons idered. 'I'he methodological limitations 
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of the ego-centric predicament are just as difficult as when 
announced by Berkeley. One thing seems very clear. Knowledge 
of matter is a complex which may be traced to sources both 
without and within the one possessing the knowledge. 
This brief statement of the epistemological problem 
shows us tbat any solution we offer must take int o account the 
imp or tan c e of the s e co n s ide rat i on s • 'l'he knO'.'!ledge situation 
is dualistic. Vmether ideas accurately r efer to the objects 
causing the sensations and give us reliable knowledge can only 
be determined by the test of coherence. Unconsciously the 
scientist has gene r a lly referred such consider a tions to 
laboratory tests and a kind of pragmatic solution has been 
found. However, the q uestion is never settled satisfactorily 
until it has been rel a ted to the whole of a system in which 
each part t ake s its place in coheren t rel a tionship .. That is 
primarily a p hilosophical task. 
Philosophy in one of its functions, is the 
critic of cosmolo gies. It is its function to 
harmonize, refashion, and ,justify, divergent · 
instituitions as the nature of things. It has 
to insist on the scrutiny of the Ultimate ideas 
and on the r e tention of the who le of the evi-
dence in reshaping our cosmolo g ical scheme. 
lt ~<O business i s to render explicit, and--so fa.r as may 
be---efficient, a process which otherwise is 
unco n sciously performed without rational 
tests ••• If my view of the function of philosophy 
is correct, it is the most effective of all the 
intellectual pursuits.l 
The seriousness of this issue is well shown in the necessity 
for a complete reinterpretation of modern physics, when it 
was shown that the interpretation of the e :mp irica.l evidence 
1. Vlh i tehead, SMVv', x. 
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which led to the Newtonian era failed at the point of coherence 
in the larger framework of a more complete system. It will al-
ways be a question whether the work of Einstein is not more 
truly a critical philosophy (in the sense that Broad uses that 
term) than a science. 
7. _THE Q,UESTION OF METHOD 
The differences between philosophies. can be traced in 
part, to differences in methods. Likewise, a difference in 
method distinguishes science from philosophy.. Most of the 
sciences employ what is known as the method of empiricism. 
They attempt to confine themselves largely to the data of 
sensation and this characterizes the work of science as 
descriptive. Fidelity to observed fact, and a minimum of 
necessary interpretation, is the ideal most often held by 
those who are cautious lest science become metaphysical to 
any extent. 
The hypotheses secured by the empirical method are 
impressive because they are easily verified. Sensations 
can be repeated. Experiments can be subjected to group 
testing. Results can be stated in an accurate language. 
New evidence often develops in such a way that one may leap 
over many intervening stages of development, by the chance 
observation of a fact which has implications altogether 
new. The discovery of the effect of penicillin on cocci 
bacteria is a case in point. 
There is a kind of verification in the empirical 
method which carries as surance and authority.. Results are 
always more satisfying if they can be demonstrated in 
empirical situations. Scientific information is "public." 
All people :rnay examine it. There is less probability that 
several people checking the same facts are likely to permit 
errors to pass by unnoticed. 
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'I'he refinements of labor a tory techniq,ues and equipment 
have led to the extension of manrs powers of observation far 
beyond the limits set by the capacities of the sense organs 
an d the response of the nervous system. · The pr e sence of 
cosmic rays can be shown by the Geiger-Mueller counter, though 
no person is a.ble to detect such activity by means of the 
usual sense organs. The research being conducted on the nature 
of matter is confined almost exclusively to the examination 
of facts wh ich are beyond the range of the usual sense p er-
ception. 
Empiricism includes, not only sensory experiences but 
also the data of self experience. The starting point of Des-
c a rtes becomes t h e foundation fact for any philosophy which 
chooses to fo l low the p a thway of free investiga tion rather 
than authoritariani~l. The fact of self-consciousness cannot 
be overlooked. 
No doubt empi r icism has yielded much which has been 
si gnificant to p hilosophy as well as science. Philosophers 
are agreed tha t every fact is significant a.nd de mands con-
sideration. For this reason there has been g r eat dep endence 
upon empiricism as a starting point, as a basis for assurance, 
and as a means of constant verification of what has been 
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discovered. At times it has afforded insights whose 
implications have been of far-reaching importance. It stresses 
more of the existential. 
Kant •·s· insight in the _ Cr i tigue of Pure Reason led him 
to question our knowledge of _ the Dinge an sich and to bracket 
empirical data asphe~nal. At the same time he went on 
living by means of the knowledge which was termed phenomenal. 
What Kant failed to show was that one might take the empirical 
knowledge, and apply reason and move from the phenomenal to 
a discovery of the ontological. 
From a survey of modern thought, one can safely say 
that most of the thinkers of the present day are ready to 
accept the empirical method as a means of gaining much 
important evidence. In fact, there is no person who rejects 
the d a ta which empiricism yields. Most thinkers welcome 
all obtainable evidence. 
The issue which more . frequently arises is due to the 
emphasis on an exclusive use of the empirical method. This 
is often the position of naturalistic thinkers. There 
is a wholesale rejection of the method of rationalism. 
When Dewey speaks of "empirical" as "tha t ambiguous word," 
he calls attention to the fact that is ba ck of much con-
f . th• . 1 USlOn on . lS lSSUe. It is difficult to find out just 
what many of the na turalists mean by empiricism. Brightman 
1. Dewey, LOG, 9. 
has pointed out that there seems to be a confusion on the 
question of the limits of empiricism. 
Naturalists, we see, are confused about whether 
scientific method restricts us to the physical 
and s~nsoryi or allows a more adequate view of 
exper1ence. 
20 
At any rate, Krikorian has given the impression that natural-
ism is 1 imited to then basic belief in the experimental 
method. n2 It is difficult, if not impossible, to place a 
boundary between empirical and rational knowledge. Pure 
empiricism would be little more than the "givenness of 
sensation," and would be subject to Kant's criticism that 
"intuitions without conceptions are blind." 3 For purposes 
of clarification in this discussion, empiricism will mean 
the description of phenomena found on the "rudimentary level 
of experience."4 This is a substantial agreement with the 
spirit and method of phenomenology, which attempt to 
establish philosophy on the foundation of immediate ex-
perience. Phenomenology concentrates attention upon the 
direct experience, of the knowing subject. In the begin-
ning of its program it makes a temporary suspension of 
metaphysical con clusions. Objects, and existential 
judgments are placed in abeyance, leaving only the pure 
experiences of the single experiencing being. It recognizes 
1. Brightman, NAV-, 103 • 
. 2. Krikorian, NHS, 242. 
3. Kant, KrV, 62. 
4. Farber, Art. (194?), 363. 
and. employs something of the truth which Kant discovered 
of t h e i mp ortance of t h e individ ualta contribution to his 
own k nowledge. Since all facts must be known facts, 
p henomenology att empts to g et at the unvarnished and 
uninterpre ted facts and tries to accumulate evidence. 
It is es s entially a method of piling up all data available. 
It warns a gainst ma k ing interpreta tions too early in the 
investigation. The da ta of matter can all be subsumed 
under a phenomenological classification. Such a method 
g ives proper reco gnition to the epistemolog ic a l p roblems 
confronted and avoids making metaphysical conclusions too 
early in the investigation. It is the most satisfactory 
treatment of the data of science. 
Exclusive confinement to emp irical data fails to 
perform the task either of science or of philosophy. The 
whole of t h e system i s never experienced. It is inferred 
by a co mpr ehensive , synoptic interp r e tation of the da ta of 
the problem in r e lationship to t he entire framework of 
experience. Interpre tation be lo ng s to the rationalistic 
method. Pro g res s , on ly comes when it is possible to move 
into the area which has not be e n r e a ched by exp e rience and 
may neve r be reached by more than a very f a int hint of what 
lies beyon d. The assumption which lies back of such a 
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credo is tha t the universe is rational and that by reason 
those rela-tionships wh ich escape the sense realm may be 
explored. In a sense rat.ionalism is a faith in the intel-
ligibility of relations. Reason is able to follow the 
guideposts from tb~ given to the inferred. It cannot 
establish those inferences without the given, nor should it 
travel far afield without empirical verification of what it 
has accomplished. Only by a joint method of empiricism and 
rationalism can philosophy perform its task. By use of the 
findings of science it is able to go farther than science 
for its me thods allow a much more extensive explanation 
of its problems. Philosophy should not be exclusive about 
methods. Any method which contributes a clue should be 
welcomed. Zvidence must be wei ghed and v e rified by the 
support of empirical tests of ra tionalistic c oncl u sions. 
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Where tbis is not possibl e it is necessary tbat logical 
cohe rence be found. Contradiction, or lack of cohe rence is 
always evidence of incomplete or erroneous conc lus ions. The 
natura lists who stres s the importance of the scientific 
metl1 od and who look with disfavor upon the more rationalistic, 
speculative philosophy, need to beware of their attitude 
towards the rationalisitic method. The descriptive sciences 
themselves are not built on a pure empiricism. The scien-
tific method employs the r a tionalistic method along with 
the empirical, though in a more limited manner. Where to 
place the line of demarkation between the rationalism of 
the scientific method and the rationalism of the speculative 
philosophy is a q-uestion which is not easily answered. It 
is l a rgely a question of degrees. The method to use seems 
simp le enough. First are assembled all the facts which can 
be obtained. Then construction of an adequate system is 
attempted which shall include all facts w~ithin its scope 
and shall be free from contradictions. The conclusion is 
t entative and p robable, not absolute and final. It will 
always be subject to the review and correcting influence 
of any new facts which may be discovered. 
Rationalism is well expounded in the definition 
which Brightman has given reason. 
Reason is an ideal of completely coherent think-
ing and living, never fully realized, never merely 
static, yet always imperative in its claims. It 
is the supreme court of the mind. It consists of 
the following norms: Be consistent. Be systematic. 
Be inclusive. Be analytic. Be synoptic. Be active! 
Be open to alternatives. Be critical. Be decisive. 
8. SUMWLARY 
There is a unique treatment of matter by philosophy~ 
I .t is the discovery and establishment of those relations 
1 .. Bri ghtman, NAV, 106-107. 
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which reveal the place and order of matter in the entire 
system. c·onger has well stated t h e task thus: 
Pbilosophy must confront the universe and never 
abandon t ha. t confrontation, whicb is our privilege 
and offic e . No one else ca n do that work, no sci-
entist, no religious genius, no artist, no politi-
cal or economic le a der or r e former or organization • 
• • • Philosop hy has to confront the universe, not 
hide from it, or try to gloss it over, or explain 
it away, or see . it mer~ly through traditional eyes 
or try to convince ourselves and others that it 
does not matter ••• The broad task is a task not for 
specialists but for "generalists.nl 
The task of philosophy is ever adva nced through the 
limitations which epistemology imp oses. The implications 
of t h e facts cannot be avoided. Due caution must govern 
any and all pro gress. The method must be inclusive rather 
than exclusive. It will be both empirical and rational. 
It will be metaphysica l in the sense that Hall uses the 
term. 
The task of metaphysics is to generalize fur-
ther on the basis of scientifically established 
p r op o s i t i on s • 2 
The goal of philosophy is the development of a metaphysical 
system. There is merit in being able to philosophize. 
Ferro is correct in h is assertion that ''it is not phi-
losophy as such that is the big thing but the joy, the sport, 
the thrill of philosophizing," when that assertion is con-
fined to the program of the "first adventurer" in phi-~ 
l. Conger, Art. (1946), 422. 
2. Hall, Art. (194?), 181. 
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losophy, but having passed the state of the neophyte, 
philosophy becomes more serious business.l 
The reflective play of one age becomes the 
passion of another. Plato crea tes Utopias, and 
the Christian faith of Europe afterwards gives 
them meaning. Contemplation gives birth to 
futur.e · conduct, and 80 the philo sop her al 80 2 becomes, in his own f ·ashion, a world builder. 
The· truth of these words is impressed daily in the con-
flict which is increasing between those who have declared 
their faith to be d ialectical materialism, and those who 
affirm alleg iance to the democratic way of life. Civili-
za tions live and die b ecause of the philosophies t hey 
follow. 
1. Ferm, FAP, v1~. 
2. Royce, SMP, 12. 
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CHAPTER II 
T}ffi TASK OF DEFINITION 
1. THE RELATIVE NATURE OF DEFINITIONS 
Definitions vary ac·cording to the nature of the thing 
being defined. The subject of the definition is termed 
the £efiniendum. That which is p redicated about the 
subject is termed the definiens. If the definiendum is a 
word wh ose meanin g is to be esta blished in a more or less 
a rbitra ry way, the definiens is determined by the selection 
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of certain words which a re esta bli shed as meeting the require-
ments of a predicate. If the definition is what a good defini-
tion of this kind ought to be it should be pos s ible to con-
vert t h e t e rms of t h e definition without chang ing t h e meaning. 
A definition of this kind is different from a p ro p osition in 
logic. It resembles more the nature of an equation. Both 
sides of t h e si gn of equality have t h e same mea nin g. A 
definition mi ght be called an e quation in which, by use of 
s~nbols an attemp t is made to exp re s s the same idea in t wo 
diff e r e nt vvays. 
A definition of a word may be spe cifie d by t h e p erson 
who has coined the word as h a ving a certain meaning v/hicb he 
stip ul a tes. In t ha t case the task of definition is a p roblem 
of clear t b in k ing on t h e p art of the p erson who has a ttempted 
to establisb a definite mea ning for a term. The symbols 
which h e emp loys in the definiens will all be terms 
which are known to those with whom he is s p eaking. Insofar as 
the persons who are receiving the definition are not aware 
of the nature of the idea lying back of the definiendum it 
27 
is the responsibility of the one doing the defining to select 
a complete catalogue of terms which when related to one another 
give a unified concept which is the equivalent of the idea 
in his mind . In such a case of definition, the p roblem is 
essentially the task of finding terms which express adequately 
what one has in mind . Such a problem is a very private matter. 
One never knows h ow true the equat i on may be unless he is the 
person doing the defining, and e ven then it might be very 
difficult to insure complete success. Obscure thinke rs some-
times complain that they are misunderstood. TheY probably 
are, but the difficulty may be a failure to employ a language 
which expres ses the full sense of what t h ey are thinking . It may 
be a failure to employ a ll the language symbols necessary . 
Many brilliant scholars make poor teachers for t h ey forget to 
make clear distinctions of many of their a ssumptions and 
intermediate processes whereby t h ey derive their conclusions. 
These may be a part of the original idea but if t h e y have 
not been clearly stated the people hearing the definition 
may have little or no means of detecting them. 
A different kind of problem is posed in the search 
for the meaning of a term wh~ch has wide usage . If it is a 
term such as "courtesy," the task becomes one of finding the 
most widely accepted meanings which are associated with 
the term. These will vary amon g different societies, and even 
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a mong people of the same social groups. Such terms will 
prove to be relativisms at many points though it may be 
possible to lift some g e neral concepts from all the diff.e rent 
situations where it is thought that courtesy is present. 
Def initions also are rel a tive to the meanings and 
i nterp retation s which individuals g ive to the various symbols 
employed. The \V i de variations in experience, and kn owledge, 
make some terms mo re s ignifica nt t han others. To hel p eliminate 
s ome of these subjective factors a lan guag e closer to that 
of ma thematics bas been developed. \vhile there can be no 
que st io n t h at such va riat ions exist, they are not too seri ous. 
Co herent results come fro m most situations where there is 
eno u gh agreement in the use of t erms to mee t t he demands of 
social i n t era ction . In tho s e situations where there i s serious 
lack of agreement the test of coherence easily demonstrates 
whether there is need for clarification of terms. 
A definition of the kind attempted in this paper pre-
sents still another k ind of problem. In this cas e a very 
common t e rm; "matter" is being def ined. Ev ery on e uses this 
term a nd there is a se n se in which it carries a very definite 
mean i ng to the persons usin g it. The que stion arises whether 
the meaning i n peop le's minds is a true r epresenta tion of the 
nature of matte r. In this case, a definition is an attempt 
to discover more meaning than has usually been reco g nized on 
the part of th os e using the term. The difference between the 
t wo views is like the differ ence between the averag e 
layman's view of wha t a human bo dy is and the ide as that 
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a me d ic a l specialist has of the sam e bod y . The definition or 
meaning which is most a ccura te will b e the one whi ch includes 
the g reatest number of releva nt facts . The task of the def - . 
in i tion of matter ends up in a very co mplex and diff i cult 
investi gat ion of all that sc i ence and ph i losophy can con-
tri bu t e. It becomes a quest for t he truth about what is 
b eing defi n ed. It is the truth whi ch co mes fro m a cohere nt 
ac count of all the eviden ce, s cience and philosophy can di s-
cover . 
The question of definition is a l ways determined in re-
l at ion to t he nature of both t h e definiendum and the definiens. 
Where the def iniendum relates to some obje c t in nature the 
p ro bl em will be set by the char a cter of what is b e in g inves-
ti ga ted and may requ ire extens ive sc ientiftc study followed 
by phil o sophi cal interpre t a tions . The re s ults will also be 
conditioned by epistemological considerations . It is a 
pr oblem to comp ile the da ta to be used . It furthe r is a 
p roblem to say just wh& t language symbols most f ai thfully 
r epresent the findings of science, and even more d i ff icult 
is it to determine what symbols shall b e emp loyed to set 
forth the me tap hysical interp retati on which a ph i l oso ph ical 
investi ga tion require s. In every instance, it is evident 
that the use of word symbo 1 s becomes a question of cl10ice 
which determines to a great ext e nt t h e su ccess or failure 
of the ve nture. 
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2. DEFINITION OF MAT'J'gR, A ME TAPB"YSICAL :PROBLEM 
The definition of matter which is here attempted is 
an effort to tell what is the true nature of matter. Some 
migh t call it an effort to tell what is the essence of matter. 
In final form the p roblem becomes one of telling just what 
science has · found out about matter and then attempting to 
relat e this to t he entire cosmic scheme of things. 
There is serious objection to such a project according 
to the log ical empiricists. They speak of any attempt at 
metaphysical interpre tation as James phrased it "tender minded,n 
or lacking in those 11maturer way s of thinking.nl Mature think-
ing for then means "avoiding both the reductive fa l lacies of 
a narrowminded positivism--stigmatized as uegativism--as 
well as, the sed.!:!.£tive fallacies of metaphysics. n2 For them 
the t a sk seems to be conceived as one of description of the 
findings of science in a languag e which is free from any 
"emotive expression and appeal function."3 Their contributions 
to symbolic logic and their program of logical analysis of 
the var ious terms which are of the greatest importance in the 
representation of knowledge has been a stimulating and critical 
factor, important to any kind of a philosophy. 
The clarification of terminology and the elimination 
of terms which seem to carry more meanings (or emotions) than 
1. J:t,eig·l, _ Art. {194?), 3?6. 
2. Ibid., 3?5. 
3. Ibid., 3?9. 
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they are suppos ed to convey is a work which is always impor-
tant. Any teacher of philosophy knows tha t to ask a student 
a. question about the na ture of t h e universe is to employ a term 
that assumes a fundamental moni sm ab out the cosmos. To speak 
of £Urpose as a de scription of cer tain elements observed in 
nature may be introducing a per s ona l idealism by the ve ry term 
whi ch was intended to describe certain relations which appear 
to the observer. To solve metaphysical probl em s by surrepti-
tiously introducing in.to the . terms e mp loyed the v e ry conclu-
s ions that later appe a r is an unph ilosopbical kind of metaphysics. 
But to aba ndon all metaphys ics because some instances of bad 
metaphysics have been found is also v e ry illo g ical. 
The chief objection to metaphysics by the log ical em-
piricists s ee ms to be their fear of using another method of 
investigat ion t han the one employed by science. The so-called 
sci en tific meth od an d the empi ric a l method are in g reat need 
of cl a rifica tion.l In certain scientific problems such as 
cosmolo g ical investi gations (e~g. how the galactic system 
c am e i n to being) the methods e mp loyed a re very much t h e same 
as thos e employed by the metaphysician. The same criticisms 
whi ch have been leveled a ga inst metap hysics could be leveled 
against these scientists and mathematicians. vVhat they have 
1. Karl Pearson in GS, 37, gives a definition of scientific 
method which supports the views advanced in this dissertation. 
32 
done is essentially to follow an inductive approach in which 
an hypothesis has been formulated on the basis of broad and 
careful comp ilation of all perti n~nt facts. The wo rk of the 
atomic research sci entists who built the atom bomb is another 
instance of the same methodology. Their entire program was 
ba sed on an hypothesis which was carefully con s tructed from 
those many facts which scientists had found either in laboratory 
or by theoretica l and speculat ive explanations, many of whi ch 
dealt with a minimum of lab oratory demonstrations because 
the objects of study .,.,..,ere sub-microscopic in chara cter •. 
If the objections of the lo g ical positivists are 
given too much consideration it would almost appear that 
their program would doom the more speculative and creative 
phase of science as well as philo sop by. The metaphysic ian 
make s no grea ter claim of perfection in his work tha n does 
the scie n ti s t. Both hold their hypotheses as tenta tive and 
subject to continual revision. Any appeal to cohe r en ce as 
a criterion should leave sufficient provision for elimination 
of wha tever hypotheses cannot stand the test of a cohere nce 
which is both logical and empirical in the fulles t sense of 
the word. The tendency towards exclusive empiricism is the 
danger in logical positivism which science as. well as philosophy 
must avoid. Empirical evidence has generally been accepted 
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by scientists as proof of the reliability of the more ration-
alistic and speculative methods. The empirical evidence which 
came from t h e e xplosion of the first atomic bomb was justi-
fic a.tion for the more specula tive hypotheses which made the 
bomb p ossible. An exclu s ive empiricism is almo st as bad as 
no empiricism at all. If log ica l positivists would quit 
making objections to metaphysics and confine thems elves to 
the mor e con structive con tributions wh ich the movement has 
to offer they would be more co h er en t in what they teach. It · 
i s doubtful if there is valid emp irical support' for their 
11 rejection of metaphysics." 
3. MATTER IS A CO NCEPT 
The ide a s a s s ocia ted with t h e word matter are all 
concepts of the mi n d. They are the results of the vari ous 
sensory experiences which first c ame to a tten tion as p er-
cep ts. Ev en a percept is an adva nce over the stage which 
marks the awareness of sense qua lia. There has been an 
integration of qualities, a focus of past experience in 
relation to present experience, and a projection of externality 
and "thinghood," which mak es the referent of the p ercept 
c ap a ble of existing without dependence on the on e perceiving 
it. Th is act of perceiving takes place on a quasi-instinctive 
level of mental activity. It is so swiftly accomplished that 
it seems i mme d i a te but this is alwa ys rel a tive to past ex-
perience. Where t h e percipient ha s been highly skilled in a 
particular fi~ld the percepts will be more hi~1 ly differen-
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tiated and clear. They will have something of that quality 
which Descartes described as »presented ••• clea rly and distinct-
ly.nl 
The level of c on ceptual think in g involves a stage of 
thinking in which the memories of past percepts along with 
whatever present percepts may be included, are synth esized 
with whatever categories the mind may contribute to the 
production of the concept. The concept of matter is an end 
product of a number of mental processes which by the unique 
"transcendental unity of apperception" as Kant calls it, has 
finally given a concept which has the status of a v1ell con-
structed hypothesis. 2 
The chief dangers in such a process is that perceptions 
may be 1 imi ted, a.nd erroneous due in part to sense qual ia 
being limited or misleading and memory faulty. All concepts 
are dep endent upon the richness of experience which contri-
butes to the deve lopment of the concept. For that very reason 
there is a place of great importance for both the scientist 
and t he philosopher in the work of defining matter. The former 
is able to supply the more significant p a rticulars, and to de-
velop concepts based on mo r e accurate observation. The phi-
losopher is able to rel a te the results of scientific efforts in 
respect to the larger units which bring together all ex-
perience into a synoptic order. Science also confines itself 
to wha t is empirical or at least empirically verifiable. 
1. Descartes, DM,. 19. 
2. Kant, KrV, 94. 
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Philosophy is interested in what is empirical as well as what 
transcends the empirical.. It is concerned about empirical 
verification as far as it can go but it recognizes that in a 
trancendenta l area, verification will have to be an appeal 
to log ic. The overall test will be coherence .. 
4 .. vVHY A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITION OF MATTER? 
The chief reason for a philosophical definition of 
matter rather than a scientific is that philosop hy includes 
everything tha t science has to offer and then contribute s an 
additional interpretation which t h e limits of scientific 
method prevent the scientist from doing. Science is not inter-
. ested in first causes, or how what is, came into being. It 
confines itself to description and empirical verific a tion of 
what it has developed. It looks at the individual stones in 
the mosaic but it doesn't see their relations to the picture 
which the mosaic intends. 
Philosophy has always been critical of assumptions 
in a way tha t science has not been critic·al. Today this is 
chan g i ng . The newer "philosophy of science" points to the 
awakened awareness of both scientists and philosophers to 
the importance of this task •. 
It might be well to remember that some of the earliest 
advances in solving this problem of matter, were .made by _ 
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philosophers rather than scientists. It was many years 
before improvements came to tlle atomic theory of Democritus. 
The gre ? ter freedom which the philosopher exercises by the 
scope of his methodology may make possible more significant 
advances than the limitations of empirical method as followed 
by the scientists. 
It is also possible that the philosopher may discover 
important evidence, empirically verifiable, that t he scientist 
seems to overlook. There is a very significant b i t of evidence 
which the scientists have continually neglected in their 
study of matter, They should have found it, but for some 
reason it has been given little or no attention. Reference 
is rr~de to the important place that form has in the structure 
of the particles such as the electron, proton, and neutron. 
When scientists stress only the energy that is in matter they 
ove rlook the fact that this energy is always found in some 
definite, characte ristic orga nization. This is further 
demonstrated by t h e way in which the particles are observed 
to a ct. Were this form absent it would be imposs i ble to 
describe the various cha racteri st ics by which the particles 
are identified. Philosophy calls attention to form and 
structure and organization. 
The definition of matter is far more importa nt to phi-
losophy than to science. ~hen philosophers consider this 
subject the outcome has great bearing upon, religion, morality 
and even world history. Variations in the scientific evidence 
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of mat t er have little effect on these wider interes ts of men. 
Any pb.i losop hy that develops a metaphysics 'Wh ich includes all 
data, must have an e xplanat ion for matter. It forms so large 
a bulk of experience that a philosophy that has no an swer 
to it is virtually useless. The aim of philosophy is synoptic. 
The way a p erson defines matter may affect his entire meta-
phys ics. This is especially true where matter is defined as 
eternal, an d uncrea ted, and hence becomes the beginning of all 
things if the system is monistic. On the other hand it may 
n o t have thB same significance in an idealistic philosophy, 
but it will sooner or l a ter affect the entire scope of one's 
metaphys ics. The definition of mat ter whi ch Profess or 
Brightman follo ws is very likely a signifi,cant factor in his 
development of the concept of a finite God to solve the 
p ro b lem of natura l evils.l Bowne's concept of 1~~ 
is closely allied to the way he def ine s matter. 2 Hartshorne 
finds the realm of matter th a t of a g r oup of psychic entities.3 
Philosophy is able to answer a great many more questions 
about matter than is science. This is due to t h e me thodology 
of philosophy which is able to make progress when empirica l evi-
dence of the k ind supplied by sensory experience can go no 
f ar ther. Philosophy can penetrate the unknown and the un-
explored by way of inferential developments which a sound 
lo g ic permits. Such a method is always emp irically grounded 
1. Bri ghtma n, PR, Chap ters IX and X. 
2. Bowne, IG, 17. 
3. Hartshorne, BH, 178 .. 
but not confined to an exclusive empiricism. ¥fuere science 
s t ops, phi losophy moves forward and continues the investi ga tion. 
The c r itical function of philosophy demands that a 
term wh ich is so important in some of the metaphysical systems 
such as ma teria lism, naturalism, and dialectical materialism, 
shall b e car efully examined. It becomes necessary to inquire 
of these particular systems what definitions they hbld for 
s uch a fundrtmenta l t e r m. In some instances there may be 
reason to wonder whe ther the meaning attributed to tbe term 
h as been packed full of a conten t that science and philosop hy 
does not justify. 
It is likewise importa nt that those philosophies whi ch 
lean mor e toward s the idealistic p latfO:.r m shall reexamine their 
denial of the fundamenta l nature of matter, and explain h ow 
ma tter c ame into existence, how it is maintained, and whither 
it is tend ing. 
5. REAL DEFINITIONS 
.The kind of p roject proposed in this study is what 
is so me times cl a ssified as a "rea l definition." Robinson 
co nclud es that the so-called r eal definitions s h ould not be 
c a lled defin itions. He says tha t ''sea rching for essences, rt 
"searching for c a use, 11 or "improving one's concep ts," are 
activities which lead to a confusion in the notion of 
definition.l He proposes to limit the meaning of definition 
1. Robinson, DEF, 189-190. 
so that we always mean: 
a process either· of equating two symbols 6r of 
reporting or p roposing a mean i ng a symbol; 
and tha.t we · never use 'definition' as a name 
for a p r ocess that is n ot a bout symbols, because 
in t ha, t use it is ambiguous and should be replaced 
b y more sp ecific terms.l 
There is merit to this suggestion if one wishes t o restrict 
t h e meani ng of definition to more n ominal limits. There is 
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no reason for con fusion if one is aware of the sense in which 
definition is used in this study. Very clearly, this is a 
sea rch for the essence of matter. I .t is an attempt to follow 
out the suggestion that "'the function of definitions is to 
define the real (what it is, how we are rela ted to it, or 
act on itl and that definitions are hypotheses subject to 
further inquir y. tt2 
------·---
I. Robinson, · DEF, 191. 
2. Brightman, Art. (1946), 366. 
CHAPTER III 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES RELATIVE TO MATTER AND 
SUBSEQUENT DEDUCTIONS THEREFROM 
1. INTERPRETATIONS OF MATTER AT THE BEGINNING 
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
i • THE ELEMENTS 
What did the scientist think about the nature of mat-
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ter at the beginning of the nineteenth century? Certain chem-
ical elements were known • . Their combinations in compounds 
had been understood for some time. 1 The efforts of the alche-
mists of several centuries earlier had been abandoned so far as 
attempting to change any of the elements. It was believed 
that matter could not be created or destroyed. 2 The simplest 
forms of matter were the elements. In Dalton's list of atomic 
weights, twenty elements were found. 3 It appeared that matter 
was present in as many different forms as there were elements. 
The problem of matter seemed to have been solved in the expla-
nations then given of the elements. 
ii. THE ATOMIC THEORY 
Matter in the form of elements, was still a problem for 
men as the size of an atom of an element was evidently ex-
tremely small. Just how small, and what its nature was, could 
1. Venable, SHC, 82. 
2. Venable, SHC, 78. 
3. Dampier, HS, 230. 
not be determined by their experiments. However, Dalton con-
eluded that the properties of gases could best be explained by 
atoms, thus going back to a theory as old as the one propounded 
by Leucippus of Abdera in the fifth century B. c. 1 He further 
pointed out that the combining weights of gases would give the 
relative weights of the atoms of which the gases were com-
posed. His list of atomic weights was the first to be com-
piled.2 It gave impetus to the investigations which resulted 
in the formulation of the atomic weights for all known elements. 
This discovery was a partial attainment of the ideal of Pythag-
orean thinkers. Each element was expressed in terms of a num-
ber relationship or atomic weight. The work of Moseley in 1913 
further extended this ideal, so that each element was given an 
atomic number as well as an atomic weight, thus achieving the 
Pythagorean ideal. 3 
iii. THE PERIODIC TABLE 
In 1869 Lothar Meyer ~nd the Russian chemist Mendel,eff 
demonstrated the connection between the atomic weights and 
their physical properties. Mendel6eff made a list of the known 
elements according to their atomic weights and found that a 
certain periodicity was observable. 4 Every eighth element had 
somewhat similar properties. All elements were fitted into a 
1. Krauskopf, FPS, 168. 
2. Krauskopf, rPs, 167. 
3. Venable, SHC, 143. 
4. Pauling, CC, 60. 
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complete table in which the similar ones were listed in the 
same column. In this way it was shown that certain gaps 
in the list, indicated undiscovered elements and by their 
place in the table it was possible to predict their wei g hts 
and some of their properties. Subsequent discoveries proved 
the truth of this hypothesis. 
iv. ELECTRO-CHEMISTRY 
The experiments of Michael Faraday (1791-1867) in pass-
ing an electrical current through salt solutions brought to a 
climax the studies of earlier scientists. He showed that the 
mass of the substance liberated from the solution was direct-
ly proportional to the strength of the electrical current and 
the time it was flowing. 1 He also showed that the mass of the 
substance liberated by a certain amount of electricity is pro-
portional to the chemical equivalent weight of the substance. 
This is not the atomic wei ght, but the combining weight, that 
is, the atomic weight divided by the valency. In the case of 
water, when one gram of hydrogen is liberated, eight grams of 
oxyg en appear. (Atomic weight of oxygen sixteen, divided by a 
valence of t wo.) 
Faraday's work was important because it supported the 
atomic theory, and also showed that electricity is divided 
into definite elementary portions. Dampier says of Faraday, 
1. Pauling , CC, 303. 
Thus, not only do Faraday's experiments under-
lie the later development in theoretical and ap-
plied electro-chemistry, but the ideas which he 
formulated are the basis on which has been built 
the whole great structure of modern atomic and 
electronic science.l 
v. X-RAYS 
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The discovery of X-rays by R8ntgen in 1895 was an event 
of very g reat importance. These rays were able to pass through 
matter. When they were passed through a gas, they made it a 
conductor of electricity.2 A subsequent effect of the discovery 
was an interest in radioactive bodies. Henri Becquerel in 
1896 found that salts of uranium and uranium itself gave off 
rays which affect photographic plates even when covered with 
black paper and other screens. 3 A resemblance to X-rays was 
noted in the power of these rays to make gases conductors of 
electricity. 
vi. THE DISCOVERY OF THE ELECTRON 
Another far reaching discovery of the late nineteenth 
century was the electron. J. J. Thomson, an English scientist, 
in 1897 per f ected experiments which had been carried on for 
several years. By means of cathode rays it had been possible 
to cause X-rays by projecting the cathode rays upon some ob-
ject. These cathode rays were found to be negatively electri-
fied particles. 4 They were deflected from their paths by a 
magnetic force. The assumption was made that the rays were 
l. Dampier, HS, 236. 
2. Krauskopf, FPS, 272. 
3. Stranathan, PMP, 315. 
4. Stranathan, PMP, 47. 
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particles in motion and that the deflection would be proportion-
al to the strength of the electrical charge and inversely to 
the mass of a single particle or ~m where ~ is the charge 
and~ is the mass. The velocity~ also would determine the 
deflection. Thomson succeeded in devising experiments to 
measure these two factors. The experiments showed that 
while velocity might vary, the same results are always obtained 
for ~m.l Assuming that one of these cathode ray particles 
has the same charge as that on the hydrogen ion, its mass is 
1/1836 of the mass of the hydrogen atom. 2 His conclusions 
with respect to the nature of the atom are of historic inter-
est. 
I regard the atom as containing a large number 
of smaller bodies which I will call corpuscles; 
these corpuscles (electrons) are equal to each 
other; the mass of a corpuscle is the mass of the 
negative ion in a gas at low pressure •.• In the 
normal atom, this assemblage of corpuscles forms 
a system which is electrically neutral. Though 
the individual corpuscles behave like negative 
ions, yet when they are assembled in a neutral 
atom the negative effect is balanced by some-
thing which causes the space through which the 
corpuscles are spread to act as if it had the 
charg e of positive electricity equal in amount 
to the sum of the negative charges on the cor-
puscles ••• on this view, electrification essen-
tiall y involves the splitting up of the atom, a 
part of the mass of the atom getting free and 
becoming detached from the original atom.3 
vii. ALPHA, BETA , AND GAMMA RAYS 
The last great discovery of the nineteenth century was 
the work of Rutherford in 1899. 4 He found two distinct kinds 
1. Dampier, HS, 386. 
2. Pauling, CC, 71. 
3. Thomson, Art.(l899), 565. 
4. Dampier, HS, 393. 
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of rays in the emanations from uranium. These were called al-
pha and beta rays. Later, gamma rays were also found. · 
Soddy and Curie also had a part in these studies.l Beta 
rays were found to be electrons traveling at great speeds. 
Gamm a rays appeared to be like light and X-rays. Alpha rays 
proved to be particles with a mass four times that of the 
hydrogen atom. They carry an electric charge which is 
positive, and two times as great as the negative charge of 
t he electron. They travel at great speeds, some as fast 
as a fifteenth of the speed of light. In time, they are 
neutralized by uniting with two electrons. Then they become 
ordinary helium atoms. 
viii. SUMMARY 
By the end of t he nineteenth century an accumulated 
impetus had been given to the study of the nature of matter. 2 
Discoveries had been made which were to prove fruitful in 
sug gesting new types of research. The atomic theory wa s 
accepted. The electron had been discovered and supplied 
with values for its mass and charge. The relationships of 
the elements to one another has been shown in the atomic 
wei g hts and the periodic table. The kinship of matter to 
electricity was suggested by electrolysis, and the action 
of gases in conducting electricity when charged by X-rays. 
1. Stranathan, PMP, 315. 
2. See summary statement of Born covering the last fifty 
years. Art. (1950). 
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Newtonian mechanics stili ruled the thinking of the scientific 
world. The most si gnificant thing about the scientific achieve-
ments of this p eriod is the way in which great progress 
suddenly burst forth in the last few years of the century. 
The histori an of science marks t he modern era from the dis-
covery of X-ra ys in 1895 and the evidence justifies the 
division. At the beg inning of the twentieth century, 
physicists were still far from being able to tell what matter 
is, but they were bequeathed numerous clues and some well 
demonstrated evidence. 
2. THE DISCOVERI ES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
i. RADIUM 
The discovery of the element radium in 1900 by M. and 
Mme. Curie not only added to the list of the elements but 
gave opp ortunity for the study of radio-activity. From the 
study of r a di um it was at last proved that the elements are 
c han g e a ble r a ther than in a fixed state in nature. The 
emana tions of radium constitute a process of chan ge in which 
the element helium is be.ing given off in the alpha particles, 
and the radium is slowly changing from radium to lead. 1 
ii. HEAT FROM RADIUM COMPOUNDS 
Radium compounds are continually giving off heat. This 
was announced by Curie and Laborde in 1903. They calculated 
1. Krauskopf, EPS, 278. 
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that one gram of radium would give off about 100 gramme-calories 
of heat per hour. 1 Later experiments showed this figure to 
be 135 calories per hour. The amount of energy given off by 
radium was so much greater than that given off by the most 
violent chemical reaction that attention was directed to the 
problem. Rutherford and Soddy in 1903 explained it as due 
to the explosive disintegration of the elementary atoms. 2 
iii. ATOMS OBSERVED 
Physicists since the announcement of the atomic theory 
by Dalton had been attempting to find some way to observe these 
tiny atoms. For a hundred years after Dalton no one could 
point to any demonstration of the existence of single atoms. 
All experiments had dealt with large numbers of atoms. Crookes, 
by means of a magnifying lens observed scintillations on a 
fluorescent screen of zinc sulphide exposed to a speck of ra-
dium bromide. 3 Alpha particles were now traced in these scin-
tillations. For the first time, atoms were observed. Later 
methods have further validated the atomic theory by continu~d 
observation of individual atoms. 
iv •. ATOMIC NUMBERS 
Atomic numbers were discovered by the young English 
1. Dampier, HS:, 395. 
2. Dampier, HS, 396. 
3. Dampier, HS, 397. 
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scientist H. G. J. Moseley in 1913. 1 His experiments consisted 
of bombardments of certain elements by cathode rays and then 
studying the spectrum of the resultant X-rays. This study 
showed that the frequency of vibration of the characteristic 
lines of the spectrum undergoes a simple change from atom to 
atom. These changes are reflected in the ratios found in 
the scale of atomic numbers. Thus is demonstrated that the 
elements group themselves again in the same order as found 
in the atomic weights and in the periodic table. 
v. ISOTOPES 
A glance at the atomic weights of the elements shows 
that many have fractional weights, as neon 20.2 and chlorine 
with 35.46. J. J. Thomson and F. W. Aston made a study of the 
elements from obsefvation of mass spectra. 2 It was possible 
in this study to observe the correlation of the atomic weights 
with the lines in the mass spectra. When Thomson studied neon 
in this manner he found two lines which showed weights of 20 
and 22. This suggested that neon was composed of two separate 
elements having different weights but having the same chemical 
properties. They were called isotopes. Aston showed later 
that Thomson was correct and that chlorine which had an atomic 
wei g ht of 35.46 was really a mixture of two chlorines, one 
1. Pauling, CC, 60. 
2. Stranathan, PMP, 162. 
having atomic weight of 35 and the other 37. Further study 
of isotopes had shown there were many more. The number now 
exceeds a t housand. They have also found isobares or atoms 
having the s a me a tomic weights but different atomic numbers 
and chemica l pro perties. 1 A heavy isotope of hydrogen is 
known as deuterium. If the hydrogen in water is of this 
i s otope it is known as heavy water, a product about eleven 
p ercent denser than ordinary water. 2 
vi. THE NUCLEUS OF THE ATOM 
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The discovery of the nucleus of the atom took place in 
two ways. The first evidence for it was the behavior of the 
rays of radioactive substances. Rutherford found the alpha 
particles now and then being deflected. This can be sho wn on 
photog raphic plates. Of this beha vior Darwin says: 
Now we know that the atoms of solids are pack-
ed very close together, so that there is no room 
between them, and it follows that the alpha par-
ticl es must go right throug h the atoms themselves 
••• But every now and then an alpha particle is 
g iven a l a r g e deflection by an atom, and t his 
can onl y be exp la i ned dynamically by s upposing 
th e ato m to contain a nucleus of small si z e which 
ca rries p r actically the whole mass of the atom.3 
The second basis for assuming the nucleus is suggested 
by t be atomic numbers of Moseley. The atomic number measures 
t he electric charge of the atom in multiples of the charge of 
t he hydro gen nucleus. This would mean that an element of 
1. Kingzett, CE, 401. 
2~ Pauling , CC, 336. 
3. Darwin, NCM, 17. 
atomic number seventeen would have an electrical charge of 
seventeen on the nucleus. The charge would be positive in 
character. Since the atomic weights of all the stems are 
nearly exact multiples of the weight of the hydrogen atom, 
"it seems reasonable to conclude that the nucleus is built 
up out of hydrogen nuclei and electrons. 111 The hydrogen 
nucleus is b1own as the proton and carries one positive 
electrica l charg e. The mass of each atom is chiefly due to 
this nucleus. This was supposed at first to be the result 
of the number of protons combined in some instances with 
electrons. 
vii. CONTROLLED ATOMIC CHANGE 
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One of the noteworthy discoveries of Rutherford in 1919 
was the production of atomic change in the nitrogen atom. 
This was accomplished by bombarding nitrogen with alpha rays. 
Fa st moving hydrog en protons were emitted. Thus, for the 
first time the scientist was able to control the transformation 
of an element.2 Later experiments were performed with similar 
results with all the elements from boron to potassium. 
viii. DISCOVERY OF NEUTRONS 
Following the s ume experimental objectives as those 
of Rutherford, Bothe bombarded beryllium and discovered some 
new rays. They were more penetrating than the gamma rays of 
1. Darwin, NCM, 20. 
2. de Brog lie, ML, 32. 
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radium. Chadwick experimented with them further in 1932 and 
found them to be uncharged particles about equal to the mass 
of hydrogen atoms. 1 He named them neutrons. Neutrons are not 
found in nature under ordinary conditions. They are hi g hly 
reactive and attach themselves to other atoms almost at once. 
They do not require hi g h temp e ra tures to react with the elements. 
The development of the atom bomb was dependent upon the dis-
covery of how to produce neutrons in large quantities. By 
t heir means atomic reactions were accomplished without the 
great heat which previously was thought necessary. At least 
one half of the mass of each atomic nucleus is due to its 
neutron content with the lone exception of one of the isotopes 
of hydrogen. 
ix. DUAL NATURE OF ELECTRONS 
The nature of the electron was further described in 
1923 when Davisson and Kinsman demonstrated that electrons 
have the double aspect of particles and waves. The difficulty 
of reconciling these two facts has caused much speculation by 
physicists. 2 Electrons show diffraction and thus support the 
wave theory. They also produce scintillations when projected 
on a powdered sheet of glass covered with powdered zinc sulphide 
crystals, thus supporting the particle theory. Further 
consideration of this will be made in the discussion of the 
q~antum theory. 
1. Stranathan, PMP, 386-402. 
2. de Broglie, ML, 165-179. 
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x .• COSMIC RAYS 
The study of cosmic rays by Anderson and Mi llikan and 
oth ers has reve a led that there are vast quantities of radia-
tion coming to the earth from far out in space. Measurement 
of t he voltage of the s e rays reveals astonishing fi gures, of 
up to five billion volts. The smallness of the rays prevents 
them from harming the human body. They are found everywhere, 
on h i g h mountains, in the stratosphere, and even at the bottom 
of lakes. They are known to leave a string of charged particles 
in the air through which they pass, thus making the air a con-
ductor of electricity. It is also thought that they occasion-
ally strike an atom and cause it to disintegrate. 1 
x.i. POSITRON AND MESOTRON 
The positron was discovered by Carl Anderson in 1932. 
It is described as a particle having the s a me mass as the 
ne ga tive electron, but charged positively. 2 In 1938 
An d ers on an d Neddermeyer established the existence of what 
t he y termed mesotrons. These were highly penetrating par-
ticles having ma sses which are intermediate between electrons 
and p rotons. Measured by compar i son with the mass of the 
electron the me s otron is about 200 times as great. 3 
xii. THE FISSION PROCESS 
Most scientists previous to 1939 were of the opinion 
1. Rusk, AMS, 253. 
2. Stranathan, PMP, 368. 
3. Dampier, SHS, 155. 
that methods to achieve the release of nuclear energy would 
be discovered in the distant future. It should be called 
nuclear energy, not atomic energy for the "changes that 
take place in atomic processes affect the nucleus of the 
atom." 1 This was all changed by two German scientists, Hahn 
and Strassman who discovered in 1939 an atomic reaction which 
resulted in the production of neutrons. It required neutrons 
to bring about this reaction but it was also a producer of 
neutrons. This discovery is called the "fission process," 
because it involves the splitting of a heavy atom into two 
nearly equal parts. 
The application of such a process to the release of 
nuclear energy may be illustrated as the result of applying a 
neutron to a lump of Uranium-235. The neutron is absorbed, 
a uranium atom is split and several neutrons are given off 
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in the process. Some of these in turn are united with more 
U-235 atoms and still more neutrons are given off. The process 
continues till in the thirtieth generation billions of neutrons 
are given off. As long as U-235 atoms remain this process 
will continue. The minute fragments which break down in the 
U-235 have velocities which "correspond to about a trillion 
degrees temperature, and the energy generated when a pound 
of U-235 has undergone fission is sufficient to raise the 
temperature on an air sphere of more than a half mile in 
1. Wigner in OWON, Masters (ed.), 13. 
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diameter to the boiling point of water."l The entire time 
for such a process to go through all the generations involved 
is only a millionth of a second. 
xiii. PLUTONIUM 
Among the discoveries made public as a result of the 
atomic research of the government during the recent war, is 
that of a method for making large quantities of a new element 
named plutonium. It is the result of the reaction produced 
by the addition of a neutron to U-238. The new product plu-
ton ium is Pu-239 and is valuable for use in the atom bomb when 
fission must take p lace. This was the first time in the his-
tory of man that it was possible to produce an element in 
large quantiti es. The power which results from the fission 
process is equiva lent to 1,400 tons of coal or 900 tons of 
g a soline for each pound of the substance.2 
xiv. GENERAL AND SPECIAL RELATIVITY THEORY 
The study of light which revealed its wave character 
led to the formulation of the theory of ether. It was neces-
sary to explain how light could pass through space and behave 
as a wave. The theory of ether explained this and was formu-
lated to account for the passage of extremely swift rays of 
light. 3 The main difficulty in this theory was the fact that 
1. Wi gner, OWON, 14. 
2. See official report. Smyth, AE, 130-153. 
3. d'Abro, EST, 116-124. 
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the earth seemed to move through the ether without any 
noticeable resistance. 
Subsequent studies revealed that light vibrations are 
transverse and no fluid can carry transverse vibrations. An 
attempt was made to formulate a theory of ether which made 
it an "elastic solid" with properties which made it a satis-
factory mechanical explanation of the problem, taking into 
consideration what was then known about light. 
Later studies of Maxwell led to a theory of an ether 
that would account for his discovery of the similarity of 
the velocity of light waves and of electromagnetic waves. 
This t heory ga ve an ether which was capable of carrying 
both li ght and electromagnetic waves which are the same in 
kind though differing in wave length. The work of Maxwell 
first placed before the world the problem of the relationship 
of electromagnetic waves and li ght waves. 1 Any theory of 
ether which failed to account for both types of waves would 
not be adequate. 
Michelson and Morley in 1887 attempted to make a study 
of the effect of the ether on the movement of light. They 
reasoned that light would travel faster if it passed through 
the stream of the ether drift than when it traveled against 
the stream. Their experiment consisted in splitting a beam of 
li ght by means of a half silvered mirror and directing the 
two separate beams so that they would be brought back to a 
1. d' Ab ro, EST, 126-131. 
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single opening. One beam was made to travel in a direction 
perpendicular to tbe motion of the app a r a tus through the 
ether and the other beam parallel. The times required for 
the two paths were so very little different that the conclusion 
made was that "whether the light moving in the same direction 
as the earth, or in the opposite direction, is of no moment; 
tbe velocity of the light, measured in relation to the earth 
is i n va riable." 1 Michelson's experiments proved that the 
ea rth's rot a tionary motion produced no ether drag.2 
Fitzgerald and Lorentz attempted to explain the re-
sults of t he experiment by supposing that all bodies moving 
throug h the ether are subjected to a contraction in the 
direction of tbe movement. In 1903 Trouton and Nobel de-
vised an experiment with an electric condenser to demonstrate 
the movement of the earth in relation to the ether but like 
the Michelson- Morley experiment, no results were obtained 
other t han found in the previous experiment. 
It was at this stage of the experimentation that 
Albert Einstein published in 1905 the principle of relativity 
known as the special theory. 
Physical exp eriments conducted in the interior 
of a s ystem cannot supply evidence of a uniform 
rectiline a r movement of that system as a whole ••• 
Electroma gnetic phenomena follo w exactly the s a me 
laws in t wo s ystems that are moving in straight 
lines and uniformly relatively to one another.3 
1. Berthoud, NTMS, 82. 
2 . d' Abro, EST, 123. 
3. Bert houd, NTMA, 84. 
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The experiment of Michelson-Morley according to Einstein was 
doomed to failure because it is impossible to determine the 
absolute movement of the earth when one moves within the 
framework of an entire system in motion. Einstein's ex-
planation was a great factor in the a bandonment of the 
electromagne tic ether of Maxwell. It also invalidates the 
laws of cl a ssical science of mechanics and current notions 
of time and space. Previous ideas of time and space were 
set aside by Einstein's discoveries. The time and space 
which are derived from the experiments of the physicist 
according to Einstein are not absolute, but always relative 
to the observer. The change suggested by the Fitzgerald 
contraction would not be observable in the case of a person 
who was moving at the same speed as the object under obser-
vation, but to a person who was not moving at the same speed, 
the change would be observed. Likewise when two persons 
observe the same event from different space relationships 
what is a present event for one may be a past event for 
another. The relativity theory of Einstein has destroyed tbe 
concep t of "si multaneity" as previously held by physicists. 
However, the speed of light is always the same in 
an y circumstances under which it is measured. This was one of 
the first laws discovered by the new physics. Any observer 
of the s p eed of light finds that time and space are such that 
light travels always with the same measured speed. Space, 
ti me, and mass when measured separately do not show this 
constancy. Mass increases with speed so that a body moving 
with speed equal to that of light would have a mass which 
is infinite. 1 
The principle of relativity also brought out the fact 
that mass and energy are equivalent. 2 A mass m can be 
expressed as energy by use of the formula mc 2 where c is 
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the velocity of li ght. Thus it is shown that energy E equals 
mc2. The significance of these facts is illustrated in the 
supposition of a person traveling nearly at the speed of light. 
An observer on the earth would note that this person is con-
tracted in siz.e, greater in mass, and his time scale would 
be slower, but the person being observed would not be able 
to detect any of these things for all of his devices for 
determination of space, mass, or time, would have changed 
accordingly. 
In the special theory of relativity Einstein assumed 
all velocities to be uniform. His general theory treats of 
the n a ture of relativity when accelerations are introduced 
in the place of uniform velocities. At this stage it became 
necessary to introduce the Riemannian geometry in the place 
of Euclidean to solve the problems which resulted. By means 
of this method it was possible to explain the behavior of 
Mercury which astronomers had previously found to be about 
44 seconds out of place in each 100 years, based on the as-
s umptions of Newtonian gravitation.3 Einstein's law of grav-
1. Eddington, NPW, 50. 
2. Einstein and Infeld, EOP , 208. 
3. d'Abro, EST, 276-278. 
itation replaced the concept of forces acting at a distance, 
with the concept of objects moving along geodesics in a 
Riemannian space. 
The behavior of light according to Einstein's theory 
is the same as the planets. He predicted that the light of 
a distant star as it passed by the sun in coming to the earth, 
would be bent. The gravitational effect would be a deflection 
t wice as great as Newtonian physics would have found. Ex-
perimental confirmation of this has come in connection with 
photographic observations made at recent eclipses of t he sun. 
Einstein's theory also predicts a shift to the red in the 
spectrum of light emitted from a star surrounded by an 
intense gravitational field. This effect is detected in the 
59 
light coming from t h e excessively dense companion star of Sirius. 
The general theory of relativity replaces the concept 
of the law of the conservation of energy with a so-called 
energy tensor which is always expressed in the same form but 
has different nuraerical va lues in different coordinate systems . 
Two significant observations of the general results of 
t he relativity theory were made by Bertrand Russell. 
Thus the result of the relativity theory is to 
show that the traditional laws of physics, rightly 
understood, tell us almost nothing about the course 
of nature, being rather of the nature of logical 
truisms. The fundamental assumption of r elativity 
is realistic namely, that those respects in which 
all observers agree when t hey record a g iven phe-
nomenon may be regarded as objective, and not as 
contributed by t he observers. This assumption 
is made by common sense. The apparent sizes and 
shapes of objects differ according to the point of 
view, but common sense discounts these differences. 
Relativity theory merely extends this process. By 
taking into account not only human observers, who 
all share the motion of the earth, but also possi-
ble "observers 11 in very rapid motion relatively to 
the earth, it is found t hat much more depends upon 
the point of view of the obs erver than was formerly 
thought. But there is found to be a residue which 
is not so dependent; this is the pru~t which c an be 
expressed by the method of tensors.l 
One of the results of the t he ory of relativity is the 
problem of .t wo realities 1Nhich seem to be the ultimates left 
by this theory. These are, matter and field. Relativity 
stresses the import ance of field. The field is c a lled the 
11most i mport ant invention since Newton 1 s time."2 In the 
nineteenth century, physicists built the ·whole of phy sics 
upon the concept of matter . Previous to the relativity theory 
references to matter were explained in terms of mass, and field 
wa s explained a~ having no mass but representing energy. 
Relativity has shown that mass and energy are not distinguished 
from each other qualitatively. It may only be said that more 
energy is concentra ted in matter and less in field. This 
reduces the difference between matter and field to a 
quantitative status. The suggestion is made t hat perhap s 
the concept of matter should be set aside and the new physics 
should regard field as the only reality~ 
But we have not yet succeeded in formulating a 
pure field physics. For the present we must still 
assume t he existence of both: field and matter.3 
1. Russel, Art. (1937), 100. 
2. Einstein and Infeld, EOP, 259. 
3. Ibid.' 260. 
However matter is not all field. Only that small 
amount which is expressing itself as kinetic energy is field. 
The rest is potential energy . 
xv. THE QUANTUM TFJEORY OF PLANCK 
Niels Bohr the Danish physicist pays fitting tribute 
to the greatness of the work of Max Planck, the discoverer of 
the quantum theory~ 
Scarcely any other discovery in the history of 
science has produced such extraordinary results 
within the short span of our generation as those 
which have directly arisen from Max Planck's dis-
covery of the elementary quantum of action. This 
discovery has been prolific to a constantly in-
creasing degree of progression, in furnishing 
means for t he interpretation and harmonizing of 
results obtained from the study of atomic phe-
nomena, which isa. study that has made marvelous 
progress within the past thirty years.l 
Planck was interested in the solution of the distribu-
tion of energy in the normal spectrum of radiant heat. The 
nature of heat radiation had been proved independent of the 
character of the radiating bodies. Evidence pointed in the 
direction of a universal function which must be dependent 
exclusively on temperature and wave-length but in no way de-
pendent on the properties of the substance being examined. 
Planck was interested in discovering this function so that a 
deeper understanding of the relationship between energy and 
temperature might be found. 
He experimented with what is known as cavity radiation~ 
A hollow body was heated to incandescence and a small beam 
1. Planck, WSG, 18. 
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of radiation was allowed to pass through a small opening and 
be analyzed in the spectroscope. In this experiment he 
discovered that radiant energy is not a continual flow, but is 
emitted in integral quantities, or auanta, which can be 
expressed in integral numbers. This measurement always re-
sulted in integral multiples of hv where .! is the frequency 
of the radiation and h is a universal constant, now known 
as Planck's constant. He deduced the value of this constant 
to be 6.55 x lo-27 erg-seconds~ Radiation takes place when 
heat has been accumulated up to the amount of h .!• There 
is no increase in radiation even though the heat is increased, 
until that increase is a multiple of h v such as 2 hv, 3 hv, 
- --
~' etc. There is no fractional part of h v which is 
radiated. The idea of such an explanation was revolutionary 
and marked a departure from the classical science of the past. 
Einstein later in 1905 applied the theory to the study of 
light, and showed that light is emitted in quanta called 
photons. Bohr applied it in 1913 to atomic structure with 
fruitful results. Compton in 1922 experiment ally verified 
the quantum behavior of X-rays. 
The significance of all this is especially seen with 
respect to the understanding of matter. When applied to the 
study _of light, the quantum theory showed that light is not 
continuous but is emitted in definite quanta. Other ex-
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periments show that light behaves like waves, as well as like 
corpuscles. The conclusion which is difficult to accept but 
is demanded by the evidence, is that light is both waves and 
bundles of energy or quanta. The same results are found 
when the electron is examined by this method. It too, is 
shown to have a dual nature, behaving as particles and also 
as waves. 
We asked before: what is light: Is it a 
shower of corpuscles or a wave? We now ask: 
what is matter, what is an electron? Is it a 
particle or a wave? The electron behaves like 
a particle when moving in an external electric 
or magnetic field. It behaves like a wave when 
diffracted by a crystal. l.I1Ji th the elementary 
quanta of matter we came across the same diffi-
culty that we met with in light quanta. One of 
the most fundamental difficulties raised by recent 
advance in science is how to reconcile fhe two 
contradictory views of matter and wave. 
xvl. BOHR'S APPLICATION OF QUANTUM THEORY 
The Danish scientist Niels Bohr in 1913 applied the 
quantum theory to the study of the structure of matter. He 
explained the complex spectl"•um 6f hydrogen by means of the 
quantum theory. His work was based on the idea of planetary 
electrons. 
He pointed out that if ''action" is absorbed in 
units, only a certain number of all the orbits in 
which an electron might revolve will be possible. 
In the smallest orbit the action would be one unit 
or h (Planck's constant) in the next orbit 2h, and 
so on.2 -
Bohr thought that the electron of the hydrogen atom 
1. Einstein and Infeld, EOP, 294. 
2. Dampier, HS, 408-409. 
63 
64 
had many possible stable orbits. He supposed that any change in 
the orbits of the electron were never gradual changes but 
instantaneous jumps without passing through t he intervening 
space between this orbit and one in which it previously moved. 
This explanation wa s a radical departure from previous expla-
nations. In moving from one energy level or orbit to another 
t he electron either absorbs or radiates energy according to 
h v where h is Planck's constant and v the frequency of vibra-
tion. Eddington say s h has a value of .00000000000000000000-
000000655 erg-seconds.l 
Bohr further held that the electrons in the atom, like 
water, would always seek the lowest level of energy. In doing 
this t he atoms would lose energy by a process of radiation. 
Bohr orig inally worked out these energy levels for hydrogen 
using t he old quantum theory. The energies of the se levels 
are, minus one, minus one f ourth, minus one ninth, and minus 
one sixteenth of a unit. When there is a movement from energy 
level minus one fourth to minus one there is a difference of 
three f ourths of a unit which travels away as a photon of 
energy.2 The discovery of the 72nd element hafnium was due 
to application of Bohr 1 s theory.3 
The work of Bohr calls attention to the particle as-
pect of both matter and light and describes how t he se particles 
act. Particles such as the proton, neutron, electron and 
positron are the most elementary units of matter known to man. 
1. Eddington, NPW, 179. 
2. Darwin~ NCML 142. 3. Haas, NOA, ·r5-76. 
Hitherto they have not been known to be broken down into 
anything simplel'• Jeans suggested that if' one were able to 
view the ultimate particles of matter according to Bohr's 
theory, they would be seen to move, not like railway trains 
running smoothly on tracks, but ''like kangaroos hopping about 
in a f'ield."l Darwin points out that the work of Bohr fails 
to give adequate attention to the wave aspect of matter. 
It is impossible to reconcile this crude theory 
with the wave-theory without considerable modifi-
cation but it is possible to make that modification, 
and still retain the conception of particles in a 
useful manner.2 
xvii. HEISENBERG'S THEORY 
The so-called newer quantum theory, also known as 
guanttrra mechanics, is that proposed by Heisenberg in 1925~ 
It was said that Bohr went farther than observed facts in 
building his atomic model.3 Heisenberg based his theory on 
only that VJhich he was able to observe, which was the radi-
ation absorbed and emitted by the atom~ He contended that 
an electron cannot be assigned a place in space at a given 
time, nor can it be followed in its orbit, hence there is no 
justification for assuming planetary orbits as did Bohr. 
The possible observations give the magnitudes of the frequen-
cies and amplitudes of the emitted radiations and the energy 
1. Jeans, P&P, 127~ 
2. Darwin, NCM, 144. 
3~ Berthoud, NTMA, 233. 
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levels of the atomic system. 
The results of his study were formulated mathematically. 
The following year Scbrodinger extended the work of de Broglie, 
taking material particles as wave systems. He obtained mathe-
matical equations similar to those of Heisenberg. It v1as found 
that the velocity of a single wave differed from the velocity of 
a group of waves. Vilien one of the wave groups is small, there is 
no doubt where to place the electron which is its manifestation. 
~fuen the group is expanded the electron can be located anywhere 
within it, hence an uncertainty of position appears. 
The quantum theory again created new and 
essential features of our reality. Discontinu-
ity replaced continuity. Instead of laws govern-
ing individuals, probability laws appeared ••• 
Quantum physics formulates laws governing crowds 
not individuals. No properties but .probabilities 
are described, not laws disclosing the future of 
sy-stems are formulated, but laws governing the 
changes in time of the probabilities and relating 
to great congregations of individuals.~ 
These observations have been the basis for what Heisen-
berg calls the "Principle of Uncertainty. 11 2 
xviii. SUFn~RY OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS 
Considerable progress has been made in understanding 
matter. The atomic theory has been proved true. It has 
also been shown that the atom is composed of several different 
parts, principally, the proton, neutron, and electron. The 
following is a list of the known forms of matter which have 
been described and observed. 
1. Einstein and Infeld, EOP, 312-313. 
2. deBroglie, ML, 187-188. 
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The Elementary Particles1 
Particle Mass Chare;e 
Proton 1836.6 Positive 
Neutron 1839.0 No Charge 
Electron 1 Negative 
Positron 1 Positive 
Meson mu 216 Positive 
Meson mu 216 Negative 
Meson pi 285 Positive 
Meson pi 285 Negative 
Photon2 0 No Charge 
Neutrino 0 No Charge 
In addition to the above particles there is theol,etical 
reason to believe that the following additional particles 
are in existence. 
Particle Mass Charge 
Meson pi 300 + 25 No Charge 
Meson tau 900 Positive 
Meson tau 900 Negative 
Antiproton 1836.6 Negative 
lfu.tineutron 1839 No Charge 
1~ Barnett, Art. (1949), 131. 
2. Stanathan, PMP, 374. "It is equally surprising tbat a photon 
of radiant energy often disappears, and in its place arises 
sinru.ltaneously an electron-positron pair." 
In spite of having made a much greater progress, 
science has reached a strange impasse with this problem~ . 
Finding both wave and corpuscular theory supported by ex-
perimentation it is now quite difficult for the scientist to 
say what is the nature of matter. His world has been chang-
ing so greatly and quickly. Eddington says: 
The physicist now regards his own external 
world in a way which I can only describe as 
more mystical, though not less exact and prac-
tical, than that which prevailed some years 
ago v1hen it was taken for granted that nothing 
could be trur unless an engineer could make a 
model of it. · 
Science has found it necessary to recast its views 
of matter as the older conceptions have proved inadequate 
to interpret recent discoveries. It has also discovered a 
world of law but one whose laws are strange to man because 
they require that man think in altogether new and different 
terms. 
xix. E:MPIRICAL PROPERTIES OF l'v1ATTER 
Benjamin has well pointed out that on the empirical 
level no such thing as matter is found. What is found is a 
complex of qualities. The interpretation of these qualities 
has given the present conception of matter, but matter it-
self is not given in experience~ 2 Those qualities ·which 
1. Eddington, NPW, 344. 
2. Benjamin, IPS, 339. 
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are found in experience may be classified as follows. 
1. Extension, or spatial identity. 
2~ Extension in a temporal sense . 
3. Permanence of sufficient extent for perception 
and verifi cation of empirical data. 
4. Resistance and impenetrability, indicative of some 
kind of organization~ 
5. Discrete in the sense that it can be broken down 
into parts . Neither a p oint nor an instant is found on the 
empirical l evel. 
6. Secondary qualities, such as color, sound, touch, 
taste, odor, heat, etc. 
xx. SCIENTIFIC REFINEMENTS OF EMPIRICAL PROPERTIES 
The scientist may summarize his facts about matter 
largely in refinements of the above empirical evidence. 
His findings are quantitative statements of his observations 
in terms of space, time, and mass. 
1. Matter is spatial and can be located in space . 
There is space relationship within the atom, and all de-
scriptions of it require space concepts. 
2. Matter cannot be defined without a reference to 
the relation it bears to time. 
3. Every particle of matter has mass . 
4~ Two particles of matter cannot be at the same 
point at the same time~ 
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5. Specific data on matter must always take into 
consideration the frame of reference of the one discovering 
the data. 
6. One particle cannot be at two places at the same 
time. 
xxi. CONCLUSIONS OF SCIENCE ABOUT W~TTER 
If the atom is taken as the basic unit of matter, 
science furnishes us a number of clues to the problem. 
1. Matter is an organization which when analyzed is 
found to consist of a definite number of protons, neutrons 
and electrons. 
2. Qualitative differences of matter appear in rela-
tionship to differences in the number of protons, neutrons 
and electrons in the atom. 
3~ The mass and motion of the protons, neutrons and 
electrons can be accurately determined. 
4. There is a relationship between matter and elec-
tricity. 
5. Matter is energy, which can be released with the 
subsequent destruction of w~tter in its more complex organ-
ization. 
6. Reduction or division of electrons and protons 
into parts has not been accomplished. 
7. Electrons behave in such a Way that they show pro-
perties of v;aves and corpuscles at the same time. 
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CHAP TER IV 
INTERPRETATIONS OF MATTER BEFORE 
THE TWEN TIE TH CENTURY 
Whatever is known about matter in the twentieth 
century cannot be divorced from the attempts of earlier 
thinkers to solve this problem. The atomism of :Democri tus 
and Lucretius contains many clues which apply today. Energy 
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" conc epts such as were expressed by Moleschott, Vogt, Buchner, 
Haeckel and others have bearing on present day conclusions. 
Contingency, force a nd indeterminism were already found in 
t h e ide a lists of the Kantian and Lotzian schools. Scienti s ts 
as well a s philosophers had attemp ted to solve the problem. 
:Boscovich, Boyle, Da lton, Faraday a nd Lord Kelvin all deserve 
their shar e of r e co gnition. 
The question first arose as men were tr~ing to explain 
the nature of the cosmos. The distinction between ap pearance 
and reality led them to mistrust sense experience and loo k for 
their answers in some realm beyond tha t of ordina ry sense ex-
peri ence. Both Democritu s a nd Plato mistrusted s ense exper-
ience and found their answers by rationalistic rather than 
purely empirica l me thod s. Later d eve lopmen ts were attempts 
to list the qualities of matter. The comparatively late 
development of more empirical evidence, forced the philosopher 
as well as the scienti s t to rely more on t h eoretical speculation. 
This chapte r is a n attempt at reviewing t h e main con-
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ceptions of matter h e ld by the pre-twentieth-century thinkers. 
It is followed in the next chapter by a criticism. 
l. I1~IAN PHILOSOPHY 
During the epic period of Indian Philosophy from 
600 B.C. to A.D. 200 there are signs of a materialistic trend 
in some philosophies. The ma terialists a re called Lokaya tikas 
- -
and also Carvakas, from the name of the founder. 
The substa nce of their views is strangely like posi-
tivism in some respects. Sense p erception is the only form 
of knowledge. What is material is real. The ultimate prin-
ciples are earth, water, fire, a nd air. Intelligence is a 
modification of these four. When death takes place the in-
telligence is destroyed. Consciousness comes from these four. 
Thought is a function of brain. The soul is never distinct 
from the body. l 
There is little in this system that throws further 
light on the nature of matter. The appeal to sense e xper-
i e nc e was probably a stag e in libe r a tion of thought. These 
people were in revolt a ga inst the authority of the past. 
"The Carvaka philosophy is a fanatical effort made to rid the 
age of the wei ght of the past which wa s oppres s in g it."2 
There a re many similarities to the systems developed by the 
early Greek thinkers. 
1. Radhakrishnan, IP, I, 279. 
2. Ibid., 283. 
Another development in Indian thought is an atomism 
which appears in the teachings of the Vaisesika. These 
atoms a re the material causes of the effects which may be 
observed in nature. They ar-e eternal, incapable of division, 
supersensible, different in kind, each having distinct indi-
viduality, and primarily at rest instead of in motion like 
those of Democritus. Sotils are distinct from atoms, a nd 
are co-eternal existence s. Movement is called Y~rma and is 
an independent category by itself.l 
Ramanuja born in 1027, deve loped a theism according to 
which matter is uncreated. There are three non-conscious 
substances, prakrti, kala, and suddhatattva, or matter, time, 
and pure matter. These non-conscious entities function in 
obedience to the will of God. Ma tter is more completely de-
pendent on Brahman (the Absolute or world soul) than the 
individual souls which have freedom of choice. Matter is 
treated as a mode of God. 2 Matter or prakrti is the primary 
matter or substance in which God reveals himself as a cosmic 
force. Pure matter or suddhatattva has only the quality of 
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being and this is the means God uses to reveal his transcendent 
exi s tence .. 
2 .. HERACLITUS 
Heraclitus called attention to the changing nature of 
a.ll that he observed. No more satisfactory symbol for 
1. Radakrishnan, IP, II, 176-247. 
2. Ibid., II, 696-697 .. 
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reality could be found than "fire." There is reason to credit 
him with one of the first dynamic concepts of the nature of 
things . For him, everything is a flux of energy. Nature -was 
an "everliving fire." 
This universe , the same for all, no one, either 
god or man, has made; but it always was , and is, 
and ever shall be and ever -living fire, fixed 
measures kindling and fixed measures dying out.l 
His sugges tion of "fixed measures " has been interpreted 
as a principle of conservation. While it may not be. a clear 
indication of more recent views on conservation of energy, 
it does suggest an earlier approach to this conclusion. 
3. THE ATOMISTS 
Leucippus and Democritus are generally credited with 
the formulation of the atomic theory . Unfortunately there 
is only one sentence remaining extant of the writings of 
Leucippus and very little of Democritus. EPicurus, who 
later expounded many of the views of atomism has left more 
of a record. The most complete exposition of early atomism 
is found in the worl{ of the Roman poet and philosopher, Lucreti~. 
Principally from him is it possible to get a very accurate 
account of the atomic theory . 
He (Leucippus) began by assuming an unlimited 
number of elements, the atoms, which were always 
-in. motion. And he supposed them to have an in-
finite variety of forms , because there was no 
reason why they should have one form rather than 
another.l 
1. Theophr., Phys. Op., Fr. 8 (]). 3.59) in Bakewell, 
SBAP, 57. 
The most systematic and consistent theory, however, 
and one that applied to all bo d ies, was advanced 
by Leucip pus and p~mociritus; and, iri mairttaining 
it, they took a s · their starting point wh a t natur-
ally comes first.I 
When matter is reduced to atomic form it bas reached 
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the final stage of reduction. These atoms cannot be divided. 
They are invisible, infinite in number, and d iffere nt in shape 
and size. Tnese differences in shape and size account for 
the diffe rences in the realm known through sense experience. 
Thus if first bodies be, as I have taught, 
solid without a void, they must be then eternal ••• 
and these ca n not be sundered from without by 
beats and blows, nor from within be torn by 
penetration, nor be overthrown by any assault 
soever t h rough the world.2 
Atoms are eternal and are in constant movement, some-
times setting up a whirling vortex, which brings certain 
atoms to g ether an d final ly cau s es the ap pearance p erceived 
t h r ough t h e sense s. 
And that more clearly thou perceive how all 
these mites of ma tter are da rted round about, 
recall to mind how nowhere in the sum of all 
exists a bottom,--nowhere is a realm of rest 
for primal bodies.3 
And a p rodigious burly-burly mass compounded 
of all kinds of p rimal germs, whose battling dis-
cords in disorder kept inter stices, and paths, 
coberencies, a n d weights, and blows, encountering s, 
and motions •••. portions began to fly asunder, and 
like with like to join, and to block out a world.4 
1. Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr., 325a. 
2. Lucretius, ~erum Natura, I, 535-548. 
3. Ibid., II, 101-105. 
4. Ibid., V, 44?-45?. 
The smallest, smoothest, and most active a toms are 
the cause of soul or mind. As these interpenetrate the 
entire body, they cause that body to live and function as a 
living being. Everything known to man is traced to some kind 
of atomic activity. 
This is what led Democritus to say tha t soul 
is a sort of fire or hot substan ce; his ' f orms' 
or atoms are infinite in number; those which 
are sp h e rical he calls fire and soul, and com-
pares them to the motes in the a ir which we see 
in shafts of li ght comin g through windows; the 
mixture of seeds of all sorts he calls the ele-. 
ment s of the whole of Nature (Leucippus gives 
a similar account); the spher ical atoms are 
identified with soul because atoms of that 
shape ar e most adapted to permeate everywhere, 
a nd to set all others moving by being themse lves 
in movernent.l 
Such an interpretation results in a thorough going 
materialism. Everything tha t exi s ts is comp osed of atoms in 
some combination whether simple or complex. The reduction 
of soul and mind to atomic structure, and the a ttribution to 
the atoms of the qualities of form, weight, magnitude, and 
anything else inhere nt in form, .leaves the issue clearly on 
the side of an exclusive materialism. 
4. PLATO 
It appears in the thought of Plato that matter, Ideas 
and God are the ultimate realities which have always exi s ted. 
Matter is not corp ore a l as some t h ink of it but rather is that 
which is c a pable of taking on form from the activity of God. 
1. Aristotle, De~., 404a. 
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Clearly in Plato's t hought, ma tter is subservient to Idea. 
There is a cloudy conc ept ion of just wha t matter is. One thing 
is very c erta in. Plato has passed beyond the stage of 
tl 
na1ve realism. His myth of the cave shows that he does not 
trust appearances. The conception of the receptacle is the 
nearest ap proximation of the concept of matter in Plato. 
Demos says of the receptacle: 
The, receptacle is a void; it is not-being ••• 
is a determinate void; it is a spa ce-time con-
tinuum ••• provides a seat for events and is not 
defined by them ••• is a principle of multiplicity 
••• is a principle of relatedness among the many 
co n crete things.l 
From a slightly different viewpoint, Demos off ers the sug-
gestion that the "receptacle functions a s a princ ip le of 
entropy in nature," and is "the factor of brute fact."2 
5. AR ISTOTLE 
The problem of chan g e which occupied so much atte ntion 
among the Gre ek philosophe rs re quire d some k ind of substance 
wh ic h was the subject of c ha nge, but wh ich woul d r ema in the 
same in essence. Aristotle called this substrate, matter. 
Thus, a piece of wood mi ght be a p a rt of a tr ee, or a pi ece 
of lumber or a box, or a c a rved statue. The fo rm cha n g ed 
in ea ch case but the wood remai n e d t h e same substrate. 
Now the substratum is tha t of wh ic h everythin g 
else is predi c a ted, while it is itself no t predi-
c a te d of anything else. An d so we must first de--
termi n e the nature of t h is; for that which under-
lies a thing primarily is thought to be in the 
1. Demos, POP, 34-35. 
2. Ibid., 46. 
true st sense its substance. 
matter is said to be of the 
in anofhe r, shape, and in a 
these. 
And in one sense 
nature of the substra tum, 
third, the compound of 
The existence of pure matter was ruled out by Aris-
totle. N~tter is always found in some form, whether it be 
the crude form of a pile of dirt or the refined state of a 
piece of jewelry. It is capable of being formed in many 
ways. Each of these forms is a potentiality before it has 
been expressed in the matter. He insisted there can be no 
formless matter . 
It is obvious then, from what has been said, 
that that which is spoken of as form or sub-· 
stance is not produced, but the concrete thing 
which gets its name from this is produced, and 
that in everything which is generated matter is 
present, and on2 part of the thing is matter and 
the other form. 
Matter is, in part, the potentiality in all which the 
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senses reveal. It is potentiality to take new forms and change 
in appearance. It is also the substrate which takes the forms. 
6 • . EPICURUS 
Epicurus is a materialist. He believes in a realm of 
d ivine and glorious forms in order to account for man's belief 
in the existence of gods. These are in a realm which is 
separa te from that wherein dwell the races of men but even these 
are material. The ma. terial ism of Democri tus is accepted in 
part as an explanation of the realm which inclndes man. He 
Aristotle, Meta., VII, I029a • 
. Aristotle, Irera., VII, 1033b. 
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accepts the atomism of Democritus, es~ecially the concept of 
movement, but rejects the determinism. The downward motion of 
the atoms was affected by a chance deviation of one atom 
which in turn set up a series of collisions. The beginning 
of the world is explained as due to these collisions. Con-
tingency and freedom are his contributions to the concept 
of rna tter. 
And the atoms move continuously for all time, 
some of them falling straight down, others swerv-
ing, and others recoiling from their collisions. 
And of the latter, some a re borne on, separating 
to a long distance from one another, while others 
again recoil and recoil, whenever they chance to 
be checked by the interlacing with others, or else 
shut in by atoms interlaced around them.l 
7. PLOTINUS 
Dean Inge suggests that the treatment of matter by 
Plotinus involves "the inter-relation of two kinds of judgment-
that of existence and that of va lue."2 From the former judg-
ment there is close resemblance to Plato's receptacle. The 
l a st a n d lowest emanation of the creative power is ma tter. 
Matter is absence of quality and in a sense is negation. It 
is a 11 substratum" in to which the qualities and forms enter. 3 
The value judgment clearly says, "the cause of Evil is Matter."4 
~1o strains of value judgments are found in Plotinus. The one, 
is best understood by thinking of Evil as the contradictory 
of the Good. 
1. Enicurus, Letter To Herodotus, in SEP, Oates (ed. ), 5. 
2. Inge, POP, I, 131. 
3. Plotinus, Enn. I, 8, 10. 
4. ~~· I, s,-s7 
The Good is that on which all else depends, 
towards which ail Existences aspire as to their · 
need, whiie itself i 's without need, sufficient to 
itself, aS:p'iring· to no other, the measure and · · 
Ter~ of all, gi~ing out from itself the Intellec-
tual-Principle and Existence and- Soul and Life 
a nd all Intellective-Act.l 
The contradictory of the above gives us a matter 
that co me s close to Non-Being. In a more positive sense 
Plotinus treats matter as that wbi ch "corrupts and destroys 
the incomer."2 This mo re positive sugge stion of action is 
not found in many of the Ennead~. Matter is the "unchanging 
substratum--Potentiality and nothing more--. 11 3 The sense 
of Abs traction has been carr ied by Plotinus to the extremes 
found in Plato. 
8. THOMAS A~UINAS 
Saint Thomas Aquinas held that there were t wo kinds 
of being, (1). simple or pure essences, and (2) essences 
composed of form and matter. God is the only pure essence 
or form.4 All else is composed of matter and form. The 
resemblance to Ar istotle's vi ew s at this point is apparent. 
PTime matter is pure p otentiality . Materia secunda is the 
ma tte r as commonly understood and is t he principle of in-
dividuation. It was created by God out of noth ing.5 Since 
1. Plotinus, Enn. I, 8, 1. 
2 .. Enn. I, 8;~ 
3 • Enn. I I , 5 , 5 • 
4. Aquinas,.§~ Theolog ica, Q, . 3, a.?. 
5. Ibid., ~ · 45, a.2. 
80 
81 
God is the first c ause he is t h e cause of both rnatter and 
form. Cre a tion is a continuous process. The work of crea tion 
ma i n t a i ns exis t ence at every mome nt. God acts "after the 
mode of intellect and wi ll."l 
9. DESCAJtTE S 
Descartes gives the co n cept of motion a larg e place 
in h is interpretation of matter. vi'hile h e attemp ts to 
limit the nature of body to the qu ality of "exten s ion alone," 
yet h e interprets the variety in which it appe a rs a s due 
to motion. 
1bat all the variety of matter, or the diver-
sity of its forms, depends on motion ••• For the 
partition of ma tter in thought makes no ch ange 
in it; but all variation of it or diversity of 
form, depend s on motion.2 
One of the best interpretations of his view will be 
found in the "Notes on Motion," appended to the Principles 
of Ph ilosophy. God is the c ause of motion. The quantity of 
motion remains t he same. This is a cl ear reference to a 
theory of con servat ion of ene r gy . Ma tter seems to have this 
quality of motion and rest, a s someth i ng i mparted to it by 
God in the ve ry act of creat ion. Matter has the p ower of 
ac quiring motion or of losing it. 
That God is the primary c a u se of motion; and 
that he a l wa y s preserves the srune quantity of 
motion in the universe ••• Vv1len it follows as 
most con sonant to reason tha t mer e ly because 
God diversely moved t h e p a rts of matter when 
he first crea ted them, and now preserves all 
1 • Aquinas , Sum~ The o 1 o g i c a, Q, . 19 , a. 4. 
2. Descartes, POP, 1 8 9-190. 
that matter, manifestly in the same mode and 
on the same principle on which he first cre-
ated it, he also always preserves the same 
quantity of motion in the matter itself.l 
It should however, be noted that mo tion is not of 
the essence of matter. It is rather an accidental quality 
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for be affirms it is possible for matter to exist in the full 
sense of the word and yet r emain at rest. This suggests 
t ha t ma tter has po t entiality for motion or for rest, and 
indica tes some app roach to the views of Aristotle. Descartes 
affirmed tha t his views were in a g reeme nt wi th t hese of 
Aristotle, but one que s tions whetber he wou ld be able to hold 
the co n cept of matter at rest, and still agree with Aristotle. 
Matter tha t is a t rest, according to Descartes, lacks diversity 
of form. 
But I am desirous also that tbis sh ould be ob-
served that, though I have here endeavored to 
g ive an explana tion of th e whole nature of ma-
terial t h in gs , I have nevertheless made us e of 
no principle which was not received and approved 
by Aristotle, and by the other philosophers of 
a ll ages.2 
10. GASSENDI 
The Frenchman Pierre Gassendi is credited with an 
awakening of interest in the atomic theory of matter. He 
and Descartes represented two of the most influential 
thinke rs of France. The former represented a more rational-
istic or mathematical approach to philosophy, while the 
latter was more of a physicist and employed the empirical 
1. Descartes, POP, 246, 24?. 
2. Ibid., 205. 
83 
method. 
It was a study of the life and teachings of Ep-icurus 
which led Gassendi to hold to an atomic theory of matter. 
Strange as it may seem this orthodox Catholic priest, the 
Provost of Digne wa s one of the propagators of modern Mater-
ialism, but this did not imply that his materialism implied 
an Atheism. There is much in Gassendi's views that resembles 
the position taken by Hobbes. 
"The first cause of everything is God. 11 1 Matter was 
created by God in a finite number of atoms. These atoms are 
the rna terial principle or ~ teria 12£ima. They are identical 
in substance but vary in figure. The motion of. the atoms was 
be stowed on them by God.. He further says that they have an 
"inherent capability of self-determined motion. 11 1 All evo-
lution and change is really a change in the union and sepa-
ration of atoms. There is an inherent dualism in Gassendi's 
thought, for apart from the visible world he also accepts 
the idea of immortal and incorporeal spirits. The greater 
f am e of Descartes has overshadowed the significance of the 
work of Gassendi in the "reformation of physics a n d natural 
p h i 1 0 sop hy • "2 
11. HOBBES 
Thomas Hobbes was highly interested in mathematics. 
He attempted to construct a mechanical view of the world. 
1. Lange, F..M, I, Sec. 3, 265. 
2. Ibid., 269. 
He considered the brain the organ of thought. Matter in 
motion was t he only reality. The best sing le statement of 
his p osition is found in the asse rtion that 11 every part of 
the univ erse is bo dy , a n d tha t wh ich is not b ody, is no part 
of tbe universe: and because the universe is all, that whicb 
is no part of it is nothing. 11 l This kind of materialism is 
not a theistic. There must be some first c a use of t h ings and 
he a grees with those who a ttribute to God the place of t h e 
"first and etern a l c a use of all thi ngs ."2 But he does n ot 
know anything about God aside from the existence of God. 
"For the nature of God is inco mprehens ible; that is to say, 
we und erstan d nothing of what he is, but only that he is. 11 3 
The lack of coherence in his t hough t is evident to a ny crit-
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ical examination. In his refer ences to exis t en ce a s c or poreal 
and his r e jection of "incorporeal existence" he is a mater-
ial i st. In h is con tention tha t God is "first a n d e t ernal 
cau s e, 11 he rejects a thorough ma terialism. His answer to 
the question of wha t is the nature of ma tter is l i ttle more 
than a recognition of matter as that which c auses sensations, 
is external to the one h a ving the s ensation, does not depend 
on the p erson wb o senses it for its existence, possesses ex-
t e nsion, may cause a ction thereby being designated an §£~1, or 
receive action a. nd in suc h a s t a te i s des i gn a ted a )2 a tient.4 
1. Hobbes, LEV, 440. Heferenc e s unnamed a re to Hobbes. 
2. LEV, 71. 
3. LEV, 25 7 •. 
4. IWP, 53, 69, 70. 
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12. SPINOZA 
Spinoza is one of the best known representat ives of 
the a ttri bute t heory of ma tt e r. God is substance to Spinoza. 
Substance he defines as "that which is in itself ••• and does 
not dep end on the co n cept ion of another t h i ng from wh ich it 
must be formed. 111 There are an infinite number of attributes 
of substan ce but only two a re kn own to man, namely, mind and 
matt er , or "thought and extension. 11 2 These a ttributes to-
gether give a complete perception of the essence of substance, 
but since man only knows two of them h is perception of the 
es se nce of substance reve a ls only thought and extension. 
wnat is t h e idea of extension excep t tha t of existence in 
space rela tions? It reveals very little about the na ture 
of matter. In fact Spinoza seems little interested in matter. 
He is inte rested in God, and matter reveals one of the many 
facets of the divine na ture. 
The two modes of extension are motion and rest. In 
mo tion we have a mode wh ich is eternal for it is traced back 
to a part of the v e ry be i ng of · substance or God . The realm 
of appe ara.nce is a re sul t of th e motion vvhi ch distingu ishes 
bod i e s a nd f o r c e s the rn to g e t h e r • The p l a c e of m o t i on i n 
Spinoza's system suggests parallels to some of the energy 
concepts of matter.3 His view of matter includes the three 
1. Spinoza, E thics, Pa rt l, 3rd Definition. 
2 •. Ibid., Part-~Proposition XIV •. 
3. Ibid., Part 2, Proposition XIII. 
qualifications of dependence, exten s ion, and mo tion. 
1.3. LEIBlUZ 
All matter to Leibniz is a system of monads. These 
are capabl e of a c ting fro m within. The very essence of the 
monad is a ction. There is no such thing as pass ive ma t te r 
i n t hi s sy s t em • 
Monads are the veritable a toms of nature and, 
in a word, the elements of things.! 
I assume further more , that every crea ted being , 
and co nsequently the created Monad , is subject to 
c hange ; and li kewise t ha t this chan ge i s continual 
in each.2 
Wn ile t h is a c tion is itself a par t of a pre-es tablished 
scheme of thin gs the action is g iven a significant place in 
the determination of this nature of the monad . 
The p ower which lies back of the activLty of the monads 
is in God, their creator •. These monads a re a part of a 
comp lex ~~ in which 11 every mo vement has some effect on 
distant bo dies . 11 3 Thus he affirms that "every crea ted monad 
represents the entire universe.-"3 There is order and har-
mony in the univ e rse because God has pre-.establi shed a r·har-
mony in respect to the way the mon ads function. In a se nse 
the se mo nads resemble psychic entities and foreshadow later 
panpsychistic views . 
I. Leibniz, Mona£oloEQC in Rand , MCP, 199. 
2. Ibid., 200. 
3. Ibid., 209. 
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14. BERKELEY 
·No treatment of t hi s subject is satisfactory without 
some reference to the thought of Georg e Berkeley. Matter 
is examined by Berkeley and he concludes that it is a mean-
1 ingless concept. He examines the notion of matter in every 
possible concept. The result is a l ways the s ame. All the 
various efforts to abstract matter from the qualities which 
are ~ound in sensation leave one *ith a bare something which 
cannot be verified in experience. 
15. BOSCOVICH 
The so-called "center-of-force" theory of t he Jesuit 
Boscovich stresses that matter is nothing but force. Th e 
ultimate particles of matter of the atomists are ~onsidered 
only centers of force. He was supp orted in these views by 
' later thinkers such as Ampere, Gauchy , and Faraday • 
••• t h e atom of their day had in analysis be -
come an unextanded bearer _ of forces, the 
idea of solid particles being only retained 
in deference to the mat~rialist instincts 
of unphilosophic minds . 
He thought of matter as consisting of "innumerable point-like 
structure s whose components lack all extension and divisibility."3 
16. TOLAND 
John Toland is chiefly known for his deistic teach-
ings. Like Hobbes he affirms that all reality is corporeal. 
Matter is force, motion, and life. It is originally active. 
In his Pantheisticon he observes, "that thought is the function 
1. Berkeley, TD, So. 
2. Dif.mpier , HS~ 319. 
3. Muller, Art. (1913), 692 . 
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of brain as taste of the to ngue."l 
1?. PRIESTLEY 
Joseph Priestley assert ed t hat the soul is material, 
and that ideas are the result of vibrations or movements in 
the brain. Both Priestley and Toland believed in the exis-
tence of God, h ence there is a dualism in their thought, :though 
Priestl ey affirms the materiality of God is more consistent 
.than other views. Priestley rejected the idea of matter as 
solid and impenetrable. Instead he intro duce d the concept s 
of attrac tion and repulsion. Later research has supp orted 
this v iew.2 
18. d tHOLBACH 
The French En cyclop e d ist, Baron d'Holbach, is one 
of the most thoroughgoing of all materialists. He is gener -
ally credited with the au ,thorship of ~~r.B~me de la Nature,, 
which has been called the Bibl e of Atheism. Ma tter and motion 
sum up the system. These are eternal. The universe is 
governed in accordance with immutable law. Everything can 
be explained by mechanical theory~ The soul does not exist 
apart from the nervous system. Thought is a result of the 
functioning of the brain. Matter is immortal, but individ-
uals as such will pass away. Theism was said to be an enemy 
1 .. Toland, PAN, quoted in Calkins , PP P, ?0 .. 
2. Priestley,. DRMS, I, Part 4. 
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of science and was opposed with vigor. Cabanis and LaMettrie 
. -
held views very muc1l. 1 ike those of d ' Hol bach and offered 
1 i ttle about the n a ture of matter that was not already con-
tained in previous works. 
19. KANT 
Kant first gave an accoun~ of his theo r y of matter 
in 1767 in his Monadologia physica. This was later pr e sented 
in ~eta~ical Firs! Principles of Nat~al Science. {1?86;. 
His theory has been termed a dynamical as opp osed to the 
current mechanistic views of h is day. He held that 
matter occupies space by intensity and not by 
mere bulk, and that it may therefore be diminished 
indefi n itely in degree without for that reason 
ceasing completely to fill the same extensive 
area.l 
The mechanistic view leaned more in t h e direction of an 
atomistic co n ce p tion in which qualitative differences a r e 
traced to qu antita tive d ifferences in the atoms found in 
different sub s t a nces. The occupation of space is entirely 
re l a tive to t h e number of atoms involved. Kant's concept 
doe s no t have support in modern physics, where as it is 
true t h a t qualita tive differences in the atom may be traced 
to the qua ntitative differences in t h e particles which 
constitute the atom. 
In his critical period Y~nt presents the realm of 
matter as something ttbased upon a thing in itself, 
though we know not this thin g in its internal constitution, 
but only its appearances.~2 This view wb ich finds expression 
I. Smith, CCPR, 355 •. 
2 • Kant , Pro , ? 5 • 
both in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena re-
cognizes the eE.istemological problems involved in the study 
of rna tter. It means that whatever view is taken of matte r, 
it will always be a product of the creative activity of the 
mind of man, and the knowledge of the natural world will 
a l ways b e knowledg e of p henomena, and not a knowle dge 6f the 
Ringe_§~ich. Tbe validity of this observation is clearly 
reco gn i z ed by all epistemolog ical dualists. 
20. HEGEL 
Hegel in his Philosophy of Nature shows that the con-
cept of matter is the We~ stag e of the dialectic and that 
formless matte r is indeterminate b e ing. The place of move-
ment, attraction, organization, leads Hegel fro m a consider-
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ation of matter from indetermi nate being to the hi ghest stage 
known wh ich is found in man. In respect to the entire Hegel-
ian dialectic, matter is one of the more abstract aspects 
of ultimate reality which he describes as Absolute Spirit. 
Matter is subjected to movement, separation, combination, 
and organization into higher a nd hi gher forms of or ganization. 
The truth a. ·b ou t it o~ ly is revealed in its r el a tion ship to 
the vVho le of t h ing s. 
21. MILL 
John Stuart Mill defines matter as a "Permanent 
Possibility of Sensation."l The sensation depen d s on some-
1. Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamil ton's 
Philosoph;t, in Hand, MCP, 697. 
thin g with in the individual. The permanent depends on some-
tbing outside the individual. 
2 2 • K.J.\RL MARX 
The metaphysician is disapp ointed when he looks to 
Marx for an interpretat ion of the nature of matter . 11llarx 
is more akin to Dewey's Instrumenta lism. Marx asserts that 
11 Fhilosophers have done nothing more than interpret the 
world in various ways; ou~ business is to change it. ••1 
His main philosophical position is indica ted in the 
follo wing: 
The main defect of all earlier material ism 
(Feuerbach's included) is that the objectp 
reality, .the sensible, is conceived only under 
the form of the obj e ct or of con templa:.ti on, 
not as human se nsory activity, not as practice, 
not subjectively.2 · 
In t h is passage he a sserts t he diffe ren ce between his view 
of matter and that of the older materialistic sy s tems devel-
oped in the eigh te en th century. Ma rx g ives mind a much 
more s i gn ific an t place. The mi nd kn ows in order tha t it 
may a ct and change its environment. Ma tter is the raw mate-
rial wh ich the mind discovers and on wh ich action effects 
cha nges . Ma tter is not static but is co n tinually under goi ng 
change. 
Ma rx held that social development is contingent on 
the evolution of t h e means of economic production. History 
is s h ap ed by the drive felt in each person to gain the ele-
1. Marx, "Theses on :l!"'euerbach, tt in R~_hle,_ KM , 92. 
2. Ibid., 90. 
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mentary needs of life such as "food, drink, shelter and clo-
thing. nl 
Marx wrote his doctoral dissertation on the subject, 
On the Difference b e twe e n the Democritean and the Epicurean 
Natural Philosoph~. His studies led him to deny t h at there 
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is anything 2ther than the materi a l universe. He took a 
non-theistic view of things and made no hesuancy in admitting 
it. He was also influenced by Feuerbach's materi a lism, but 
he r eacted aga i n st its more sta tic nature in favor of a more 
dialectical activism. 
23. LOTZE 
Lotze grounds everything in the concep t of a univer-
sal substan ce which is a self. This self is essentially 
a spiritual subject capable of maintaining unity in the 
midst of diversity. God as a personal self-conscious being 
is the cause of all being • . God is a Being 11 in Mind alone, 
self-possessing and havin g self-existence."2 A somewhat 
lov< .. er order of b e ing is man, who is a fi n ite self, 11 a pale 
copy of God's Perfect Personality, exercising some of the 
same powers which God exercises completely."3 Na t ure is 
described b y Lotze as composed of beings who are modes of 
the activity of God. 
1. Ruhle, KM, 94, quoted from Die deutscbe Ideologie. 
2. Lotze, 1\tl'"IC, II, 689. 
3. Ibid., II, 688. 
Either only minds exist and the whole world 
of t hing s is a phoenomenon in min d s, or things 
which app~ar · to us as p e rfuanent yet selfless points 
of departure, inter section, and t e r min a tion of 
action, <Lre being s whi ch sha re with minds in 
various degrees the general ch a racteristics 
of men tali ty, namely self-existence .1 · 
All of the material world is full of life a nd action, and 
is explained on the .basis of mind. Our kn owle dge of mind 
is derived from our own experienc e of consciousness. All 
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modes of existence are exp ressions of mind. These modes show 
levels of development, some of which a re higher ~ ban others. 
"It is only the living mind tha t is, a nd nothin g is before 
it or external to it.~2 
24. du BOIS-.REYMOND 
Any history of the various views of matter would be 
incomp lete without a reference to the lecture, "On the 
Limits of Knowledge in Nature," which was delivered by Emil 
du Bo is-Reymond before German scientists in 18?2. He showed 
tha t by accepting an atomic theory to interpret na ture one 
i s led at last to some inexplainable force. 
We may turn and twist the notion of matter 
as we like, we always come upon an ultimate 
someth i ng that is incomp rehensible, if not 
absolutely contradictory, as in the hypothesis 
of forces that a ct at a distance thro ugh empty 
space. 3 
The outcome of his position is that t h ere is never 
any hop e of understanding nature. Our knowledge is m~rely 
a substitute for an explanation. 
1. Lotze, MIC, II, 65? •. 
2. Ibid., II, 658. 
3. Lange, ill~, II, 309. 
Within these limits the scientist is lord 
and master; he dismembers and builds up; ••• 
beyond these limits he cannot and will nev~ r 
be able to go. With f~~~ect to th~ · riddle~ · 
of the ma terial world ••• i££!oramus ••.• with re-
spect however, to the riddle of what are 
matter and force, and how they are able to 
think, he must decide, once for all, on a 
v erd ict much more difficult to r ender ••• 
ignorabimus--we shall never know.l 
25. SPENCER 
Herbert Spencer, in the First Principles descri bee 
the process of evolution as a change "from a less coherent 
form to a more coherent form, consequent on the dissipation 
of motion and integration of matter .... 2 · From this, it would 
seem that matter attains an importan ce to his entire thought. 
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After a psychological description of the experience of know-
ing matter as a f~, he moves to a more metaphysical state-
ment by declaring it to be a mode of the Unknowable. 
We can only say that it is some mode of the 
Unknowable, related to the Matter we know, as 
ca.use to effect. 3 
The properties of matter are "resistance and extension.tt4 
He also make s way for the ttatomic hypothesis, 11 and hol d s to 
the 11 indestructabil.ity of matter. 11 5 This latter point turns 
out to be based on the experience of sensing the "force" 
which matter exerts upon the subject through its re s istance. 
There is little that contributes to the understanding of 
I. du Bois-Reymond, quoted by Frank, BPP, 59. 
2. Spencer, FF, 337 .. 
3 .. Ibid., 1?0. 
4. Ibid., 169. 
5 • Ibid • , Chap t e r IV. 
what matter is, aside from what it is found to be in the 
experience of resistance and extension. As a ~ode of the 
Unknowable, it is not ultimate or fundamental. Spencer left 
the problem of matter unsolved. 
Matter then, in its ultimate nature, is as 
absolutely incomprehensible as Sp:ace and Time.l 
26. MOLESCHOTT 
Jacob Mole schott, a German thinker, published Der 
~reislauf des Lebe~ in 1852. His thesis was a combination 
of the principles of conservation of matter and o f energy. 
Nature was regarded as a monistic system co n sisting of a 
fixed amount of e nergized matter wh ich proceeds to pass 
through a con tinuous and unendin g circle of change . Within 
this system, life, and mind are a part of the s ystem. Or-
ganism is a fo rm assumed by matter. Consciousness is a form 
assumed by energy. One of h .is famous sayings was, 11 0hne 
Pho sphor kein Gedanke.•t •No phosphorus, no thought."2 
2? •. VOGT 
Karl Vogt followed the lead of Moleschott in his 
materiali sm . He e xp r e s sed t h e view of Cabanis tha t the 
"brain secretes thought as t h e live r secretes bile." His 
meth ods of meeting philosophical is s ues earned him t h e un-
enviable chara cteriz a tion of fi ghting his opinions chiefly 
"with the weapon of satire."3 
1 •. Spencer, FP, 56. 
2. Cited in Weber and Perry, HOP, 462 n~ 
3. Ueberweg, HOP, val. II,. 333. 
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28. BUCHNER 
Ludwig L. B~chner is better known than either of the 
other two German materialists mentioned. His Kraft and Stoff 
published in 1855 went through numerous editions as well as 
translations. The conception of matter took increasing 
account of the place of energy as a concept for the inter-
pretation of reality. He rejected all ideas of soul, God, 
irmnortality, and freedom. All consciousness has a material 
substratum which is a form of matter endowed with spiritual 
functions. The use of scientific discoveries and physic-
logical emphasis upon the relationship of consciousness and 
thought to the nature of the brain is prominent in his 
interpretation. The brain produces mind. Both brain and 
thought stand in such an immedi a te and necessary connection 
that neither can exist without the other.l 
29. HAECKEL 
These were followed by Ernst Haeckel who published 
" Die Weltratse1 (The Riddles of the Universe) in 1899. He 
holds that a monism is basic to all existence. This monism 
approaches a kind of naturalism or materialism. Stemming 
from a single unitary principle are two aspects of this 
monism. 'I'hes·e are matter, and force or energy. The two 
laws of the "conserva tion of matter," and the "conservation 
of energy." constitute what he calls the "funda mental cosmic 
law." All existence can be traced to this origin.2 
1. Hocking, TOP, 9 7 • 
2. Haeckel, RU, Chapter XII. 
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Haeckel uses the t.erms "ponderable matter"· and "impon-
derable matter," to designate matter whose mass can be deter--
mined and the "ether" whose mass cannot be determined. 
The existence of ether (or cosmic ether) 
as a real element is a' ~sitive fact arid 
has b~en known as such for the last twelve 
yea rs.l 
Much of his particular view of matter is due to the 
emphasis he makes on ether as a kind of matter. 
In my opinion the existence of ether is as 
certain as that of ponderable matter---as 
certain as my own existence, as I reflect and 
write upon i t.2 
There are five stages in the way in which matter is 
arranged. These are "(1) the etheric (2) the gaseous 
(3) the fluid (4) the viscous (in the living protoplasm) 
and (5) the solid state."3. From t h is it is clear that 
Haeckel looks upon ether as the primary stage of matter. 
For this reason, some have cal led this theory, the "ether 
theory of matter.•t4 
That most important clue he gives about the nature 
of ether is that 
••• the best idea of it can be formed by comparison 
with an extr em ely attenuated elastic and light 
jelly. It has no chemica l qua lity and is not 
comp osed of ato ms. It fills the whole of space 
in so f a r as it is n ot occupied by ponderable 
matter. It is in eterna l motion ••• and is the 
ultimate ca use of all ph enome na.5 
1. Haeckel, RU, 225. 
2 .. RU, 226. 
3. RU, 228. 
4. Gruber, CEN~ 216-230. 
5. RU, 227-228. 
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From this last statement it is clea.r tha t he attributes 
"ultima te causality 11 to ether ·and his description of it is 
an "energy concept." 
30. BOWNE 
Idealists as well as Materialists have held to the 
energy theory of matter. Borden Parker Bowne taught that 
the real nature of the physical world is a product of the 
'"one infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy by which it is 
continually supp orted, and r'rom wh ich it incessantly pro-
ceeds.111 
This is his solution to the troublesome problem of 
motion. Motion and activity have their source in the dynamic 
agency of a persona l being. The vast store of energy which 
matter is known to possess become s for Bowne just a small 
cosmic projection of something which is infinite in supply. 
He affirms tha t matter as experienced is phenomenally real, 
but not ontologically rea l. tt is just a vehicle through 
which the supreme being is expressing h is will. 
31. BRADLEY 
The views expre ssed by F. H. Bradley bea r close re-
lation to those of Hegel. He decla res his Appearance an~ 
Re.al ity which was produce.d in 1893 that reality is only found 
when some principle is discovered which can stand alone and 
l • . Bowne, ME T, 243. 
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does not involve contradiction. This he c alls the Absolute. 
All experience involves partial aspects of the Absolute. The 
truth and reality will only be found in the Absolute. The 
physical world known as the world of Nature is an abstrac-tion 
which cannot exist by itself apart from the Absolute. It is 
the not-self and shows that within the Absolute there is an 
independence from soul. It always appears in the form of 
space, and its action is a movement from without rather than 
prompted from within. "The material world is an incoherent, 
a one-sided, and self-contradictory appearance of the real."l 
3·2. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETATIONS 
A survey of the various views of matter held before 
the twentieth century reveals that materialistic thinkers 
have generally given more comp rehensive accounts than the 
ideali s t s . The vague n a ture of t hi s subject as treated by 
Plato is in marked contrast to the clear and well developed 
treatment of Democritus. There is no mistaking what Lucretius 
means qy matter. Plotinus is no clearer than Plato though 
he make s some statements of a more definite nature~ 
The two views wh ich seem ·most in harmony with the 
science of t he twentieth century are what may be termed the 
tta.tomic theory" and the "energy theory." The atomic theory 
has been p roposed in var ious ways by the Vai sesi ka of India. 
as well as the Greeks, Leucippus and Democri tus , a nd the 
Roman Lucretius. It received marked attention from Gassendi 
1. Bradley, AR, 235. 
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and Dalton. The energy theory was first suggested by Hera-
clitus, and then l F.!. ter by Descartes, Le·ibniz, Bllchner, Haeckel, 
Bowne, and others. Both theories h a ve their sources in experi-
ence. The discovery tha t an object can be reduced to simpler 
constituents sugg ests continuing the analysis until something 
is found which can not be broken down. The continual dis-
covery of movement and ac~ion suggests an energy theory for 
matter. Subsequent scien i ific discoveries have added much 
evidence to supn ort the e1ergy theory. The atomic theory 
has generally been develoJed more by an appeal to a specu-
lative than an empirical jet~od. 
Both the atomic and [ energy theories are an adva nce 
in thinking wh ich has gone far beyond the stage of narve 
realism such as found in ~he Carvakas of India. The atomic 
theory comes from an effoJt at systematic development of 
a cosmology and a metaphyiics which accounts for the facts 
of permanance, and change, or being and becoming. The energy 
theory is an extension of the problem of motion in relation 
to the atomic theory. It tells how the a toms move r a ther 
than that they move. 
Another very important trend in explaining matter 
is whether or not it shall be considered the only substance 
or whether it is a mode or attribute of substance. It is 
essentially the question of whether matter is reality or 
appearance. The materialists have regarded it as the funda-
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mental substance from which everything has come. All things 
are developments of matter. Evolutiona ry interpretations 
have gener a lly been used to explain how the co mp lexities 
have developed. The barde pt explanation is al ways that of 
the mind. This is attributed to the functioni ng of the brain . 
In such a sy stem, ma tter is eternal, unc a u s ed, possesses self 
movement and is indestructible. It is discovered as the 
ultima te unit whenever analysis is carried out as far as 
possible. All tha t is real is shown to be some organization 
of mat ter. 
The concept of matter held by a large number of dif-
ferent philosophers may be classed a s the mode or attribute 
of· real ity. Bene a th matter is found some more fundamental 
reality. Pantheistic interpretations t end to treat it as a 
fragment of a larger whole which constitutes reality. All 
views stress the depe nd ence of matter and its incompleteness 
apart from the more "c·oncrete" relatio"ns to which Hegel called 
a tten ti on. 
There is little in Plotinus tha t differs from Plato 
s o far as their ideas of matter are concerned. Both stress 
the suggestions of some kind of a formless-matter, such as 
Aristotle op p oses with convincing evidence. Since the moral 
- charac ter is determined by the realm of Idea s or the being 
of God, the mor e matter is removed from either, the less good 
is found in it. Such a negative view is easily refuted by 
an app eal to empirical evidence. 
102 
The :philosopher will always be indebted to Aristotle 
for his cl a rifica tion of the importance that form has in re-
lation to matter . There is n£_matter without form. Strange 
to say, his gre a t insi ght has been neglected even by scientists 
and philosophers of the twentieth century. There· is no doubt 
tha t Aris totl e did not realize the imp orta nce of his view as 
it applies to the study of the subje ct in its twentieth-
century analysis. 
The next chapter is a crit icism of these views in 
much more detailed manner. The purp ose of this chapter has 
been largely historical. 
CHAPTER V 
A CHITICISJvi OF THE INTERPHE TATIONS OF ltiATTER 
BEFORE TI-fE TWEN TIETH CENTURY 
A careful reading of what had been written about 
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matter p revious to the twentieth century reveals some nota-
ble accomplishments. The concept of matter as energy shares 
honors with the atomic concept as the two great contributions 
of earlier thought on this problem. The stress on form-matter 
by Ar istotle will show increasing importance in calling at-
tention to a neglected fact, which science has not stressed. 
Philosophers will see its value more in the future. There 
are certa in specific critic isms which result from tb.is study. 
1. THE SUBSTANCE 'IHEORY 
1'he dominant concept of matter held by many early 
thin1rers was tha t of an impenetrable spatial substance, 
cons tituting all that exists in the sensory realm. It was 
wha t occupied space. It caused resistance to man's activity. 
It was generally thought to be inert, lifeless, and without 
the power of self motion. Any movement of it was communicated 
to it in a mechanical fashion from some outside source. This 
early stage of thought might be termed a more na1ve inter-
pretation which developing science and philosophy could not 
permit to remain. Heraclitus recognized the importance of 
change, and a more fluid kind of substa nce. Democritus 
fa.ced the problem of motion and maae it inherent in the 
very nature of substancea But all of these efforts failed 
to transcend the 1 im.i ta tiona of simple mechanical explana-
tions of the behavior of matter. 
Present day criticism of these early thinkers has 
been concentrated especially at this point. The oversim-
plification of the problems which a mechanical explanation 
attempts finds one of the strongest critics in Sellars. 
oell a rs is indebted to Green, Bradley, Bowne and Ward for 
these views. One of his chief criticisms is its reductionism 
and the inadequacy of mechanical explanations. 
The older materialism declared that physical 
reality consists of matter and motion ••• In short 
it seems to me that this older materialism was 
largely the generalization in an uncritical 
fashion of the dominant mechanical view of the 
world .1 
It remained for later science to impress upon the se 
thinkers the importance of biological concepts with their 
more complex systems. While the mechanical explanation was 
useful in some areas it was only suited to limited instances. 
It failed to accomplish what the materialists thought it 
could do in explaining the higher activities of the orga.nic 
1 evel. 
The advances of physics and chemistry pointed towards 
a matter that seemed to be more of the nature of electricity, 
and energy. The discoveries about the structure of matter 
pointed to great stores of energy in a tiny portion of matter. 
1 .. Sellars, EN, ? • 
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The substance theory, gradually gave way to a more Heraclitic 
flux, and this in turn to energy. 
2 .. THE QUESTION OF STRUCTURE 
The structure of matter acco~ding to Empedocles was 
Earth, Air, Fire, and Water. To these he also ad ded the 
a gencies of Love and Hate. It is now known that all matter 
can be reduced to the basic structures found in the so-called 
particles of matter as the meson,. electron, proton, neutron, 
etc. The attraction and repulsion which were attributed to 
Love and Hate are explained by the inherent nature of oppo-
sitely charged particles to attract each other, and similar-
ly charged particles to repel one another. There is in this 
sense a pluralism in matter, but it is the pluralism of these 
minute particles. 
Contrary to the assumption of Anaxagoras, there is 
not an indefinite variety of qualitative characte rs, or atoms 
as they were later called by Democritus. There is a very 
limited number of different kinds of atoms, though they are 
not called atoms but particles such as the electron, proton, 
etc. 1~eir differences are not of the qualitative sort. 
The property of motion is properly disposed by Democritus as 
a characteristic of the atom in its na tural structure. It 
is not necessary to bring in some outside factor to account 
10.5 
for motion, so far as the level of scientific observation is 
concerned. In matter as man finds it there are various amounts 
of energy depending on the size of the material under ob-
servation. 
It is necessary to make clear the distinction in 
meaning of the term ~tom as used by Democritus and as used 
by modern science. Modern science regards the atom as the 
first subdivision of the molecule. Such an atom is subject 
to further division into the particles, as electrons, pro-
tons, neutrons, etc. Democritus has a very different con-
ception of the atom. He does not find it in the empirical 
realm. He finds it tnrough a rationalistic construction and 
for him it means a "discrete irreducible element."l If he 
had kept to this definition it would not have been difficult 
to affirm that he was virtually predicting the particles of 
present day physics. There is considerable resemblance be-
tween his a toms and more recent views of electrons and pro-
tons. The confusion which Democritus introduced when he at-
tempted to explain the soul as being atomic and at the same 
time diffused throughout the body, is indication of an inco-
herent conception of the atom, for an atom to be so diffused 
would have to be a far larger atom than Democritus described. 
The claim that qualitative differences may be reduced 
to quantitative differences is substantiated in the field of 
matter. The different kinds of elements are due to changes 
in the numbers of protons and electrons, in the atom. So 
l. Runes, DOP, 26. 
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far as qualitative changes in matter are concerned those 
differences are traced to quantitative dlfferences in the 
inner arrangements of protons, electrons, etc. 
3. MATTER AS THE ONLY SUBSTANCE 
The chief problem which confronts those who hold that 
matter is the only substance is to account for the facts of 
consciousness, mind~ and ideas. Every effort .which is made 
to do t h is glosses over the transition from matter to mind 
and depends primarily on concomitant variations between 
brain and menta l activity. This is substantially the argu-
ment of Cabanis and Halbach. There is no disposition of 
modern philosophers to overlook the fact that body does in-
fluence the mind, but it is also well known that the mind 
influences the body. The concomitant variations between mind 
and body . are just as impressive as those between body and 
mind. The str ongest arguments which materialists have ad-
vanced are offset by data which mi ght build t h e case for 
mi nd in t h e same way that materialism has worked for matter. 
To say that body influences mind is one thing , and must not 
be confused with the claim that mind is produced by body, 
but it appears that the materialists haYe made just such an 
irre levant conclusion. 
The development which biologists and geologists claim 
to find in nature, points in the direction of evolutionary 
theory. Such development se ems well established so far as 
the evidence has been gathered. The materia list who affirms 
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that matter is the only substance is put to the test in ex-
plaining novelty and development as something which is in-
herent in the very nature of matter. Where mind is one of 
the higher expressions of matter, anything resembling mind 
does not seem possible on earlier more rudimentary levels. 
The ac·tivity and organization which is necessary on the part 
of matter to reach the level of mind, must then be a mere 
chance movement and combination of those simpler particles 
which takes place on the suborg anic level. II Lecomte du Nouy 
has shown that such development on the basis of cnance is 
impossible in the time span which geology attributes to our 
earth • 1 
That unique organization and use of matter which is 
called a function of living things marks a level which matter 
as substance must explain. One looks in vain for satisfac-
to·ry explanations. The gaps between the various levels are 
not transcended by the mechanical explanations which the 
older philosophy employed. The necessity for meeting this 
is shown in the efforts to shape an explanation for novelty 
in the theories of emergent evolution. Recent thinkers 
have found that some explanation of each level must be made. 
The movement away from materialism towards naturalism had 
tended in the direction of theories of emergence in order 
that more satisfactory interpretations be made of novelty 
II 
1. du Nouy, HD, 26-39. 
108 
a nd the higher levels of evolution. 
The materialist who would reduce everything to matter 
arrives at such ideas by use of the method of analysis. An-
alysis may ac compli sh the reduction, but there is reason to 
wonder whether something has not been lost in the reduction, 
which is es sential to the formula. The difficulty of materi-
alism is shown in the p roblem of attempting to explain how 
from simpler levels of matter, one can ~ove to t he mo re co m-
p lic a ted level s of mind and spirit, since matter contains no 
purpose, consciousness, or thought until it develop s these 
q ualities as "emer gent.~ 
'f'o say that matter is the only substance is to a ssume 
the burden of proving that everything tha t is, derives its 
being from some form of matter. To c a rry out the implica-
tions of such a task has proved too difficult. Either it is 
nece ssar y t o g ive sucb meaning to matter that it does not 
agr e e v.'i t h observed qualities of matter, or it results in 
u ndue simplification and ne glects i mp orta nt a spects of the 
case. When materialists attempt to meet these issues, they 
genera lly abandon their so-called scientific approach and 
become hi gh ly speculative about matter. 
4. THE ENERGY CONCEPT 
'fhe shift in the concept of matter from dead, inert, 
substance to something which is endowed with movement is in 
the direction of more rece n t discoveries. The principle of 
activity in the monadology of Lei~n iz is in some respects 
more akin to the phi losophy of organism of Whitehead, Bergson 
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and others. The chief difficulty which any speculative system 
faces is found in the monadology. 'l'here is nothing in matter, 
apart from energy, and certain elementary qualities which 
would remotely resemble the monads of Leibniz. The pre-estab-
1 ished harmony of the natural order is more justifiable. 
But there is noth ing to indicate that there is the least bit 
of consciousness in theparticles of matter. 'l'here is response 
on the plane of attraction and repulsion, but that can hardly 
be called conscious. Since matter for Leibniz is a crea tion 
of God, the motion and activity may be traced back ultimately 
to God for their origin .. 
The German materialists, Vogt, Czolbe, Moleschott and 
.. 
Buchner interpreted matter as energy, and force. Their 
theories have been subj e cted to devastating criticism by 
Thilly who sa.ys: 
lndeed, the theories offered were, as a rule 
not consistent materialistic theories at all, 
but conglomerations of many views: thought be-
ing conceived sometimes as motion, sometimes 
as the effect of motion, sometimes as the nec-
essary concomitant of motion, sometimes as one 
of the aspects of an underlying unknown prin-
ciple of which motion is a parallel expression.l 
Very much the same criticism might be made of Wilhelm 
It 
Ostwald in his two works, Die L~erwendun~ des wissenshaft-
lichen Materialismus, (1895) and his UaturJ2.l:!ilosQ.ILI.!ie, (1902). 
His energy theory accounts for the various properties of 
matter as special - forms of energy as, kinetic, thermal, chem-
ical, magnetic, electrical, and psychical. The latter he sub-
1. Thilly, HOP, 492. 
divided into conscious and unconscious energy. By such a 
classification he explains interaction as the transition 
from conscious to unconscious energy. His transition from 
psychic energy to conscious energy is a fallacy of abstraction 
as well as unwarranted assumption. 
John Toland's stress on the p owe r of ma tter to be 
moved from with in is a continuation of the activity of Leib-
niz bu t he ma kes too much of the assumption that matter is · 
life, and offers no proof to supp ort that assertion. There 
is no evidence to indicate that one can move from matter to 
life. Life involv es unique powers which matter cannot pr oduce 
by itself . Physicists show that by itself, matter tends to-
wards incre ase of entropy. Living thi ng s exhibit a tendency 
to ward increase of or ganization. The materialist fails to 
take sufficient account of the imp ortance of t h e known facts 
about entropy in constructing his theory.. Of .course the early 
materialists had not profited by knowledge of this more re-
cent scientific fact. 
One of the chief difficulties of the energy concept 
of mat ter lies in t h e question of whe ther energy is ultimate 
or not. The older materialists are content to explain energy 
as being the essence of all there is in the cosmos . E ternal 
energy, as thus e xplained does not satisfy the question of 
p urpose and of form. 'rhe organization in the world as man 
discovers it, involves not only the en e rgy to p ut things to-
ge ther, but als o t he inte llig ence that provides the guidance 
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necessary to bring formal order into existence. If all of 
this is a part of the energy, or the matter of the material-
ists, then it would seem that some concept of person ality 
ought to be included in the idea of energy. Such eternal 
energy would be a far different entity from the energy as 
commonly understood by man. Calling it energy would be doing 
so in what Moore would call a highly nPickwickian sense." 
It would appear that the materialists are determined to 
have nothing akin to personality in the a gency of matter, 
but they think differently when it comes to the resu l ts of 
matter. In other words , he would expect to find the kind 
of results from this matter which experience teaches us can 
only come from some kind of mental ac t ivit y , but t here 
must be no trace of mind in the causes which explain the 
results. Materialists always leave this problem unsatis -
factory, for they fail to explain how energy is formally 
organized . 
It is well to go back to Aristotle for a moment and 
recall his stress on the fact that matter always appears in 
some form. The concept of matter as energy has much evidence 
to support it as a theory of matter . However, there is a 
lesson in Aristotle wh ich needs to be transferred to the 
energy concept . Energy (like Aristotle's matter) is always 
in some form, or organization, or characterized by a certain 
definite nature. This fact has been g enerally ne g lected by 
the materialists of the period under criticism. By its 
ne g le c t they have missed one of the most importm. t obser-
vations, which an a de quate hypothesis must include. 
In this connection the idealism of Bowne could be im-
proved by the development of an hypothesis of how matter 
is produced. Bowne says that matter is a product of none 
infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy, by which it is con-
tinually supported, and from ·which it incessantly proceeds. 11 1 
\Vba t he fails to recognize is the fact that energy alone 
does n o t explain all that is found in matter. There is also 
a formal structure. According to this view, all sense data 
are evidence for the existence of God. The immanence theory 
of Bowne causes him to make nature continually detemined 
by God both in its essence and in its activity, i.e., nature 
is the activity of God. The lo g ic of t h is position is shown 
in the l a ter wo rk of Brigbtman and e specially in his con-
ception of a Finite God. 
5. CONTI NGJi:NCY ANIJ INDE1ERMINACY 
Ma terialistic philosophies h ave generally tended to 
be more deterministic. 'l'his was one of the weaknes s es of a 
more ri g id mechanistic interpreta tion which attempted to 
explain everything in tems of motion, and reduct ion ism. 
Heisenberg 's Principle of Ind e terminacy presents a problem 
·wb.ich tbe older type of materialism was entirely unable to 
explain. It remained for the idealism of Leibniz and Fichte 
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to make a place for contingency in the interpretation of matter. 
Schelling, Schopenhauer and Lotze likewise provided more 
1 • Bo wn e , :MET, 2 4 3 • 
specul a tive justification for the freedom found in atomic 
matter. The i mp orta nce of continge ncy is decidedly more 
favorable to idealistic systems than to the more na tural-
istic and materialistic views. 
6. THE FALLACY OF ABSTRACTION 1 
Bergson and Vfu i tehead would both critici ze the earlier 
interpretations of matter for the fallacy of abstraction. 
Bergson recognizes matter, and a ll being as well, as part 
of an ongoing process. Time is the very essence of all 
reality. ~ any of the older interpretations of matter have 
left out the sense of the continuity, the sweep of being , 
as is stres sed in an ongoin g p rocess. A true conception of 
being must catch the entire history of it as it moves along. 
Wbitehe ad likewise looks upon all reality as process, and 
mat ter as living , organic, and like all living beings subject 
to change. lifJB. tter abstracted from process g ives a mere 
c adav er of the r eal matter . The dema nds of a more ac cura te 
errmiricism req uire that matter shall be defined so as to ex-
p l a in the dual truths of bei.Qg and becgming. At the same 
time it must avoid the dangers of an exclusive Heraclitic 
flux or an unchang ing Eleatic co n c ept. 
7. OUUWilE:D TREORIES 
The bold assertions of Haeckel have not been vind i-
cated by subsequent science, but have suffered disproof. 
His statement that affirms that •tthe exi s tence of the ether 
1~ Bowne develop ed the criticism which he termed the fallacy 
of abstraction. See 'ME T, 14-15. 
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is a positive fact," is ba sed on an outmoded science. 1 
If ether is discarded, the entire explanation of matter 
g iven by Haeckel falls apart. Einstein's recent views make 
wspace•t which has the property of curvature, a nev1 kind of 
ethe r. 
Lord Kelvin's vortex-ring t h eory has likewise suf-
f ered from later scientific criticism. What he a ttemp ted 
to do amounted to a formulation of matter that had no ma ss . 
One c a n be more ch a rita ble in criticism of t h is theory since 
it awaited l a ter sci entific demo n strat ions tha t would have 
pro bably c aused Lord Kelvin to reformul'a.te a more adequate 
theory. 
Thomson's vertical atoms lack one of t h e es-
sential attributes of matter; they have no 
wei- ght. Half a century a go, the elements req-
uisite for formulating a satisfactory t h eory 
were still wa nti ng . It was necessary to await 
the g reat discoveries which began during the 
last years of the nineteenth century, the dis-
coveries wh ich have renewed the very founda-
tionE of physical science.2 
8. ARISTOTLE'S POTENTIALITY 
Undo ubtedly Ar istotle viewed rna t ter as so meth ing wh ich 
is detected by the senses and therefore occup ies space. 
Ho wever, the main stress wh ich he mak es upon potentiality 
has been e mp loy ed constantly with ever wider application. 
Ma tter always is present in some form. The p roblem for meta-
phy s ics is ho~ this form is g iven to matter, if it is im-
1. Haeckel, RU, 225. 
2. Berthoud, NTMA, 46. 
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parted to matter. ~ellars woul d not be satisfied with a 
suggestion of the formal aspect of matter coming from out-
side. He would say that the form originates as a p art of 
t h e "integrative causality" inher ent in all matter, i.e., 
it emerges and is i mmanent in matter. 
One of the most impressive facts which man confronts 
in any study of matter, is the way in which it can be organ-
ized in a complex and wonderful manner on the many levels of 
nature. While potentiality as stre ssed by Aristotle, calls 
attention to this noticeable property of matter, it amounts 
to nothing more than a ttfunctiona l description" of how matter 
beha ves. It tells nothing about the ultimate nature of mat-
ter but leaves the question unanswered. 
9. CONCL USION 
The atomic theory of matter was the most rema rkable 
speculative accomplis~~ent of early philosophy on the prob-
lem of matter. 'Nh ile subj e ct to some modifications, it has 
been amply supported by subsequent science. The ene r gy con-
cept of matter is an importa nt ~alf-truth which was unfor-
tunately treated as the whole truth by ever .... enthusiastic 
materialists. It is a half-truth because it neglects the 
fact of form or organization. Concepts of motion were also 
important but they have turned out to be variations of the 
energy theory. 
Only in the idealistic philosophies are there trends 
in the direction of more organic views of matter. 
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One looks in vain for any comprehensive and satis-
factory metaphysical interpretation of matter among these 
early thinkers. 
117 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCEPTS OF MATTER HELD BY REPRES ENTATIVE 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS 
The advances of science during the last century have 
made it necessary that philosophers take into account these 
new insights. Philosophy has also advanced and the added 
insights and newer emphases of recent thought have made 
their impressions upon all thinkers. It is not advisable 
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in this study to make a complete survey of every shade of 
thought. Enough variety to give a fair presentation of what 
people are thinking will be found in the representative cases 
which have been selected for more intensive study. The 
systems chosen for study might just as well have been others. 
The only basis for choice was that each person seemed to 
represent some significant phase of the subject. The differ-
ences are largely due to following methods of analysis, or 
taking more organic conceptions. Obviously, no interpreta-
tion of matter can be fully understood or evaluated except 
in relation to the entire system of philosophy. This chapter 
is primarily interpretive. The next chapter will be a criti-
cism of these views. 
1. THE NATURALIS M OF R. W. SELLARS 
The naturalism of Sellars stresses the idea of emer-
gence and novelty. His system resembles S. Alexander's, 
Space, Time and Deity but does not employ the nisus to 
account for each higher level. All being is termed a "phy-
sical existent," but this concept must not be confused with 
a simple reductionism. The true meaning of ffmatterff is only 
fully appreciated in the richness of th.e various levels on 
which matter has emerged. Each of them has been capable of 
more complex types of action, higher organization, and more 
adaptive functions. He attempts to give full place to the 
findings of science and also the recent insights of phil-
osophy. '"Matter can assume many forms, all equally real, 
though different.~1 WBack of pomp and circumstances, back 
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of love and beauty and tragedy and happiness, lies--matter."2 
And matter is all there is that is real in Sellars's system. 
Its highest emergence is the value realm wherein man's spir-
itual life is an achievement of the highest order. 
When Sellars explains how these higher levels come 
into being he rejects the ~Thomistic theory of causality, as 
agency from above," and also the "dead level, atomistic me-
chanicalism."3 He calls his type of causality, "integrative 
causality,w stressing the importance of the forming of wholes, 
and the place of organization. He also gives "time" a very 
important place as "'pattern forming and functioning. 11 3 There 
are additive properties and other properties "novel or emer-
gent~ which go with the organizational nature and the func-
1. Sellars, PPR, 6. Subsequent references unnamed are to 
the works of Sellars. 
2. PPR, 6. 
3. Art. ( 1950), 4 71. 
tioning of the larger unity. He further points to the idea 
of "'free energy"' in the universe which has the favoring con-
ditions necessary for the novelty which is so important a 
part of his system. wrf integrative organization goes on 
in nature under favoring conditions of free energy, genuine 
novelty of process and procedure can take place."l 
Matter is fundamental to everything but it is a mat-
ter that is invested wit~ capacity for organization that 
accounts for all that is commonly termed organic and living, 
including the mind. Matter explains process. Process is 
matter functioning on a higher level. 
2. SANTAYANA'S REALM OF MATTER 
The thought of Santayana must be understood in rela-
tion to his epistemological dualism. In fact, Sellars and 
Santayana both are critical realists, and hence epistemologi-
cal dualists. There are two realms which he terms the 
realms of essence, and of matter. The realm of essence is 
essentially one of Platonic ideas. All knowledge is a know-
ledge of essences. These essences refer either to the realm 
of existence or of subsistence. The term Santayana seems 
to prefer for the realm of existence is that of matter. It 
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is known by what he calls "'animal faith.'t While it is possible 
for one to think of essences and be definite about them, the 
realm of existence is indefinite. It is a state of constant 
1. Art. (1950), 472. 
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flux. "~11 causal efficacy is ascribed to matter; the causes 
of mental changes are material."l There is a skepticism 
about the interpretations which men have given of the meaning 
of ma tter. Since Santayana posits it as inclusive of all 
existence he says: 
But it would be frivolous to attempt to define 
it, as if a set of words, or of blinking ideas, 
could penetrate to the heart of existence and 
determine how, fro~ all eternity, it must have 
been put to gether. 
For Santayana's use of the term matter, we are nearer 
to a Spi nozistic sutstance, which forms the ground of all 
tha t ex is t s, but whic h is not known in its ultimate meaning. 
It is more t he recognition of the givenness of a causal 
somet hing l y ing back of all experience, but mysterious and 
unknowable. He is not using the term matter in the sense 
in which the scientist uses it but rather in place of a 
g enera l term for existence. 
By the word matter I do not understand any 
human idea of matt~r, popular or scientific, 
ancient or recent. 
The axiom which governs his entire treatment of the 
subject is found in the following quotation: 
The dominance of matter in every existing 
being, even when that being is spiritual, is 
the great axiom of materialism, 4to which this whole book is only a corollary. 
This axiom grows out of his recognition of the extent to 
1. Russell, Art. (1940), 458. 
2. Santayana, ROM, 18. Subsequent references unnamed refer 
to Santayana. 
3. ROM, 140. 
4. RO M, 100. 
which man is bound by the circumstances of material exist-
ence. It is the recognition of the body, and its dependence 
upon nature. It is the realization of the influence of the 
material in our thought processes. It is something of the 
Stoic in more modern garb, bowing to the inevitable fact of 
~ature and finding answers to the every-day problems of life 
by conforming to the demands of nature. Only Santayana is 
not sure what the demands of nature are. He is sure of na-
ture as a fact of existence, but at best is able to recom-
mend only animal faith in man's commerce with nature. On 
the basis of what experience seems to indicate about matter, 
one must act, but one cannot be dogmatic or certain one's 
knowledge is true. All that he seems to know about matter 
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is, that it is "primeval, plastic substance of unknown poten-
tiality, perpetually taking on new forms."l 11 But my mater-
ialism, for all that, is not metaphysical. I do not profess 
to know what matter is in itself. But whatever matter may 
be, I call it matter boldly .•• 11 2 
3. BERTRAND RUSSELL'S LOGICAL ATOMISM 
The philosophical emphasis of Bertrand Russell is ex-
pressed in the following words. "I hold that logic is what 
is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be 
characterized rather by their logic than by their metaphysic. 113 
1. ROM, 100. 
2. SAF, vii, viii • 
3. Russell, Art. (1924), 359. 
subsequent references are 
Unless indicated otherwise, 
to Russell. 
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He describes his philosophy as "Logical Atomism." 
The structure of the world is said to consist of a 
number of entities. Each entity is called an "event." Each 
event is related to a certain number of others by what he 
terms a "compresence." Everywhere there are collections of 
"compresent events," which occupy a "minimal region on space-
time." He defines a set of compresent events as a "minimal 
region." These minimal regions form a four-dimensional mani-
fold, from which can be constructed the space-time manifold 
of physics. Similar events, in different regions give rise 
to variations which lead to the discovery of the laws of 
propaga tion of li g ht, sound, etc. Some regions having pe-
culiar properties are designated as occupied by matter. 
Matter forms habits of altering its structure in certain 
environments in almost a uniform manner.l 
The most that is claimed for these hypotheses is that 
they "may be true. 11 Russell says, 11 ! do not believe there 
is any method of arriving at one sole possible hypothesis, 
therefore certainty in metaphysics seems to me unattainable."2 
He has suggested that to understand his views on this 
subject it might be helpful to use the "Leibnizian analogy 
if not taken too seriously. 113 Any study of his thought re-
veals that he has undergone a change, moving from a more 
1. Art. (1924), 380-382. 
2. Art. ( 1924) , 382. 
3. Art. (1944), 710. 
phenomenalistic viewpoint to that of neutral monism and to 
1 
a more empirical emphasis. 
He criticises the view that matter is impenetrable 
calling it one of those neat properties which is the wmark 
of a logical construction, ... but "not an empirical fact."2 
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It is very clear that his so-called "events" have the property 
of compresence and these events are the "bricks out of which 
the world is built •-" Matter according to Russell is a com-
plex consisting of many of these events. If the term matter 
is employed in the sense in which Russell uses it then it 
mi gh t be treated as having the property of impenetrability 
in some instances. When he denied i mpenetrability it would 
a ppear that he was thinking of the more ultimate and funda-
mental "events."· What Russell means by "eventsn other thinkers 
often desi gnate as matter. 
Matter, then, is a complex, consisting of many events 
whose property of compresence makes possible the interrela-
tions revealed to the senses as matter. 
4. RALPH BARTON PERRY AND NEO-REALIS M 
The problem of matter for Ralph Barton Perry and the 
nee-realists is the problem of a complex. Matter, as known 
in experience, does not reveal its true nature. This posi-
tion is clearly formulated in his assertion that "mind and 
body are both complexes capable of being analyzed into more 
1. Sta ce, Art. (19 44 ), 357-358. 
2 . Art. (1 924), 366. 
primitive terms."l 
This school of thought follows the analytical method. 
To understand matter, the analysis is carried beyond the 
stage of atom, proton, and electron. The final stage is an 
ana lyzable, simple entity, sometimes called a neutral entity 
to indicate that it is neither mind nor matter. The state-
ment of Holt may well set forth the view of Perry at this 
point. 
The picture which I wish to leave is of a 
general universe of being in which all things 
physical, mental, and logical, propositions 
and terms, existent and non-existent, false and 
true, good and evil, real and unreal, subsist. 
The entities of this universe have no substance 
but if the spirit is weak to understand this, 
then let the flesh, for a season, here predi-
cate a neutral substance.2 
Matter then becomes a vanishing something, which an-
alysis can break down into these neutral entities. These 
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entities can enter into complex wholes which have many varied 
qualities. He speaks of the possibility ~that the same ele-
ments compose both mind and body."3 This tends to break 
down the concep tion of reality of two impenetrable spheres 
and leaves a fundamental explanation for the interpenetra-
tion of the two. The mind-body problem ceases to be such a 
problem to the nee-realist for what is an entity of one may 
(like a point which lies at the intersection of two lines) 
be in both objects at the same time. 
1. Perry, PPT, 310. 
2. Holt, NR, 372. 
3. Perry, PPT, 311. 
The problem of discovering reality becomes the prob-
lem of finding by the mathematical method those relationships 
within the complexes which ultimately yield the most simple 
and universal realities, namely neutral entities. 
I~tter is a complex of neutral entities. 
5. BERGSON AND THE INVERTED .PSYCHE 
Bergson begins the treatment of the problem of mat-
ter on the empirical plane. He asks, "How do we know any-
thing about matter?". The answer is, 11 our perception of 
matter." His epistemology quickly disposes of the kind of 
idealism that leaves the qualities of matter within the per-
ceiving subject. 
As if everything lost to matter must be gain-
ed by spirit, spiritualism has never hesitated 
to despoil ma tter of the qualities with which 
it is invested in our perception, and which, 
on this view, are subjective appearances.! 
He believes that matter is known through percep tion 
and that it is just what perception reveals it to be. 
Now as we have shown, pure perception, which 
is the lowest degree of mind--mind without mem-
ory--is2really part of matter, as we understand 
matter. 
This assumption supports an epistemological dualism, and 
rejects the kind of relativisms which a more existential 
philosophy would en gender. 
l. Bergson, MM , 79. Subsequent unnamed references are 
to Bergson. 
2. MM , 297. 
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The truth is that there is one , and only 
one , method of refuting materialism: it is 
to show that matter is precisely what it 
appears to be.l 
Perhaps no statement sums up in better manner his 
views on the perception of matter than the following: 
For it is possible to sum up our conclusions 
as to pure perception by saying that there is 
in matter something more than, but not some-
thing different .from, th~t which is actuall.J:. 
given. This arr~unts to saying that matter can-
not exercise powers o.f ~~y kind other than 
those which we perceive . It has no mysterious 
virtue, it can conceal none . 2 
In perception one does not comprehend the whole of matter 
~ 
but one does find the nature of matter and anything further 
which could be known would not differ in kind , from what is 
already known . 
Along with this "common sense" view of matter , Berg-
son .finds it necessary to treat the problem of memory . All 
perception is related to memory . The two are "inseparable 
in practice ; "l Memory imports the past and "lends to per-
ception its subjective character."l In order to understand 
matter there must be "elimination of the contributions of 
memory. 11 1 When this is done, the pure perception gives. the 
~ 
"essent i al part of matter . "3 
Still keep ing to the empirical approach, Bergson sug-
gests that if spirit is a reality that the memory is the 
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place in which "we may come into touch with it experimentally. "3 
1. MM, 80 . 
2. MM, 78 . 
J . MM , 81 . 
He affirms that the living body and the nervous system in 
particular are both unable to engender representations 
sue h as one finds in memory. They are only "channels for 
the transmission of movements." 1 
1 28 
The origin of matter is the same as that of intellect. 
There is a tendency in Bergson to break down the division 
between the two as found in Gartesianism. 
An identical process must have cut out mat-
ter and the intellect, at the same time, from 
a stuff that contained both. Into this real-
ity we shall go back more and more completely 
in proportion as we comp~l ourselves to tran-
scend pure intelligence. 
All that exists has its origin in what he describes as a 
series of explosions which he compares to a rocket. Life 
has its origin in a series of these explosions or vital 
thrusts. Matter is often presented as an inverse process 
to that of intellect and consciousness. He speaks of it as 
winverted psyche." 
Behind 11 spirituality": on th.e one band and 
"materiality" with intellectuality on the 
other, there are then two processes opposite 
in their direction, and we pass from the 
first to the second by way of invers~on, or 
perhaps even by simple interruption. 
Matter as contrasted with the freedom found in spirit, is 
"'inertia, geometry, necessity." 4 
Bergson has tried to develop a theory of matter which 
does away with the difficulties ordinarily found in the mind-
1. MM, 81. 
2. CE, 218. 
3. CE, 220. 
4. Mg, 17. 
body problem. Empirically he recognizes the close associa-
tion between the two but he is careful to indicate that mind 
and brain, or consciousness and the nervous system, are no~ 
to be considered as one and the same, as certain naturalistic 
and ma terialistic systems have asserted. Consciousness is 
more than the nervous system. The nervous system is compared 
to consciousness as the edge of a knife to the entire knife. 
The closest he comes to a metaphysical definition of matter 
is his sta tement that matter is the inverse of the psychical. 
It has a 11 tendency to constitute isolable systems .'rl It 
"calls forth effort and makes it possible.•r. 2 
6. WHITEHEAD'S ORGANIC VIEW 
Whitehead looks upon the interpretation of matter as 
ordinarily given by science as an abstraction. It is lacking 
in relation to the entire order of things and as such is 
fragmentary and incomplete. The business of philosophy is 
to remedy this defect and produce a more complete insight 
due to a recognition of the entire relationships which e~ist. 
I hold that philosophy is the critic of ab-
stractions. Its function is the double one, 
first of harmonizing them by assigning to them 
their right relative status as abstractions, 
and secondly of completing them by direct com-
parison with more complete intuitions of the 
universe, and thereby promoting the ~ormation 
of more complete schemes of thoug ht. 
The concept of organism is Whitehead's answer to the 
1. CE, 13. 
2.. ME, 28. 
3. Whitehead, SMW, 126. Subsequent unnamed references 
are to Whitehead. 
129 
meaning of matter. 
The doctrine which I am maintaining is t h at 
the whole concept of materialism only applies 
to very ab stract entities, the products of 
logic~l discernment. The concrete enduring1 
entities are organisms which ent e r i n to it. 
There is much of kinship in tq.e thought of Whi the.ad and 
Bergson when the concept of organism is treated. It is also 
noticeable that Whitehead has come very close to Hege l in 
the empha sis upon concreteness and relatedness as giving the 
truth abou t matt er. The movement, c11ange , and energy which 
one finds in matter is organized and individualized. He 
s p eaks of "atomic material entities," very much as others 
speak of· particles of matter. 2 In his later me taphysics he 
speaks of "actual entities" as being the 11 final realities" 
3 and he a scribes dipolarity to them. This dipolarity at-
temp ts to bring the mental and physical into organic relation. 
The conception of organism which is basic to the en-
tire system of Whitehead is the final explanation of t h e 
problem. He spe aks of molecules, electrons, and living things 
as organisms.4 "Individualityn se ems to be the chief char-
acteristic whereby this distinction is made. In the prob-
lems abou t matter he says that individuals must be studied. 
If we wish to throw light upon the f a cts 
relating to organisms, we must study either 
the individual molecules and Ftlectrons, or 
the individual living beings.~ 
1. SNrvV, 115. 
2. SMN , 155. 
;3 •• - PR, - 32, 72. 
4 S1.'1W, 162. 
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This suggestion causes great difficulty when an a ttempt 
is made to understand the organisms found in individual mole-
cules o~ in electrons. The re~ults of the attempt of Heisen-
berg to meet this problem are summed up in the principle of 
indeterminacy. The important fact that emerges is that of 
process. wThus nature is a structure of evolving processes. 
The reality is the process." 2 Matter is organism, and or-
ganism is process. Process stresses the togetherness of 
things in space-time. Whitehead uses the term •r. prehensive" 
to describe this togetherness.3 But matter is also individ-
ualized and as such is separated in space-time from other 
organisms. This characteristic is called its 11 s~parative" 
character. 3 
In his criticism of materialism are found certain 
sug gestions that indicate the inadequacy of the older views. 
There persists, however, throughout the whole 
period the fixed scientific cosmology which pre-
supposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible 
brute matter, or material spread throughout 
space in a flux of configurations. In itself., 
such a material is senseless, valueless, pur-
poseless. It just does what it does do, fol-
lowing a fixed routine imposed by external re-
lations which do not spring from the nature of 
its being. It is this assumption that I call 
scientific materialism. Also it is an assump-
tion which I shall challenge as being entirely 
unsuited to the scientific situation at which 
we have now arri ved. It is not wrong if pro-
perly construed. If we confine ourselves to 
certain types of facts, abstracted from the 
complex circumstances in which they occur, the 
materialistic assumption expresses these facts 
to perfection. But when we pass beyond the ab-
1. SMW., 162. 
2.. SMW, 106. 
3. SMW, 94. 
straction, either by more subtle employment of 
our senses, or by the request for meanings and 
for coherence 1of thoughts the scheme breaks down at once. 
One of the most difficult problems before modern 
physics is that of the corpuscular and wave theory of matter. 
Whitehead suggests a solution to this problem by the dis-
integration of the corpuscle and its dissociation into 
li gh t waves. 
There are certain indications in modern phy-
sics that for the role of corpuscular organisms 
a t tbe ba se of the physical field, we require 
vibratory entities. Such corpuscles would be 
the corpuscles detected as expelled from the 
nuclei of atoms, which then dissolve into waves 
of light. We may conjecture that such a cor-
puscular body has no gr~at stability of endur-
ance when in isolation. 
7. HAR TSHORNE'S PANPSYCHIS M 
Hartshorne, influenced by both Whitehead and Peirce, 
calls his view panpsychism. He divides all existents into 
two classes. "Thus there seem to be two great classes of 
existents: organisms, which form a scale from low to hi g h; 
and inorganisms (if one may coin that word) which cannot 
readily be put on this scale.w 3 He considers ~inorganisms" 
as a ggrega tes or systems of organisms. All things which 
are individuals 11 fall upon a single scale running from the 
least particle of inorganic matter to the great universe 
itselr.n·4 One of the q_uestions which becomes very important 
1. SMVV, 25-26. 
Z. S MW , 193. 
3. Hartshorne, BH, 111. Subsequent references are to 
Hartshorne unless otherwise indicated. 
4. BH, 112. 
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in such a view is the nature of the variables which cause 
us to place some enti ties hi g her in the scale than others. 
These variables are shown in the increasing complexity of 
spatio-temporal structur e and also in the complexity of 
psychological activities such as feeling , volition, and 
thought. 
The hi g her individuals on closer examination are 
shown to be inclusive of lower individuals. 
Only the theory of "compound individuals," 
the individual consisting of individuals which 
to some extent, but not absolutely, are subor-
dinated to the whole, can satisfactorily inter-
pret the facts of modern science, satisfactorily 
solve the old philosophical problem of the one 
and the many.l 
Differences between individuals may be "statable as differ-
ences among values of the cosmic variables. 112 Operating 
from the empirical base of what is found in human experience 
he looks upon the 11 psychic variables 11 such as cognition, 
feeling , and volition, as a sure basis for unders_tanding the 
nature of all individuals. The individual will function ac-
cording to these variables, be it on a lower or a hi g her 
variation. He uses these psychological variables for appli-
cation to the entire scale of beings because 11 there are no 
other variables." 3 If one is to understand the problem of 
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each individual, panpsychism in its dependence upon the know-
ledge which man derives from his own psychic experience, 
1. BH, 123. 
2.. BH, 114. 
3. BH, 121. 
offers what Hartshorne considers the only alternative to 
follo w. Other wise the problem is left an ''impenetrable mys-
tery ." God is an individual who has realized the minimum 
of these variables and includes those found in lower indi-
viduals. There is a very close resemblance to the assertion 
of Bo wne that "personality is the key to reality." Psychic 
experience becomes the clue whereby he forms his hypothesis 
to exp lain the problem of every individual. His system is 
akin to that of Leibniz but avoids the determinism of the 
latter. He also allows for a more dynamic interaction of 
the monads. There is t he added advantage of an empirical 
support for the theory which is lacking in a more rational-
istic approach. 
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The problem of matter for Hartshorne is just the prob-
lem of one group of individuals, somewhat low on the scale, 
but possessing a degree of psychic variability. Recent dis-
coveri es such as quantum mechanics, and the work of Planck, 
Bohr, and Heisenberg all require the factor of contingency 
i n any adequate theory of the nature of matter. Hartshorne 
fi nds his ~~"psychic variables" meeting this req:uirement. 
The living matter of the system of Hartshorne requires 
that the .activity be both sentient and purposive. He calls 
attention to the fact that most of our observations of so-
called dead matter may be traced to aggregates of individuals 
which are observed. When the stone appears dead it must be 
rememb ered that the stone is a myriad of individuals assem-
bled in an aggre ga te. The evidence of science is quite 
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different when individuals are observed .instead of aggrega tes. 
While science does not prove conclusively that individual 
atoms, or electrons or any other particles have the property 
of sentience, yet it bas brought forth nothing to disprove 
the possibility. 
The dependence upon man's experience for clues to the 
nature of matter, at times, seems to place Hartshorne in a 
position akin to that of Berkeley. He rejecta any such im-
plication and in recognizing the problem of the "egocentric 
predicament" insists that: 
The basis of panpsychism muijt not be that 
everything I know or think is something known 
or thoug ht by me and hence dependent on me. 
The argument is rather that everything I know 
or think is such that I can abstract from its 
relation to my system and still see the object 
as a member of some other system by virtue of 
which it exists as part of a real individua l , 
and as such similar to and substantially almost 
identical with itself as part of my system .•• 
Everything I know is sympathized with, parti-
cipated in, by me and hence is akin to me.l 
The answer of Hartshorne to the problem of matter is 
best summarized in the statement that "~atter is low-grade 
mind." 2 
8. BOODIN'S FUNCTIONAL MATTER 
The outcome of Boodin's thought in his most recent 
publications leaves a dualistic cosmology as the answer to 
the quest of metaphysics. "We must with Plato, recognize 
two fundamental principles in the cosmos--spirit and matter. 113 
1. BH, 187. 
2.. BH, 191. 
3. Boodin, GOD, 113. Subsequent references are to Boodin 
unless otherwise indicated. 
In his earlier writings a more monistic position is taken 
which explains the variations observable in the cosmos as 
various energy systems which all express reality. 
Reality · reveals itself in many systems. It 
is matter, it is light, it is electricify, it 
is mind, it is truth, right and beauty. 
He says that the "simplest unit of reality is an energy 
system.w2 From his earliest writings the definition of 
matter would be some kind of "energy system." In ~is chap-
ter on "Dualistic Cosmology, 11 be says, "we cannot venture to 
say what ma tter ultimately is.~ 3 This last statement must 
be taken as an indication that be has no m~taphysical answer 
to the problem of matter. Boodin says as much, or more, 
about matter, than almost any other modern philosopher. 
While be recognizes two principles in the cosmos yet 
they are in a state of cooperative endeavor. Viewed apart 
from the more organic nature of his cosmos they are mere 
abstractions. He is careful to avoid a trunc a ted view of 
m& t t er by warning against a process of abstr action. 4 Jus-
tice must be given to his organic cosmology. "My cosmology 
is built upon the conception of the cosmos as a going and 
self-regulating whole. 115 
In the creative evolution which is an ongoing pro-
cess, matter and spi rit have their two functions to perform. 
1. RU, 53. 
2. RU, 35. 
3. GOD, 113. 
4. CE, 125. 
5. GOD, 112. 
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They are complementary to each other. Some of the properties 
of matter are well described as winertia, entropy, losing of 
potential, disintegration, and dissociation of energy."l 
He sees matter as rreverywhere controlled by spirit," 
and the "whole material world immersed in spirit." 2 It is 
matter that "furnishes t he body, and spirit the soul of 
things." 1 Both are complementary to each other. Neither 
could function without the other. But matter is an energy 
s ystem which is increasing entropy, i.e. spending energy and 
hence reducing potential. Spirit on the other hand is able 
to reduce entropy, i.e. increase energy potential and store 
it up for later use. Immanent in his cosmology is God who 
is at work "present in his integrity everywhere.n3 "God is 
the soul of the cosmos • 114 He rejects a pan theism and comes 
closer to a personalism, making the distinction of God as be-
ing more than "personal in our imperfect sense ••• rather in-
conceivably higher than what we mean by personality."5 
Boodin holds to the concept of energy when thinking 
of matter. "Matter must occupy a secondary place to that of 
energy." 6 "What has been established is that matter must 
be exp l a ined in terms of energy rather than energy in terms 
of the interactions of inert matter. 117 
1. GOD, 115. 
2. GOD, 114-115. 
3. GOD, 41. 
4. GOD, 39. 
5. GOD, 41, 45. 
6. RU, 24. 
7. RU, 25. 
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If matter is energy, then the question of the nature 
of matter becomes the question of the nature of energy. This 
question he answers in terms of what energy does. 
Since the fundamental characteristic of en-
ergy is activity, it would seem that the saner 
attitude is that of common sense and science, 
bot h of which estimate energy by what it does 
•.• And if energy reveals itself in certain phy-
sical and psychological changes, these we must 
assume, indicate the nature of energy.l 
Questions about the ultimate origin of matter are not 
ans wered by Boodin. He rejects "creation out of nothing 
at a finite time. 112 Creation as he employs the term means 
"transformation." He stands on the sure foundation of an 
emp irical approach that will "start with the evidence from 
the persp~ctive where we are in history. Nature as we now 
conceive it consists of pulses of energy ••• within an elec-
tromagnetic field and a gravitational field."3 
Boodin's answer to the nature of matter is in func-
tional terms rather than metaphysical. Matter is an energy 
sys tem, whose ultimate nature is unknown but whose activity 
g ives rise to a cooperative adventure cosmic in scope and 
ranging from simple ~evels to the highest known which is 
man. It is one of the five attributes which are "genuine 
aspects of reality. 114 
9. ROYCE'S THEORY 
Royce makes a distinction between what he calls the 
1. RU, 67. 
2. TIU, 488. 
3. TIU, 489. 
4. RU, 385-386. 
" World of Description" and the "World of Appreciation." 
The former is what each individual discovers in exp erience 
when using the methods of investigation common to science. 
These discoveries are important and have their place in any 
attempt to understand the nature of things. At this point 
he makes room for every possible contribution science could 
ever offer to such a study. 
But such knowledg e as is found in the World of De-
scri p tion i~ fragm entary and therefore inadequate to solve 
the problem. 
It hardly needs very elaborate proof to show 
that this world of description as it has now 
at length been defined for us cannot be the 
whole of the real world.l 
Rather must this limited viewpoint be supp lemented by what 
is found through the World of Appreciation. All events in 
nature bear a double aspect. Their true meaning is found 
in the hi g her order of appreciation which sees them in their 
more synoptic relations. 
For all physical causation is only the de-
scribable translation of the inner meaning of 
things into terms of relations amongst bodies. 
The relations of the world of appreciation, 
which is the true world, to the world of de-
scrip tion, which is its show, are therefore 
themsel~~s in no wise relations of cause and 
effect. 
The entire problem of metaphysics resolves itself in 
his concept of the Logos. This is a position of Absolute 
Idealism wh ich still attempts to preserve the integrity and 
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1. Royce, SMP, 405. Subsequent references are to Royce unless 
otherwi s e indic a ted. 
2. SMP, 419. 
reality of each individual. Royce's statement of his view 
should leave no one in doubt about his position. 
The true world is, to sta te our theory 
afresh, the system of the thoughts of the 
. Logos. His unity, as we have seen, is a 
reflective, a self-conscious, and so an 
ap preciable, but not1 in the deepest truth, a describable unity. 
Another expression of his idealism is his assertion that 
"the world, then, is sue h s tu1' f as ideas are made of. 
Th6ught pos sesses all things." 2 
All inves ti gations of science are valuable as t hey 
will indic a te the way in which the structure of the world 
points at last to a "single ordered system in which count-
les s definable series of real facts are intervvoven."3 He 
warns that sensory experiences will not give the answers 
which the philoso p her seeks. They do not even give the 
direct percep tio n of matter. They merely give the si gns 
which are interp reted as matter. 
The senses never show us, by themselves, the 
true Being of anything whatever. It would be 
vain to assert that we perceive directly through 
our senses, the existence of that which we call 
matter. The senses never show us individuality 
but only the presence of sense qualities •.• we 
interpret as the signs of the existence of mat-
ter.4 
Beyond the ass ertion that the world is made of "such 
stuff as ideas are made of, 11 there is little further clari-
fic a tion in Ro yce of the problem of matter. Speaking of the 
1". SMP , 415. 
2. SMP, 380. 
3 • Vii i , I I , 70 • 
4. VVI, I I, 159. 
difficulties in the mind-body problem be said, "matter is 
actually the more mysterious of the two extremes since it 
is not immediately given." 1 His suggestion that the more 
c a refully scientists try to explain matter the more they 
approach the world of appreciation, receives impr essive 
support in the statements of recent scientists such as 
Jeans, Eddington, Heisenberg, de Broglie, and others. 2 
Royce then throws the problem of matter back on the 
problem of the Logos, and how the Logos functions. 
10. BRIGHTMAN'S PHENOMENALISM 
The ideas of Brightman show a development from what 
he terms "moving from a Kantian to a more metaphysical 
view."3 At an earlier time he held to what he called . a 
"scientific positivism," which asserted th~t experience is 
all that science knows, thus leaving open the question of 
the possibility of metaphysics. 4 He also widened the scope 
of science by tbe "critical positivism" which not only 
allowed science to formulate laws of actual experience but 
also made a place for "laws of all possible experience. 115 
This latter experience he described as "idea~ly possible." 
Thus science gave truth but not the wh-ole truth. A meta-
physical explanation of these facts would be justified only 
by going beyond the confines of science for its answer. 
1. WI, II, 212. 
2. WI, II, 214-219. 
3. Brightman, as contained in a personal communication to 
the author. All subsequent references are to Brightman 
unless otherwise indicated. 
4. PI, 44. 
5. PI, 45. 
The facts which science gives about nature, viewed 
in the larger perspective of ideals caused him to conclude 
t ha t "nature is a vehicle for the realization ••• of ideals." 1 
In the li g ht of t he ep istemological problems which nature 
pos es, he concl uded that "nature is nothing more than actual 
or possi ble experience of minds. 11 2 
His present vie ws affirm that God is the 11 unbegun and 
un endi ng energy of the universe ••• and matter an order of 
organization of the experience of God. 113 Matter in the 
organi zation as detected by the senses and as reported by 
science is real for experience. He is willing to give 
science every a dvantage to describe and explore matter, but 
whateve r science reveals will be nothing more t han a de-
scription of experience which he terms "appearance or 
phenomena." 4 
In one of his most recent books he affirms that "every 
l aw of nature is a law of God, every energy of nature is a 
""" deed of God. ttO Matter is defined in another place as 11 the 
will of God in action. u6 It is this which Bri g htman feels 
affords a more log ical explanation for the "law abiding pro-
perti es," of na ture. Following the position of other per-
sona lists he believes that "the facts of consciousness are 
clues to the na ture of all reality--the only possible clues." 6 
1. PI, 97. 
2. PI, 99. 
3. PR, 226. 
4. PI, 44. 
5. NV, 120. 
6. PR, 399. 
The ultimate fact in the universe is God. "God can 
be ultimate, because the concept of God is coherent with 
all facts. 111 "'Matter cannot be ultimate because it is an 
hypothesis inco herent with experienced facts. 111 
The ans wer to the problem of matter is found in two 
ways. Exp erience reveals functions, laws of behavior, and 
numerous properties and qualities, but all of them are phe-
no menal. The metaphysical answer to the problem of matter 
leads to the "will of God." Brightman and Bowne stress the 
idea that the essence of being is activity and the will of 
God stresses the active nature of God, but it is an activ-
ity which is intelligently controlled and morally grounded. 
From a religious standpoint his theory of nature is termed 
"the immanence of God in nature • 112 On this hypothesis, it 
is possible to .explain the many facts known about matter 
to gether with the larger relations it bears to all exper-
ience. Coh eren ce both in logic and experimentation support 
t hi s pos ition more adequately than the rival claims of 
na t u ralism which leav es some impersonal "energy," 11 matter, 11 
or "p hys ical substance" to work its way up through the 
levels of organi zation till one r eaches the highest forms 
of living beings. 
1. PR, 399.; 
2. ITP, 336. 
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11. SUMMARY 
Modern thought about matter ranges itself in the 
two g reat divisions of functional description and meta-
physical explanation. Boodin is an outstanding example 
of t he former. His works are steeped in scientific lore. 
Bergson and Sellars likewise make much of the functions 
of matter but this does not suffice for them. They also 
employ metaphysical explanations. Metaphysical explana-
tions fall into the three general classes of materialism 
(or naturalism of the kind set forth by Sellars), neutral-
ism, and idealism. The idealistic group includes the 
three principal types commonly classed as, absolute ideal-
ism, panpsychism, and personalism. If there is any satis-
factory definition of matter it will necessarily have to go 
be yond the functional descriptions which science, as well 
as p hilosop hy, has acivanced. The functional descriptions 
are guides to a destination which will be reached only when 
reason supplements experience. 
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CHAPTER VII 
A CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPTS OF MATTER HELD BY 
REPRESENTATIVE TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS 
The last chapter indicated the main divisions of 
modern philosophies of matter as either functional descrip-
tions or metaphysical explanations. the former are impor-
tant as clues to be followed. The latter come to grips with 
the real purpose of t his study. 
There are three major classes of metaphysidal expla-
nations which will be considered. These are found in systems 
of neutralism, naturalism, and idealism. Neutralism will 
be shown to have certain weaknesses which are due in part 
to the limitations of philosophical methods and a failure 
to meet epistemological requirements. Laclc of empirical 
justification and incoherence also invalidates it. 
The issue lies between naturalism and idealism. It 
is well to indicate here that Bergson and Whitehead are here 
treated as idealists. The writer is aware of diverse inter-
preta tions of Whitehead, but the dynamic character of his 
concept of process and the 111feeling" ascribed to a l l actual 
occasions warrant such inclusions. 
·1.. WHY NEUTRALISM IS UNSATISFACTORY 
The chief criticism of the method of analysis is its 
failure to take sufficient recognition of the properties of 
wholes. Unless it is supplemented by a synoptic account of 
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reality it fails to provide for the simple difference which 
even a child c a n note between a dissected animal and a living 
an irna.l. 
The epistemolo g ical monism of nee-realism which is 
some times known as 11 panobjectivism," poses gre a.t difficulties 
especi a lly in the kn owle dg e of other persons a nd in explain-
ing error. If the distinction between subject and object is 
broken do wn as t h is theory contends, the probl e ms mentioned 
beco me a.cu te. 
Another di ff icul ty is how one bridges the gap be tween 
existe nce and subsistence. While nee-realism has a solution 
of the mind-body problem it has to explain how one moves from 
subsistence to existence. This would not be a problem if 
some causal age nt might be employed , but there can be no such 
agent in this system. How then do these entities which sub-
sist, get together and form complexes? Neutralism fails to 
account for movement, change or p rocess. Has the history 
of being , b e en a story of movement from simp le to more com-
plex objects or ha s the comn lex exi ~ ted from the beginning? 
A rigorous neutra lism is inadequate to explain the dynamic 
character of events. 
Perry's claim that ma tter is a complex is g e nerally 
accepted, but not accepted as a complex of s imp le neutrals. 
The popular sense in which matter is viewed as the background 
of what gives sense experience, is shown by science to be a 
co mplex. Analysis has been possible, i.e. the complex can 
be reduced to simpler forms. Thus far, science has not been 
abl e to make analysis extend beyond the particles of the 
atom, namely, the protons, neutrons, and electrons. 
2. THE SCEPTICISM AJ:ifD FAITH OF SANTAYANA 
Santayana is some times cl assed as a materialist. 
He g ives reason for such classification by the assertion 
he makes in the 11 axiom of materialism." 
The dominance of matter in every existing 
being, even when that being is spiritual, is 
the grea t axiom of materialism, to which this 
whole book is only a corollary.l 
In saying, "Now in n a tural philosophy I am a decided mater-
ialist--apparently the only one living,'~ he gives further 
reason for such classification.2 But the reader is not so 
sure when he finds Santayana saying , "But my materi a lism, 
for all that, is not me taphysical. I do not p rofes s to 
k now what rna t t e r i s in i t s e 1 f • " 2 
The scepticism of Sanatayana is especially valuable 
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as it throws a focus on the d a ng er tha t comes from easy 
expl a nations and dogma. .. He d isting uishes between the exper-
ience which perception brings a nd the explanations wh ich 
men devise to account for wh a t they find in the p erceptions. 
As an epistemological dualist he is well aware of the prob-
lems involved in whether or not the idea s correctly represent 
the n a ture of the object to which they refer. He reminds 
the philosopher that "all alleged knowledge of matters of 
1. Santayana, ROM, 100. Subsequent unnamed references are 
to Santayana. 
2. SAF, vii. 
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f a ct is faith only, and tha t an existing world, wha tever 
form it may choose to wear is intrinsically a question a ble · 
and a r bitrary thin g . ttl There is some tbing in such a warning 
that every ph ilosophe r needs to beed. 
Asi d e from tb.e l>·,h olesome critic isms wh ic h Santaya na 
develops wi th refe rence to the epistemolo g ic a l considera-
tions, he g ives very little light on t he subj e ct of ma tter. 
The clo sest he come s is the statement that "mat t er is properly 
a n ame for the a ctual substan ce of t he na tur a l Y..'orld, what-
ev er that substa n ce may be. n2 He also spe a ks of it as 
11 flux."3 In a sense it is more of an Aristotelian matter 
that serves as the substan ce through which cha nge is possible. 
:Ma. t t e r seems to include anything that exists, an d it excludes 
only that which is non-existent. 11 By the word matter I do 
n ot under s t a n d any human idea of matter popular or scientific, 
ancient or recent."2 
The datum wh ich enables man to t h ink about any event 
is c a lled "es s ence." These e ss ences are not Platonic ideas 
for they lack the metaphysical status Plato gave them but 
they are immedia t e a nd contribute to the beliefs of the one 
poss essing them. Knowledg e such a s man has is a r e sult of 
intuition which apprehends essences directly and infa llibly. 
The gap between essences and existence le aves one with no sure 
or clear indica tion of the n a ture of existence. 
Hence it become s fruitless to try and formulate a 
1. SAF, 49. 
2. ROM, 1 40 . 
3. ROM, 38. 
d'efinition of matter when following the scepticism of San-
tayana. Matter is an unknown, and whatever explanation or 
definition men may make of it are alike subject to the 
uncertainty wbich lies between essence and existence. 
By animal faith two things are recognized as factors 
of experience, "namely, organ and stimulus, body and enviro:n-
ment, person and situation .~l Experience is the result of 
these two coming together. This experience is present as 
an essence. 'tif I am co n t .ent to recognize them for pure 
essences, they cannot deceive me; they will be like works 
of literary fiction, more or less coherent but without any 
claim to exist on their own account."2· 
Through animal faith Santa yana posits a belief in 
substance Vlbich is the equivalent of a faith that something 
exists. The nature of t b is substa nce a nd its meaning is 
another problem. "I must add ress it questioningly but trust-
fully, and it must reply to me in my own terms, in symbols 
and parables, that only gradually enlarge my cbildish per-
ceptions."3 The closest he comes to a definition of matter 
is in terms of substance. "Matter is a primeval plastic 
substance of un known potentiality, perpetually taking on 
new forms ••• "4 
1. SAF, 22 -23. 
2~ SAF, 99. 
3 . -SAF, 191. 
4. ROM, 100. 
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3 • CRITICISM OF B:ti~R TRAND RUSSELL 'S VIEWS 
Bertrand Russell contributes most to the understand-
ing of the problem of matter by his critical approach. He 
insists that the "stuffiness" of matter is no longer accep-
table. There is some thing more dynamic, which he designa tes 
an "event." By followin g his Leibnizian analogy one may 
gather tha t "action" is the basic idea.l There is no pre-
established harmony to determine the why or how of action. 
In this sense he seems to leave the me taphysical question 
wide open. Why do events take place nea r to one another, 
or greatly separated? How do they join in making a comp lex? 
Briefly, why do they exhibit action which is more satis-
factorily described as purposive although there is no reason 
to suspect them of any kind of purposive action according 
to their definition? The scientist in Russell has overcome 
the philosoph e r a nd description has preva lied over expla-
nation. The "event 11 cannot be observed. It is obtained by 
analysis and bears some resemblance to t . e neutral entities 
of the nee-realists. In some respects it differs, esp e cially 
in a. dynamic and complexly active cha r a cter, stressing tern-
poral r e lations. The term is vag ue in some respects and 
this probably offers protection rather than clarity. 
The difficulty with this interpreta tion lies in the 
1. Russell, Art. (1944), 710. 
are to Russell. 
Subsequent unnamed references 
me an i ng of an "event. 'r While its dynamic cha r a c t er is re-
co gnized yet there is n o t hin g in t he term tha t accounts for 
the orga nization and co mp l e xity wh ich characte rizes the 
world of experience. Is t b is even t an exp e n d iture of e ne r gy, 
or an a ctivity of a "something?" It co u l d be a thought, 
or an e xpression of "cosmic will. 11 However, none of these 
suggestions bea r any rel a tion to the term as he has described 
it. Consequently one is f a ced with the difficulty of just 
wha t Russell means by an "eve nt." The probl em is no closer 
to a solution when he s ays that tt .Ma tter is noth i ng but a 
seri e s of events obeying certain laws.nl It is even more 
difficult when he suggests tha t both matte r and ego are 
~conve ni e nt a ggregation s of ev ents.u2 
It is highly ques t ion abl e the n, how much Russell has 
co n tributed to a solution to the pr oblem of matter. He has 
shown tha t ma t ter must be thought of in some more dynamic 
terminology and that t h is term must bear rel a tion to "mind" 
as well as "matte r." Thus he s eems to sugge st some k ind of 
basic monism even t h ough he decla r e s "certa inty in metap hysics 
seems to me unattainable.•r-3 His terminology n e e d s cl a rifi-
cation .. 
4. THE NATURAIJISM OF R. W. SELLARS 
The n a turalism of Sellars is a far more ade quate variety 
than the e arlier mechanistic types of ma terialism. For one 
1 • Ar t • ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 2 4 ? • 
2. Ibid., 24 8 . 
· 3. il..rt. (1924), 382 . 
thing, the concept of matter is enriched by the breadth of 
his interpretation. He includes all the varied qualities 
of the organism. Matter has potentialities for something 
as complex as the brain and the mind. Everything that has 
existence or being is some form of matter. Matter is not 
found merely at the end of a process or analysis. It is 
found at many levels, each complex and possessed of qualities 
which must not be cast aside in the attempt to explain it. 
The system of evolutionary maturalism assumes to 
bridge three gaps which no experimental evidence has sue-
ceeded in bridging. In a sense it emphasizes the gaps 
between the living and the non-living, animals and plants, 
and rational and non-rational beings. The difference be-
tween these levels are so great that one cannot rest con-
tented with the assurances that scientists think they are 
on the verge of bringing forth life from non-living matter. 
Sellars terms his faith in this problem archebiosis. 
There is, however, no reason that I can see 
why the laboratory may not in time, as know-
ledge and technique develop, see the produc-
tion of rt least the first hesitating stages 
of life. 
The critic must point out that laboratory technique has . 
failed to bridge the gap between the living and the non-
living. Even if it should accomplish this, there would 
still be the gap between the rational and the non-rational. 
1. Sellars, PPR, . 283. Subsequent unnamed references are 
to Sellars. 
There would still remain many more problems before the case 
for naturalism would be won. From the findings of science 
one must recognize that there is no verification for the 
theory of archebiosis. Instead of the more vague assertion 
t hat ~~'nature seems to have direction and novelties," a monist 
of the kind Sellars claims to be should frankly admit that 
matter in the broad sense of the term as he uses it, has 
not exhibited in coherent and explicable manner the proper-
ties he claims for it. 1 Call it nature or matter, proof is 
still l a cking that there is sufficient potentiality for 
matt er in its lower organization to rise to the higher orders 
of organization, without the aid of some nisus or extra 
f a ctor. As he defines matter it is· incapable of doing what 
he claims for it. 
Theists will agree with his assertion that there are 
just three important solutions which appear most plausible 
as explanations of the origin of life. 
Now there a re only three important candida-
tes: (1) the theory of the cosmic transport 
of germs, (2) the theory of special cr2ation 
by a Divine Will, and (3) archebiosis. 
Most people will agree that the first theory is no solution 
to the problem. The second Sellars rules out as. "an appeal 
to a supernatural agency and cannot expect to meet with 
sympathetic response from science."2 Obviously Sellars 
here demonstrates his partial allegiance to positivism. If 
1. P PP, 283. 
2. PPP, 281. 
one is to rule out all explanations which do not conform to 
the dictates of science then special creation has to be ruled 
out. Is such an approach philosophical? Does it not behoove 
the u·lover of wisdom~~' to open the door to any evidence that 
makes claims or promises further light? Are the dictate~ 
of science the supreme authority in philosophy? The weakness 
of this kind of position lies in initial prejudice against 
any so-called "theological explanation." If theology has 
an explanation ought not philosophy to be ' willing to listen, 
perchance to criticize what it offers and to test it along-
side of other theories? Sellars himself leaves one with a 
tentative hypothesis which lacks the experimental verifi-
cation, such as he demands of religion, while leaning heavily 
on the geological evidence for evolution. 
&ellars and many naturalists and positivists fall 
into a strange contradiction. They seem to neglect and in 
many instances reject history as evidence for philosophy 
and yet every one of them is an ardent evolutionist. Take 
the historical out of evolution and what have you? By what 
justification may the records of the rocks be preferred to 
the more explicit records of human writing? Are the con-
clusions of the science of biology any more reliable than 
the science of history? True, there is not universal agree-
ment on many things the historians offer, but neither do the 
scientists agree at all points. To dismiss historical evi-
dence as "mystic historicism ~ hardly justifies being called 
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rr~hilosophical" let alone meeting the canons of logic. 1 
What evidence is there in history that a naturalist 
ought to recognize? Religious experience covers a wide 
variety of situations but it should be considered both on 
the merits of its claims and the results which come from 
it. Only on such a basis can one understand the zeal of 
Mohammed as he tried to eliminate polytheism in Mecca. The 
trail of Buddha has left unmistakable evidence of a new way 
of life in the history of Asia. The ecstasy of Saint Francis 
of Assisi left a new quality of joy and compassion in the 
Christian Chruch. No evaluation of history is complete 
without recognition of the life and influence of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Alongside of religious experience has gone a 
development of mo"rals, the increasing significance of the 
individual, the place of love in human relations, the ideal 
of a world governed by law and order, instead of anarchy 
and strife. The liberation of the slave and the increase 
of free investigation and education have been products of 
the influence of religion on the world. No mention bas been 
made of tbe vast literature of mysticism and the figures of 
those wbo in history have been granted a place which is 
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given to those who have shaped the destiny of men and nations. 
One has only to mention such persons as Jesus, Moses, Luther, 
Calvin, Wesley, to mention some of the great Christian and 
Jewish leaders, but one might also include Zoroaster, Buddha, 
1. Williams, Art. (1950), 529. 
Mohammed, Confucius and Shankara. 
A theism which holds to a basic personalism requires 
a God who imparts truth to man. That claim has been made 
in revelation. The idea of revelation is that of uncovering 
what was previously hidden. In theology it signifies the 
divine initiative to portray to man the will of God or 
whatever it is that God desires to show to man. Obviously, 
revelation assumes there is a God and that he is personal in 
the sense that he communicates with man. The history of 
religion is full of many revelation claims. While it is 
recognized that one cannot build a case for belief in theism 
on the foundation of a syllogism which affirms the consequent 
of a hypothetical proposition, yet the affirmation of the 
consequent is a step in the direction of a coherent situation 
if there is a basis for belief in Gbd. At any rate, the 
revelation claims which have been made in the past are 
impressive when judged by a pragmatic test. Their effects 
on historical developments are unmistakably outlined in 
significant manner. 
Judging revelation on t 'he deeper level of whether the 
individual to whom the revelation came believed it true, 
there can be only one answer. Should anyone convince them 
that their beliefs were erroneously founded, such beliefs 
would have dissolved at once. However, it is difficult to 
establish proofs for most claims of divine revelation. 
~eople were convinced of the truth in their own days, and 
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they passed on t heir convictions. It is impossible to 
reverse the movement of history and recheck these incidents. 
Wh ere some verification has been possible (and the weighty 
evid ence of Biblical criticism supports what ~· is here claimed) 
there is what most courts whould consider, strong circumstantial 
evidence. 
Theism might also cite the evidence of religious ex-
perience in support of the view that revelation is continu-
ous and contemporary. One of the very strange coincidences 
of history is the way in which revelation seemed to have 
come to Confucius, R-'uddha, Jeremiah, and Lao Tzu at about 
the same time. The early revelations claimed by Mohammed 
impress the student with sincerity and high minded purpose 
as the response to what he felt was a direct message from 
God. The revelations given to Z~roaster led to higher 
moral codes, and meant a progressively better standard of 
life wh ich has continued to the present day in the Pa.rsees 
of India. The reports of Christians from the time of Jesus 
to the present day is a report of numerous revela~ion claims 
and the claims of wor-ship experiences in which the will of 
God bas been revealed. The conversion of Saul on the road 
to Damascus is a major factor in explaining the life of the 
apostle. These claims are founded on historical reports 
which any philosophy needs to consider to judge the values 
of such claims. Naturalism must do more with these ~laims 
t han dismiss them as "superstitions of the theological stage 
of thought. 11 
A further inconsistency in the thought of Sellars is 
his failure to apply the scientific method to his own de-
ductions. He rejects supernaturalism because it does not 
meat the demands of scientific method. How scientific is 
he when he attributes to matter by his own interpretation, 
powers of organization, and types of activity such as are 
found in the higher mental processes? These affirmations 
are speculative, rather than scientific. This is pointed 
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out to show that his own claims lack scientific verification. 1 
The epistemology of Sellars appeals to personal 
idealists as well as critical realists. It is dualistic and 
rejects the assertion that the reality of the object is de-
pendent on the perceiving subject. Personalists agree in 
substance with Sellar's epistemology. Such a position does 
not commit one to any specific metaphysics. 
Justice to Sellars demands also that full recognition 
be given to the richness of experience which he attempts to 
preserve. He is not guilty of reductionism but rather is 
willing to include the rich value experience of the race. 
The only value that suffers is religious value. His denial 
of God's existence undercuts the very meaning of religious 
values such as prayer and co-operation with G:Od. If re-
ligious people became convinced of the claims he makes, 
1. Sellars is reported to have said to Brightman that he 
distrusts the "philosophy" of most scientists. 
they would cease to find in their religion those values 
which have called out their devotion. The problem of evil 
would have no cosmic meaning. Man would be left steering 
his boat towards relativism in a stream that moves in no 
clear direction. It is a strange thing, but Sellars is an 
empiricist in everything but the subject of religion, and 
there he is dogmatic and unphilosophical because he ignores 
religious exp erience. The same criticism can be made of 
John Dewey. 
The inconsistencies cited_, and the inadequacy of the 
hypothesis of Sellars to account for all the facts of exper-
ience make his system highly unsatisfactory. He has prof-
ited from the errors of older systems of materialism, and 
bas a breadth of ~nsight into everything but religion. Were 
his empiricism freed from this one "blind spot" and his 
appreciation of history more balanced his metaphysics might 
be recast in more coherent lines. One is tempted to call to 
mind wb.at Peirce once said. "Materialism is that mode of 
philosophizing which can be counted on to leave the world 
as unintelligible as it finds it." 1 
5. ROYCE'S ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 
The consideration of the systems of naturalism and 
materialism has proved unsatisfactory in seeking a definition 
of matter. There are several systems of idealism which 
1. Feirce, quoted by Hartshorne, BH, 222:. 
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have made attempts at this problem. These will now be 
considered in the order in which they appeared. 
There is little in Royce's system which goes beyond 
the contributions which an idealism of the kind developed 
by Berkeley or Hegel, offers on the subject of matter. 
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Royce would agree with Berkeley that "beyond the self no truth 
is knowable."l He would not deny the presence of matter 
but this matter "is simply an external a..spect of the true 
and appreciable world."2 His nearness to Hegel shows in 
his stress on the Logos as the one whose insight resolves the 
apparent duality of the mental and the physical. He differs 
from Hegel in his attempt to preserve the ontological 
unity of things and at the same time safeguattd the individual. 
All idealists will affirm that in some sense, matter, 
as commonly known, is "appearance." Whatever more may be 
known about it will show that in some senses, "~atter is 
min~." & fair interpretation of Royce would require a 
demonstration of the varied relations of "matter" and the 
Logos. The tendency to pantheism leaves him constantly 
trying to preserve the individual from being lost in the 
Absolute. He accepts an evolutionary doctrine as seemingly 
justified as "an account of the process that has a real basis 
1. Royce, SMP, 481. 
2. Ibid., 417. 
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in the essence of things." 1 The distinction between the 
World of Description and the World of Appreciation, is the 
modern distinction which would be made between science and 
metaphysics. Ultimate truth will come from the latter. 
Royce's view of matter is satisfactory in outline but lacking 
in detail. 
6. BERGSON'S VIEWS CRITICIZED 
There are two stages in the thought of Bergson on the 
nature of matter. In his earlier work Matter and Memory 
he was primarily interested in the problem of epistemology, 
and the relation of the mind to the body. His epistemology 
is ~ualistic. This in turn leads to a form of realism with 
respect to matter. Matter is just what perception reveals 
it to be. But he states that to understand matter there 
must be elimination of the contributions of memory. In 
practice this is difficult if not impossible. He admits as 
much in the statement that "every perception fills a certain 
depth of duration, prolongs the past into the present and 
thereby partakes of memory .... 2 If this is true then how can 
one understand matter? At this point there seems to be a 
contradiction. However, his major purpose was the solution 
of the mind-body problem and this he finds in what he calls 
1. Royce, WI, II, 210. 
2. Bergson, MM , 325. Subsequent unnamed references are to 
Bergson. 
":perception in its concrete form. 11 
If we take perception in its concrete form, 
as .a synthesis of pure memory and pure per-
ception, that is to say of mind and matter, 
we compress within its natrowest limits1 the problems of the union of soul and body. 
That which binds the two is the concept of time. He feels 
that too long have people attempted this problem on the 
basis of the distinctions of space. 
We were right then, when we said, at the P,egin-
ning of this book, that the distinction between 
body and mind must be2established in terms not of space but of time. 
The mind-body problem is solved in terms of time or the idea 
of duration. Matt.er is what it appears to be as it is per-
ceived. Matter can never be explained as particles but the 
"materiality of tl:le atom dissolves more and more under the 
eyes of the pl:lys i cis t. 11'3 Perhaps the closest he comes at 
this stage to a definition of matter is "a present which is 
always beginning ••• a system of sensations and movements and 
nothing else. 114 
In his earlier work, the ·unique place that memory 
was shown to have and the indication of "spirit" as the 
explanation of memory, were of great importance. He was 
more concerned with spirit than with matter. His idea of 
matter at this stage is vague and unsatisfactory. Only 
l. MM, 325. 
2. MM, 294. 
3. MM, 263. 
4. MM, 178. 
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when he speaks of it as a "present which is always beginning," 
does he seem to add anything. 1 
The more thorough treatment of matter is given in 
the Creative Evolution. There is a tendency to approach 
the bi-polar idea of reality as Whitehead later developed 
it. When he speaks of matter as the inverse of the intelli-
gence or of the life process, there is no clear cut line of 
demarkation between the two. It is indefinite, just when 
intelligence becomes matter. The nearest to an answer is 
at the point when freedom surrenders to determinism and ex-
tension is perceptible. 
When matter is termed ••inertia" it suggests an "in-
hibiter" of spirit. 2 In other places one almost gains the 
impression that it is the necessary goad that forces spirit 
to higher achievements through the resist ance it offers, 
thereby being a good angel in disguise. Creative Evolution 
presents it as a kind of by-product in the creative process 
;I 
of the elan vi tal. Som.e times he defines matter as so de-
pendent on spirit that all one can say of matter is that 
it is spirit inverted. 
For if matter is a relaxation of the inex-
tensive into the extensive and thereby of lib-
erty into necessity, it does not indeed wholly 
coincide with pure homogeneous space, yet is 
constituted by the movement which leads to 3 
space, and is therefore on the way to geometry. 
1. MM , 178. 
2. ME, 17. 
3. CE, 238. 
164 
The 1·at 'er · views of Bergson move in a more idealistic 
pattern. Matter is spirit in a different mode of being. 
His emphasis on determinism may require some modif ication . 
His contribution to a more organic conception is an advance 
towards a more coherent way of viewing reality. What Berg-
son accomplished most may someday be attributed to his in-
fluence on Whitehead, and subsequent thinkers who have drawn 
from his brilliant insights to clarify their own thinking. 
As a system builder he is not great. He is more the pioneer 
who opens up new territory. 
7. A. N. WHITEHEAD'S PROCESS PHILOSOPHY 
The chief merit in what Whitehead has done for the 
solution of philosophical problems is to devis e a new se t 
of concepts which seem more adequate. They are more in 
harmony with empirical observations. They resolve the 
dualism of the Cartesian philosophy, and they attempt an 
organic synthesis which allows for a recognition of the 
status of both mind and matter without denying either. 
In a sense mind and matter have been aufgehoben by the 
dialectic of process. In fact there never was a bifur-
cation in nature. The mind of man was responsible for 
this division. 
When he speaks of the particles of matter as organ-
isms he comes very close to panpsychism, at least in respect 
to the behavior of the actual occasions and the actual 
entities .l However, he is more empirical . The realm of 
existence presents to experience the fact of matter com-
bined with f£!m, be that form a drop of water or a member 
of the Supreme Court. Regardless of how matter is inter-
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preted there must be some recognition of the data that lead 
to the assumption that matter is present . Whitehead accom-
plishes this without the unfortunate reductionism of 
panpsychism. Probably all interpreters of Whitehead and of 
the p.anpsychists in general, need to beware of the dange·r 
of thinking of psyche in human terms, when thinking of the 
more elementary forms of being. 
In this closeknit category, it appears that he has 
succeeded in stressing both the principle of the entelechz 
and the means whereby the entelechy expresses itself. The 
two are combined in a creative organic manner.. But, when 
the question of creativity is presented he makes each en-
tity a causa ~· 
All actual entities share with God this char-
acteristic of self-causation. For this reason 
every actual entity also shares with God the 
characteristic of transcending all other actual 
entities, including God.2 
The breadth of Whitehead's metaphysics impresses 
one who will take time to reflect upon experience. The 
term "experience" as he employs it is so rich, so mani -
fold, so diverse, so full of surprises, and so intimately 
1. ~fuitehead , S~~, 162. Subsequent unnamed references are to 
Whitehead . 
2 . PR,339 . 
interrelated toat no simple and smug formulae are adequate 
to express it. Whitehead has given the most daring specu-
lative answer to the problem of metaphysics since Hegel. 
He is far beyond Hegel in thoroughness, and he has escaped 
toe more a rtificial and mechanical structure of the Hegelian 
dialectic. He has encompassed the best in Plato and Ari~­
totle and has transcended British empiricism. No treatment 
whico is necessarily as limited as is a study of this kind 
can do justice to the scope of t bi s sys tern. 
Perhaps the next step which needs to be taken in the 
task of carrying forward the work of Whitehead is to reestab-
lish the justified place of abstraction, that is, a deliver-
ate abstraction for practical purposes only. There is no 
question that an abstraction is dangerous. But if it is 
treated as a half-truth, and considered as such, the in-
vestigation will prove its value. One is almost bewildered 
by looking a t the entire metaphysical structure of White-
head; in f a ct it is doubtful if Whitehead himself could do 
more t oan ro am ab out this castle by going from room to 
room. It will be necessary to work over the system of 
Whitehead after the spirit of Descartes who suggested that 
one ought to "divide each of the difficulties under examina- -
~on into as many parts as possible." 1 
1. Descartes, DM, 15. 
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In this spirit one finds that matter is an abstraction 
from process. Procesa in terms of one's immediate exper-
ience of it is the "extensive continuum."l This is a four 
dim ensiona l space-time continuum inspired in part by views 
taken from Einstein.2 This "extensive continuum" may be 
broken do wn into actual entities or occasions. These actual 
occasions are dipolar.3 The specific determination of the 
actual occasion is in its formal status determined by the 
"eternal object. 114 An actual ent i ty is a "concresence of 
prehensions."5 The process of concrescence is a ttgenetic 
passage from phase to pha.se" and is not in physical time.6 
Physical time makes its appearance when the concresence 
has reached the stage of actuality in the actual entity, 
which he calls "a.atisfaction."7 In the nature of all 
things is the "category of the ultimate, the universal 
of universals, Creativity."8 This principle brings the 
many together into the "one actual occasion, which is the 
universe conjunctively."8 
One question which arises in this consideration of 
matter is the relation of the actual occasions to God. 
Here once more, the complexity of Whitehead's system makes 
exposition difficult. The dep endence of the actual occasions 
1. PR, 95-126. 
2. PR, 102. 
3. PR, 72. 
4. PR, 32, 34. 
5. PH; 35. 
6. P.R, 434. 
7. PR, 38. 
8. PR, 31. 
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on God is clearly indicated. From the primordial nature of 
God "he is the principle of concretion--the principle whereby 
there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation other-
wise riddled with ambiguity.ul The consequent nature of God 
is conscious and "is the realization of the actual world in 
the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of 
his wisdom."2 To put this relationship of God and the World 
in simpler terms Whitehead's God is a personal God. This is 
the judgment of Hartshorne.3 It is borne out by assertions 
which bear impressive resemblance to the writings of Bowne, 
Knudson, and Brightman. 4 
God and the world are the contrasted opposites 
in terms of which Creativity achieves its supreme 
task of transforming disjoined multiplicity, with 
its diversities in opposition, into concrescent 
unity with its diversities in contrast.5 
Probably th'e chief difference between the work of 
Whitehead and that of Brightman is that the former is more 
given to speculati v_e metaphysics and the latter is more 
empirical. For anyone to write a system as daring as 
this, it would be strange if there would not be certain 
1. PR, 523. 
2. PR, 524. , 
3. Harts-horne, "Whitehead ts Idea of God," PANW, Schil:gp 
ed., 549. Hoernl{ and Werkmeister class him as ideal-
ist despite Urban's claim in PANW, 327. Urban's view 
rests en failure to judge him synoptically. 
4. See Bowne, MET, 421-429; Knudson, PP, 240-241; 
Brightman, NV, chapter vi. 
5. PR, 526. 
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places where the ariculation would be unsatisfactory. There 
is so much in common between the philosophy of Whitehead 
and t hat of Brightman that one finds difficulty in detecting 
serious differences. However, Brightman is more exact in 
his statements whereas Whitehead's thought tends to leave 
one not so sure of his position. In fact, Whitehead makes 
a ; principle of defend i ng vagueness as necessary. In this 
he is more cautious than Brightman. 
His view of matter makes it temporal in nature, in-
ves t s it with unusual potentiality for entering in to varied 
kinds of organ izations, explains its formal structure, and 
relates it to God in terms of causality. He accounts for 
the "energy" in matter as a part of process. His view of 
matter is comprehensive and appears to be coherent though 
one makes the latter judgment with caution. It is doubt-
ful if anyone has ever tested this system for coherency 
in all that such a test would involve. That remains for 
future thinkers. 
B. B60DIN'S FUNCTIONAL MATTER 
Boodin's interpretation of matter tells a great deal 
about how matter acts, but he professes to tell nothing about 
the ulti ma te nature of matter. The closest he comes is the 
stress on energy as being of the very basis of any expla-
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nation. If the suggestion in his more recent writings be 
taken into account he is dualistic in his thinking. 1 He 
appears to be closer to a personalistic idealism than to 
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any other system. This is especially true when he sees matter 
2 
as "everywhere controlled by <Spirit." Hoodin suggests a 
person whose grasp of modern science and the best that it 
offers has not yet crystallized his thought on the metaphy-
sics involved. He is cautious about striking a balance. 
It is difficult to see why he holds back when his ~creative 
evolution" has so clearly suggested the lines he might fol-
low. No doubt the suggestion of a ~ualism is the real 
problem he faces. The brevity of this criticism necessarily 
follows, for one can find little serious differences with a 
man who is so skilled in what he has done. One wishes 
he had gone farther in his metaphysics of matter. 
9. THE PANPSYCHISM OF HARTSHORNE 
Is panpsychism a satisfactory account of matter~ 
It is true that matter involves activity---that the acti-
vity follows certain laws--and it is reasonable to attri-
bute some centralized a gency, a psyche, as the cause of 
action. It is likewise reasonable to extend the conception 
of "prehension" which is so integral a part of Whitehead's 
1. Roodin, GOD:, 113. 
2. GOD, , 114. 
philosophy to the insistance that every individual unit of 
being exercises some feeling or response to every other 
being. 
Perhaps Paulsen has sta t ed t h e case for pansychism 
as well as any defender of that view when he strikes a blow 
at materialism which goes to the very heart of the issues. 
ttTf thought can be the effect of movements, there is no 
reason wha tever why a movement should not be the effect of 
a thought."1 As he points out, the first insta nce imp lies 
a destruction of energy and the secon d a creation ~ ni h ilQ_. 
Without going into the many avenues suggested by these 
issues it should be clear, from the way in which he put the 
case, that idealism is as rea.sonable as material ism. As it 
stands, it is no more unjustifiable to say that thinking 
causes the action i n the world than to say t hat the action 
and move ment in the world is what causes thought .. 
The starting point · of panpsychism is the same as 
that of perso n alism. It is the experi e nce of self-conscious-
ness.2 On this both systems app eal to evidence which is 
believed more real and valid than any other. Panpsychism 
then reasons from this a ccepted fact of experience and by 
analogy infers that the movements of oth er like beings indi-
1. Paulsen, ITP, 90. 
2.. Cf. Paulsen, ITP, 94, and Brightman, NV, 113. 
171 
cate similar mental processes. By the same kind of r e ason-
ing the situation is continued in the sub-human animal realm. 
Then as the distinctions b e twe en p lants and a n imaJL s are very 
difficult in the g roup of the E.rotista the assumption is 
made t h at plants a lso have souls. Panpsychi sm then makes 
the sweeping genera liza tion t h at the inorg anic a s well a s 
t h e organic realm is a system of souls .. Ultimately e v e ry-
thing i s a system of s ouls. 
Both Hartshorne and Paulsen suggest that t b ere are 
no proofs to inva lidate their theories of panpsychi sm. 1 
In the case of assuming souls in p lants this may be true, 
but there is a fatal we a kne ss in the argume nt when it is 
at temp tea aero s s the boundaries of the inorg anic. Be t ween 
living and i norganic beings there is a diff e rence in the way 
that entropy functions. Living things reduc~ entropy. In-
organic things tend to incre a s e en tropy. There is a serious 
g ap here which panpsycb ism has not taken into sufficient 
account. Furthermore, any argument t h at rests up on the 
failur e of t he opp osition to disprove the case still seems 
weak and l a cking in a sufficient support. 
\Vhen one considers the capacity for org anization, 
the structural chan g es which t a ke p l a ce when the c oncli tions 
of the environment of an inorga ni c subs t a nce are varied, 
1. Cf. Paulsen, ITP, 98, a n d Hartshorne, BH, 171. 
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and the activity which takes place on this le~el, the case 
for panpsychism seems stronger. However, one questions 
the wisdom of employing the term "low grade mind"- for some-
thing which is so limited in the responses made to any so-
called sentient experience.. However, the question of terms 
is properly met by Hartshorne when he says, "panpsychism 
does not insist that mind has no degrees and must be present 
if at all in unlimited fashion.n1 
The question of order is sure to arise in any pan-
psychism. A pluralistic universe of psychoids would be a 
chaos unless some principle of order could be effected. 
This is a necessity~ 
Nature can be maintained as an orderly sys-
tem only if there is a hi ghest soul creative 
of order. But this soul 2must be the extre me 
opposite of d isembodied. 
The nature of this God i .s well presented in Hartshornets 
Man's Vision of God. Go-d is personal in much the same way 
that Whitehead rs God might be so classified.. Our present 
world is a temporal creation out of a previous world. He 
denies creation ex nihilo. This stage of his thought is 
very much in the spirit of "Process 11 philosophy, comp'llex 
and taking into accoun t the suggestion that as creation 
1. Hartshorne, BH, 169. 
2. BH, 1 ?1. 
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goes on, God is affected by the process as well as working 
in and through it.1 He uses the word panentheism to de-
scribe these relations in God, "since it distinguishes God 
from the all and yet makes him include all. 11 2 
One of the features of Hartshorne's thought which 
is unsatisfactory for metaphysics is his postponement of 
the question of how the earlier world came into existence 
before our present world. Both he and Whitehead at this 
point are in danger of introducing a regress in their 
systems were it not for the suggestion that process is 
eternal. In this sense process would then avoid the re-
gress. But has not process then supplanted deityr 
A careful reading of Paulsen's excellent article 
on panpsychism along with the highly intricate process 
philosophy of Hartshorne creates a favorable impression of 
this system.3 However, the clear break in nature posed by 
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the problem of entropy tends to destroy its idea of continuity 
in nature. The principle of indeterminacy of Heisenberg 
renders valuable service to this view, but it does not re-
quire panpsychism to the exclusion of other alternatives. 
Panpsychism assumes too much continuity in nature. 
All that experience requires is that matter shall not be 
ultimate. It has a place in nature as an instrument. Min~ 
1. Hartshorne, MVG, pp. 230-250. 
2. MVG, 348. 
3. Paulsen, ITP, pp. 87-111. 
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is potentially always above matter, but is limited by matter. 
As a separate and d istinct ~eation of cosmic mind there is 
no reason to deny that matter has a certain status in the 
scheme of thin g s. As Berg son suggests, it may be a kind 
of incen tive to t h e sp irit.l Panpsychism achieves its 
g oa l by a n exp l ana tion ·which as sume s a continuity betwe en 
eve ry level of bei ng . The continuity is not there. Ex-
p erience is eloquent a bou t a bifurc a tion of ~atur e, a s well 
as a unitary functional synthesis, but t he st a tus of the 
entire realm is d epend e n t, a n d c on tinge nt. Natur e is not 
God a nd God is n ot na ture. Nature is the workmanship of 
God. It is his ideas, his expressi on of will, a nd h is 
continuing purpose~ 
10. BRIGHTMAN'S PHENOMENALISM 
Brightman in a p ersonal note to the author sta tes 
tha t h e is " movin g from a :Kanti a n to a more metaphysical 
view of ma tter." Instead of the more "·scientific p ositiv-
ism" expr e ssed in his A Philosophl._.Q.f_Ideals he now defines 
matter "a s being one mode of d ivine energizing."2 This 
agrees with the views exp re s sed i n his A Ph ilosoph$ of Re-
li g .!_2E_, where he sp e a ks of God a s the "unbegun a nd une nding 
e ne rgy of t he univer se ••• and ma tte r a s bei ng a n ord er of 
1. Berg son, ME, 28. 
2. Stated i n a personal note to t he a uthor .. 
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or gan izati on of the experienc e of God. nl 
According to t h is view e very t h i ng has its ultimate 
be g i nn ing with God. The world as man discovers it is all 
the c r e a tive a ctivity of God~ In a gene ral sense the world 
may be found to consist of two mo des of creative exp ression, 
n amely mind and ma tter but there i s n o d u a li sm i mp lied. 
l'Jatur e is a process wh ich i nclude s sundry and varied orgari.ic 
and highly integra t ed combinations of ~hese two. The prob-
lem of mind brings up the wh ole question of its relation 
to living being s, its va rious levels of activity, and the 
status of it s permanence. These questions will not be ex-
plored since they are not g erman e to the subject. In a 
sense the problem of mat t e r is the simpl e r problem of the 
two. Modern science reveals something of its structure 
and functioning. Brightman looks upon it as a kind of 
"divine ener g izing ." It is dependent upon the a ctivity of 
God for its existence. In fact, it is Godts activity. 
This is a thorough r e j ec tion of ·a panpsychism. His 
ma t te r is n ot free to act independ ently of God. God is 
dynamic a lly rel a ted t o it at all t imes . " 'The energy which 
p hysicists describe is God 1 s will in action • .r2 "All the 
activities af nature are activiti es of a cosmic mind."3 
1. Brightman, PR, 226. 
2. Brigh tman, NV, 11 4 . 
3. NV, 120. 
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He has much the same explanation that one finds in Bowne so 
far as the nature of matter is concerned. Bowne makes the 
material world a "product of one infinite, omnipresent, 
eternal energy by which it is continually supported, and 
from which it incessantly proceeds."l This he called the 
11 dynamic theory of matter."2 
Any criticism of this view rests upon the entire 
metaphysical system. If one accepts the position of per-
sonal idealism, much has already been determined about one's 
view of matter. F6r one thing, matter is not ultimate, 
nor is it eternail. It is dependent on God for its exist-
ence. Why does matter have to be subjected to, or tied 
to God in t be way that Bowne and Brightman suggest? The 
immanence theory is probably more deterministic than a 
panpsychistic interpretation but the difference may not be 
great. The chief problem lies in the question of whether 
the energy that is found in the smallest units of matter, 
namely the particles, is an energy that comes from its 
source in a continuous manner or is running down. In 
Brightman's theory the law of entropy would apply to the 
inanimate part of nature but not to the will of God. The 
constant expenditure of energy through motion shows that 
some energy is always being expended. From a more empirical 
1. Bowne, MET, 243. 
2. MET, 18. 
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approach to the problem it would appear that energy is con-
stantly being lost. If the measurements of energy a s sug-
ge sted by the formula of Einstein, E=mc2 , are true then 
matter as man knows it, is n ot caused by a continu ous stre am 
of energy but rather is a definite packaged energy. It 
wou ld indicate, either that God's activity as shown in the 
way that energy is spent, ceases always after a definite 
time period, or that the energy which God created in mat ter 
is a definite quantity that can be expended. To make the 
energy of mat ter the activity of God in the direct continu-
ous manner t hat an immanence theory demands require s a 
responsibility on God's part for all tha t happens in nature . 
To make the energy of matter a creation of God wh ich is 
operating according to the laws of its own inner structure 
makes God only indirectly responsible for what happens . 
Impersonal matter can't be morally responsible . On t he 
i mpersonal l eve l it is better to disre gard any moral 
responsibility in nature. Whatever r e sponsibility the re is, 
must lie in God, until one conside rs the level of human 
personality. 
11. CONCLUSION 
The trend in the criticism h as moved in a direction 
favorable to idealistic theory. Neutralism poses an unin-
telligible situation because it provides no explanation of 
h ow neutral entities in the r e alm of subsistence can come 
to gether and move into the re a l m of existence. It also 
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fails to point out the liW.its of analysis. 
Ma teria lism is a lmost as unsatisfactory in its later 
formulati on of naturalism. The chief advantage of a natural-
ism of t he kind found in Sellars is the adequate inventory 
of sig nific ant data. Adequacy of desc r iption can not be 
a ccepted as a substitute for a coherent metaphysics. He 
i s i::Jcoheren t in his use of h istory, dogmatic in h is re-
jection of supern a tura lism a nd relig ious exper i ences a nd 
utterly l a cking in an y support for his main p ro blem of 
showing how mind c an come from ma tter. 
Panpsychism f a ils to give suff icient r e co gn1tion 
to the fact t'l'la t t h ere a re two p roce sses in nature which 
destroys its a ssumption of uniformity of a ction. Some 
proce s ses are ir re versible, and others are reversible. 
The arg ument from a nalo gy breaks d o wn becaus e of t h is. 
Whitehead' s interpretat ion seems to a void most of the 
criticisms one mi ght leV'el a t it by the complexity a nd 
comprel1ens iveness of the system. It does n ot g ive a sat-
isf a ctory answ er to the problem of First Cause, though a 
careful reading po i n ts more in the direction of process 
than de ity. Perhaps ~~ itehea.d smuld hav e follo wed Kant's 
suggestion a nd wr itte n a Prole gomena. tlis account of 
matter is not so satisfactorily treated by Wbitehead. 
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Personalism has implicit in it the most s a tisfactory 
answe r to the problem. The "'dyna.mi c theory 11 of :Bowne a nd 
Bri ghtman needs revision. It should be recognized tha t t h e 
" dynamic theory" is n ot necessary t o the perso nali s tic 
ph ilosophy . A re c onstruction, more in harmony with rr.odern 
physics a nd the mora l d eman ds of personalism will b e 
a ttemp ted in t he chap t er t ha t follows. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
A DEFINITION OF MA.TTER 
~. IMPLIES FAITH IN MEtTAPHYSIC'S 
The intent of this study has been a definition of 
matter which does justice to all the evidence· which science 
offers. In addi tion, it attempts to go beyo.nd science and 
in the synop-tic approach characteristic of philosophy 1 t 
must be expressed. in a metaphysics. Definition, then in 
the sense that it is employed here, is a treatment of the 
metaphysical problem of matter. This implies: a fa.i th in 
meta physics. Meta physics involves one in the building of 
a. system. It is we.ll defined as "the attempt to give a 
coherent and rational description of the rear.~1 
Any effort in the direction of formula.ting a meta.phy-
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sics involves one in what has been called an "awkward poeition," 
and he ••finds himself classified in a dvance, with one of the 
parties in a very bitter conflict."2 Dewey has df sclaimed 
metaphysics prima.rily because he felt that philosophy must 
dea l with what he calls "the problems of men~ rather than 
be ~l device ttfor dealing with the problems of philosophers."'3 
Feigl is voicing what many lo.gical positivists are saying 
when he rejects- the 1tconstructio.-n of a world view" as: the-
a-_im of' philoso.phy and characterizes metaphysics as a ""pre-
1. Brightman, PR, 60. 
2. Hall, Art. (1947 ) ~ 147. 
3. Dewey, Art. (1940), 389. 
sci-entific mode of expla.:nat ian. ,, l 
The criticism of metaphysics will proba.bly go on !or 
a long time. A do.gmatie: metaphy-sics which refuses to face 
wha tever eviden:ce sC'ience offers is not worthy of defense. 
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A metaphysics which trea.ts of s·ubjec:ts which are utterly 
remote from the experience or needs. of man should have no 
place in the philosophical world n.ot because it i s self-
contradictory but because it is inc-onsistent with giv·en facts·. 
But the needs of man are. varied and extensive, a.nd the ques-
tions about the ttreal• are some of the most important questions 
any man faces.. It remains as true today as when it was uttered 
long ago that tt·man does not live by bread alone... He lives by 
the goals, the purposes, the values, the e~eriences, which 
enrich his life. Metaphysics e.specially as it rela tes to 
value experience has much to do about these everday concerns. 
The metaphysic ian must give consideration to the prob-
lems o.f language.. He must be cautious in his c.ol lection of 
ev-idence. He does find that sc-ience is a valuable- help in 
sec.uring data. What logical empiricists say about these mat-
ters in important. Improv-ement in language and the symbols 
to be used is a task that philosophy must c.onstan.tly a ttem:pt. 
However one can point out the simple fa.c t that d.es.pi te the 
barriers of· language it still is eff'ective in solving mants 
problems. One is able to go. to the telephone and call his 
I. Feigl, Art. (1947), 3?6. 
grocer to deliver an order of goods· which is delivered as 
orde·red. Language still func tiona effectively when used 
intelligently. While language will always be a problem 
yet philosophy must not surrender its t a sk of- met~;lphysics 
by b~comihg bo·gged down in a complete preoccupation with 
a _ language problem tha.t always involves a rela.tive instru-
mentality~ relative always to the exp,erience and knowledge 
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of the one who uses it. The task of me:taphysics a s it relates 
to languag e and symbol will have to depend upon wba.t appears 
to be an instrumentality in need of continual reYision, and 
consta ntly undergoing change, but st i ll usef-ul in solving 
problems. 
Metaphysics implies a faith that language can be 
found to formulate a symbol that fa fairly representative 
of one 'a icieas •- It rests on a confidence that there is 
reliable knowledge which becomes the data o.f metaphysics. 
It regards man's c a pa_city for rational thought as the means 
whereby he is able to, go beyond. the 1 imita t ions of sense 
da ta a nd to formulate his experience in coherent and sys-
te-matic manner. Each of thes.e· points. might be elabora ted 
a t grea t length but this di ssertation is no-t intended as a 
defense of me .:tap-hysics... It is· rather- an e.ffo.rt to expound 
a metap-hysics. 
Metaphysics is not a popular subJect,. but as long as 
men will ask questions such as metaphysic-s atte.mpts to answer 
there wi 11 be a pla ce for s u ch a discipline.. This study is 
in substantial agreement with Whitehead, Sellars, Hocking, 
Perry, Brightman and many others who still believe it is 
necessary to answer questions ab out the ulitmate and try to 
pierce the mysteries of life and existence. It indicat es 
a conviction that science has proved insufficient to complete 
the entire task of metaphysics--that is, of coherent thought 
about the real. 
2. THE DATA OF METAPHYS ICS 
Before any sys tem of philosophy c an be constructed an 
inductive approach shou ld reveal t h e facts whi ch are to be 
included in · the system. As soon as one has compiled a 
list of these facts the questions of epistemology and the 
cr itical investigations of the me t h ods, as s umptions, and 
symb ols, a r e brought into the dis cussion ~ First of all, the 
data of metaphysics will be presented. Following this, 
certaln critica l questions will receive attention . 
The fact that eventually seems most important to t h e 
r eflective thinker is that of hi s own self-consciousness. 
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At first he may be unaware of h is own imp ort a nce i n the knowing 
situation. In fact he may not be aware that the thinker 
exists, for h is p r e occupat i on with whatever he may be 
studying will a b sorb his attention. The history of 
philosophy itself reveals that man was first concerned ab out 
the nature of the p hysical world about him, and onl y in 
a later more ·r e flective stage did h e b e come aware of the 
importance of the thi nker to what h e was observing . 
All knowledge is due to the u niqu e capacity within 
ma n for taking t h e sensation s and t h e i n f luen ces of h is 
environment and rel a ting them i n s u ch a way t hat they become 
idea s, and tak e on significanc~. _Th is creative activity 
is revealed in self-consciou sness. There is a unity in 
diversity, a power of self-direction:, and self-determina t ion, 
an ability to choose t h e manner in whi c h o n e sets up go a ls 
and dr i ves towards t h eir reali zat ion. Th is unique experience 
is private to every i ndividual and y et it can be s h ared in 
part. A more matu re reflection reveals its import ance. 
It has been c a lled t h e mind of man. It is the most signi-
fican t fact t hat p h ilosophy discovers. De ny it and all 
science and p h ilosophy ends. Every fact which man cites is 
really a rel a tionsh ip between the mind a n d t h e object under 
investigat ion. It is alway s ~ fact fo r t h e mind of man. 
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Every scientific discovery is t h e announcement of a formu lation 
o f experience in terms of what is related to a mind as well 
as to t h e object under stu dy. 
The dy namic natu re of mind s (lows itself in t h e manner 
that man is able to express h is ideas in variou s ways. He 
may fas h ion a piece o f wood into an article of f u rni ture. 
He may transmit a social custom to a different gro up of 
people. He may portray i n music the ecstasy of a " Hallelujah 
Choru s." He may discover t h e cau se and cu re of a disease. 
In t h e variety of what constitute s t h e world of man t here 
is abundant eviden ce of how the minds of men h ave ch anged 
t b e entire setti.ng of t h e world. History is but t h e continual 
r e cord of t 1e way in which ideas have been impressed, upon the 
great masses of hw~anity, first by on e g roup and t h en by 
a different grotip. The problems of h istory reside ultimately 
in t h e mirids of t h ose wh o have t h e power to impose their 
ideas upon others. 
That unique f u nction in .experience wh ich leads some 
t h i nkers to attribute it to t h e activity of what is called 
mind is a fact wh ich all must recognize. The experience of 
self-consciou sness is not to be discounted in any manner. 
It is a~ong t he most important data of metaphy sics. Any 
adequate metaphysics cannot afford to pass it by. 
A second source of the dat a of metaphysics is found 
in t h e physical realm. Consciou sness as man observes it 
in his own experience and as h e infers by analogy to be in 
other persons, is alway s associ a ted with a body. Scientific 
evidence of consciousness or a mi nd existing apart from a 
body is lacking . There is constant demonstration of t h e 
fact of a body which was once related to a mind, bu t is now 
just a body . This body may be used as a subject of in-
vestigation and t h ereby yield many facts wh ich are pertinent 
in the development of a metaphy sics. These facts are 
summarized in t~ e . findings of t h e biolog ical, chemical, and 
physical sciences. They reveal a kinsh ip between t h e body 
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and the so-called material realm. 
In addition to t h e fact of body t h ere is t h e entire 
env ironment o f b ody . This vast realm of sense impressions 
wh ich arrests t h e atten tion of man f rom the very first response 
he makes to what is about h i m, must be incorporated in any 
adequate metaphysics. All science reveals that much o f t h e 
environment of t h e mind is a complex organization of some 
more f u ndamental someth ing which h as been called .matter. 
Analysis reveals t hat matter can be redu ced from its more 
comp l ex appearances t o certain more elementary units which 
t h e physicist designates as t h e particles o f matter. Since 
t h is part of t h e discussion is intended only as a listing 
of t h e d a t a of me taphysics, t h e term matter will be used to 
include t h is source of evide n ce to be e mp loyed in a meta-
p hysics. Furth er discussion later will attemp t a definition 
of matter. 
Th e t h ird source o f t h e d a ta of metaphysics is found 
i n t h e fa cts of org a n ization, life, process, or stru ctu re, 
w~J.i ch are p resent at all levels o f exper ien ce. Every t h i ng 
in man 's envi ronment proves to be an organization o f some 
de gree o f complexity. ' Simple t h ings a re not found in ex-
perience. They are only deduced from the more complex. Not 
only i s t h ere comp lex i ty of organi z atio n in t h e material 
re a lm but lik ewise i n t h e social and .t h e cons ciou s. Here 
t h e organiz a tion is varied and h i ghl y articu l ated. In 
addition to this must be noted that mind and matter 
in t h e case of man, someh ow f unction as a u nit and t h is is 
lik ewise a complex . The psy chologist cou ld add mu ch evidence 
to what has been s uggested as his stu dy of behavior reveals 
t h is same intricate and c·omplicated rel a tionship. The 
togetherne ss and interrelationship of t h e t h i ng s of experience 
cons t itute t hB l a st of t~e main div i sion s of t h e data of 
me t aphys i cs. All t hree areas here mentioned migh t be exp anded 
to a grea t extent b u t whatever data philosophy con s i ders all 
will eventu ally pro ve a subdivision of t h e three Pl'incipal 
divisions wh ich have been here pres ented. Mind, matter, and 
organization, t h en constitute t h e t h ree significant aneas of 
experien ce which metaphy sics must i n terpret. 
J. EPISTEMOLOGI CAL POSITION 
Th e epistemolog ical p osi t ion here take n is first 
of all dualistic. Introspection reveals a dualism b etwe en 
t h e t h i nker and t h e ob j ec t of t h ought. The du alism between 
t h ought and t h ing is more apparent when t h e object is some-
t h i ng out side t h e body of t he t h inker. However t h e same 
du alism in t h ought may be found even in the situation of the 
think~r who is t h i nk i ng about himself. The ob j ect of t h ought 
is never iden tical with t h e idea. The du alist h olds t hat 
t h e idea describes, refers, or represents, t he object. 
Th is k i nd of an epistemology h as some d ifficultie~ 
wh ich - one sh ould face. There is t h e possibility that the 
medium through which sensations come from t h e object to the 
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mind of man may distort or misrepresent the object. Error can 
creep in where t r.1.ere is t h e possibility of an external medium. 
In t "~-1 e case of t h e dualism found in self-consciousness t h e 
medium between s ubject and object is consciousness itself, 
and t h ere is less reason to s u spect error or distortion so 
long as consciousness is functioni ng properly. It is t h e 
one instance in which we know t h e inner n a t u re of a t h ing. 
While t here is a t h eoretical possibility that t h e skepticism 
about a Kantian Ding ~ sich may troub le one about t h e 
external world, t here can be no skepticism abou t t h e object 
when it involves t h e internal relations of self-consciou sness. 
The ch ief point wh ich such an epistemology establish es is 
t h at in t h e fact of mind or consciou sness, there is even 
greater certainty t h an t h ere is of t h e expernal world. 
There is a sense in which t h is epistemology also recog-
nizes that all ideas a nd knowledge will be a product of the 
activity of the mind of man relating present experience to 
past experience and formulating it in symbols and ideas. 
Th e very nature of mind may be a very considerable factor in 
t h is task a s Kant claimed that it vvas i n his Critique of ~ 
Reason. Whether t h e ideas within t h e mind correctly represent 
t h e objects to wh ich t h ey refer will always be a question which 
cannot be directly proved. The test of s u ch ideas will only 
reveal t heir coherence or lack of coh erence when employed in 
socia l i n tercourse. 
The qu estion o f how reliable are t h e ideas in s u ch 
an epistemology is only settled by t h eir practical 
employment. If t here were utter confusion and complete lack 
of coordination in t h e ideas that people have, soc ie ty would 
not function. On t h e contrary it appears t h at careful 
observation and recording of experience leads to coh erent 
social intercou rse in all of man's highly integrated 
opera tions. On the basis of such result s the faith that the 
p h ilosopher has who holds to epistemolog ical dualism seems 
f u lly justified. Experience, s ubj ect to the tests of critical 
evalu ation and following t he cautiou s observations of t h e 
trained scientist, gives a knowledge of t h e object u nder in-
vesti gation which is reliable and trustworthy. 
4. THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED 
The emp irical app roach t o philosophy recognizes the 
import a nce of all experie nce. If there is any starting 
point for philosophy it must always begin at some experience 
of man whether it be reflecting upon t h e st ars, or meditating 
upon t h e moral law within. 'rhe phi losopher who starts with 
sense data or the facts of self-consciou sness is f a r nearer 
to a true account of thi ngs t han the person wh o starts with 
some hypothetical object u tterly unrelated to experience. 
Of cou rse, even in s u ch an instance t h ere is a sense in wh ich 
an examination of t h e hypothe tic a l obj ect reveals t hat it has 
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been constructed from patches of experience. 
A sound metaphysics must draw up on all evidence that 
scie n ce can offer, for science is the kind of 8 X-
perience whi ch contributes ~uch to ph~losophy. Science is 
experience wh ich has been tested, c he ck ed, and described in 
t h e mos t accurat e manner. 
In addition to the employment of the findi ngs of 
science t h e metaphysician mus t employ log ic in h is task. 
Th e facts under investigation i mp l y causes, purposes, and 
valuation s. Often when an inference has been drawn t here 
appears to b e justification for an . additional inference to 
be drawn from the one already made. Sometimes t h e more syn-
optic approach reveals wh a t appears to justify an inference 
of broad generaliza tion . This process of re as oning becomes 
the means whereby t h e speculative approacl:'1 come s to fruit ion 
in a system. Logic must continue its work till every in-
coherency has been eliminated. This means t ha t t h e r e will 
always be a place for the continued testing either b y log ic 
or by new empirical evidence. When one has found a s y stem 
wh ich accounts for all the data of metaphysics in the most 
coherent manner t h e task is comp leted for t h e time being. 
Whether t b.e solut ion is correct, only the continu ed veri-
fic at ion of s u cceeding generations will tell. If no error 
or contradiction is found t h en it may be assumed to be 
adequate. Only those who have faith both in t h e records of 
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science and in t he power of lo g ic will be ready to s u pp ort 
s u c h a method. 
Nothing higher than a relative certainty can come 
from s u ch a met hod. It will alway s be subject to t h e correct-
ing influ ences of additional facts a nd more searching logic. 
5. PERSONAL IDEALISM, THE METAP HYSICAL ANS~~R 
Personal idealists consider t h e mind as t he most 
important fact in p h ilosophy. The y regard man as the highest 
known created development in the unive~s~ and look for an 
adequate answer to the question of how man came into existence. 
One hardly needs to remind h i mself o f t he fact that man cannot 
create man. He can reproduce man, but the very powers 
whereb y he does it are given to him and he cannot create 
t hem for himself. If t h ere is a cau se for t h e existence of 
man it must be other than man h i mself. Th e complexity and 
t h e intelligence found in man cou ld only come from some h i gher 
sou rce of intelligence, a nd organization. Personalists 
expl a in t h e presence o f mind in man as t h e resu lt of t h e 
cre a tive activity of a God who is a person capable of 
t h i nking , and willing , and feeli ng . Personalists in look i ng 
for some symbol for t h inking of t h is cau se of man discover 
what t h e y condider to be t h e most adequate symbol, in t h e 
concept of personality . They have sometimes been accused of 
being anth ropomorph ic. Th ey rep ly t h at an anthropomorphic 
symbol s u ch as personality is t h e most adequ ate symbol 
wh ich can be found. By s u ch a term they do not mean that God 
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is limited to the levels of activity found in man, but would 
rather hold t hat what is highest in man's activity must at 
least be found in t h e activity of the Supreme Person, and in 
addition to this there may be vast areas of action which man 
has never dreamed about in the Supreme Person. 
Personalists are very empirical in their consideration 
of the unique nature of man. They recognize that personality 
is free to choose according as it wills. They hold that 
personality is the true locus of values, and offer evidence 
for the belief that personality is immortal. Even though the 
body of a person ~ay die . there is no evidence to prove that 
the mind ceases to exist. The personalists generally hold 
that personality is real whether in God or in man, and t h at 
all else is some activity of a person, but has no independent 
status. 
The fact of organization, or of process, as interpreted 
by the personal idealists is simply a result of the activity 
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of persons. In some cases it is due to man, but in most cases 
God. The developments in the natural realm are all the products 
of the creative work of God. Generally personalists are favor-
able t o an evolutionary view of the world but one which explains 
each novelty as a creative act of God. Social development and 
complexity is a dual work of both God and man. Organization 
and complexity generally reveal, purpose, and powers of 
adaptation to accomplish certain objectives. 
Sin ce the problem of matter has been the principal subject 
of this dissertation a much. more detailed treatment will follow. 
6. WHAT ANALYSIS REVEALS ABOUT MATTER 
The first thing which an analysis reveals about matter 
is what has already been designated as the capapity for enter-
ing into complex organizations of many kinds. As analysis 
proceeds one moves in the direction from the forms in which 
it is apprehended by the senses to those more elementary 
chemical substances which are found in compounds as well as 
in the more simple elements. When analysis is cont i nued 
down through the elements and atoms of matter it finally 
rests at the place where the particles such as protons, 
electrons, neutrons, and positrons are found. Recent research 
has identified approximately fifteen of these elementary 
particles. Whether scientists will be able to make further 
analysis of these particles is doubtful. It appears that 
science has reached a limit in such investigations. Present 
· analysis can go only one step farther. That is to point out 
that each of these particles is composed of two factors, 
namely form and energy. 
Form as is here used refers to the fact that each of 
these particles exists in some definite structural order. 
Each may be qualified by characteristic types of activity. 
They can be identified, and distinguished from other particles. 
Energy as physics defines it is, "the capacity to do 
work ."l 
1. Krauskopf, FPS, 103. 
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This definition in turn requires another. .What is meant by 
work? Work is defined as "the product of a force and the 
distance through which the force acts."l This distance 
through which the force acts is always the vertical distance. 
Physicists usually distinguish two kinds of energy, potential 
and kinetic. Potential energy is energy which is s t ored up 
generally by means of position or some mechanical device so 
that the energy may later be released. Kinetic energy is 
the energy found in a moving body and has been defined as 
the ttwork it can do on bodies while it is being stopped.n2 
196 
Together, potential and kinetic energy are designated mechanical 
energy . Scientists also indicate several other forms of 
energy , as ch emical, heat, electrical, magnetic, and radiant 
energy. All of these may be transformed into some f orm of 
potential or kinetic energy, and t hus be ab le to do work. 
One of the important resu lts of Einstein's theory of 
relativity is the statement of the equivalence of mass and 
energy in the equation E = mc2. This has been mentioned in 
chapter J. Energy is equal to t~e product of t h e mass and 
the square of t h e speed of light. This makes the older 
concept of mass which figur e d so prominently in classical 
1~ Krauskopf, FPS, 103. 
2. Webster, Farwell, and Drew, GPC, 77. 
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physics and philosophy in relation to the concept of substance, 
no longer related to something inert but to someth ing dynamic. 
In the light of these discoveries there is little wonder 
why Wenzl say s what he does about the idea of energy. 
Physics defines it as working capacity, that 
is to say as something potential; moreover, it 
is not merely the potential energy but the 
kinetic energy also which is, strictly speak-
ing , potential: it can actualize itself. It 
is a special instance, a sub-concept of what 
Aristotle called energeia. Force, itself again 
a potential conc~pt, ente~s constitutively into 
the field of energy; and mass into t h e kinetic 
energy; mass too is a potential concept, it im-
plies space-control-potency and the tendency to 
lay claim to space; the mass-bodies and mass-
particle s are t h emselves bearers of the energy-
content E = mc2. Substance, therefore, whether 
mass or energy, is from the be g inning a capacity 
to make itself effecfive acco rding to mathematical 
order; spatially-temporally, ·therefore, material 
reality appears to us where and only where po-
tentiality actualizes itself and where, -by so 
doing:,; it becomes comprehensible for us .1 
The particles which seem to be t h e basic units from which 
all matter is composed are possessed of two kinds of e nergy, 
kinetic and potential. It is this kinetic energy which 
makes it possible for experimenters to trace the paths 
of the-se particles and study their characteristic activities. 
Just how great a distinction may be made between the concept 
of form and energy in matter as found in the particle is 
difficult to determine. For example, mass seems to be a 
qualifying characteristic but its relation to energy is so 
1. Wenzel, Art. (1949), 592· 
direct that a variation of the energy produces a variation 
in the mass. This being the case one is inclined to question 
whether a variable should be cast in the role of a qualifying 
factor or a form. However due to the slow energy loss of a 
particle the mass seems to remain constant enough to measure 
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it. That fact points to evidence for form. There is a very real 
sense in which one may say that :_ the particle is really a 
form-energy in something of the same sense that Aristotle 
speaks of matter as being form-matter. Wenzel has expressed 
it thus . "Material reality is actualized mathematics."l 
The factor of charge is also a constant characteristic so 
far as certain particles are concerned. This seems to point 
towards f ormal structure. 
Experience in the laboratory never reveals any energy 
which is devoid of form. All energy which the scientists 
have discovered is form-energy. Were it possible to abstract 
form from form-energy what would simple energy of this kind 
be? This idea bears some resemblance to the "Prime matter" 
of the scholastics . Science has no answer to such a question. 
Only speculative philosophy may attempt to devise an answer . 
1. Wenzel, AEPS, 594. 
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7. MATTER AS DIPOLAR 
There is a suggestion in Whitehead which might assist 
at this point . When he speaks of the actual occasions as be-
ing dipolar, i.e., having a mental and a physical pole, he is 
sugges ting much the same thing that is here meant by the form 
and the energy. Their union is in feeling. Every unit of 
matter has that in it which corre sponds to a mental pole, that 
which exercises ·a command position , which gives determinateness, 
which sets the boundaries and expresses legal limits. Whitehead 
uses the term "subjective aim" to describe that which operates 
in the unit as this self-determining creative principle. While 
its initial phase is derived from God its completion depends 
on itself.l The other pole is that which is acted upon by the 
former. In the dynamic structure into which the two are inter-
related matter is given as man discovers it. 
The investigat ion will here be best advanced by attempt-
ing an analysis of the two poles of matter. The mental pole 
which is formal in nature suggests a product of mind. An 
illustration may clarify the point. The world is full of t he 
evidence of the activity of man. The art, the music, the 
literature, the alterations in the surface of the earth, the 
machinery, all may be traced back to the activity of the mind 
of man. Once again Aristotle assists the problem by his 
distinction of "formal cause~' The most coherent explanation 
of formal cause in the area of what man has done is some kind 
1. Whitehead, PR , 373. 
of mental activity. It is the expression of ideas which were 
first thought by man and then were later expressed through the 
various media he employed. The analogy between the structure 
seen in the work of man and tbe structure of the particles of 
matter leads to the hypothesis that the form of the particles 
of matter is the work of a mind. Personal idealism. explains 
the cause of ~ as it exists in matter, as the work of the 
mind of God. While the formal element in the particle seems 
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to be rather simple, its subsequent behavior belies such a con-
elusion. Any list of the particles c arries descriptions which 
are largely in terms of charge, mass, and a few other items, 
but generally very little more than charge and mass. The 
situation changes greatly when the next level of matter is 
considered, i.e. the structure of the atom. Here there are 
definite numbers of the particles combined in certain orders 
and functioning in certain very characteristic ways. The 
variety of characteristics in the elements show precise 
mathematical quantities 9f each of the particles involved 
in the atomic structure. The s~~e kind of a situation persists 
in more complicated manner in the case of the higher levels or 
chemical compounds both inorganic and organic. The exactness 
of structure, the constancy of qualities, the power to combine 
in these unique ways hardly could be a product of chance. 
Rather does it point to a purpose and to a law abiding tendency 
' 
which seems to be a part of the very potentiality in the 
particles themselves . They seem to have a capacity in associ-
ation with other particles to bring forth far more varied 
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characteristics than might have been predicted of them. How 
does such a capacity develop or appear? The most coherent 
explanation attributes it to the activity of a Cosmic Intelli-
gence or God. An impersonal cause of such activity and structure 
contradicts experience . It would mean that order comes from 
non-order. Experience shows that the mind of man is capable 
of making a great many highly complex machines and objects. 
He can even develop n ew breeds of livestock and produce animals 
which have whatever characteristics he desires to stress. ,While 
there are distinct limitations upon man's capacity to impose 
his ideas upon the things about him, there is nothing which 
performs such highly articulated work except where the mind of 
man is concerned . There is nothing in man's experience which 
leads him to think that absence of mind is associated with the 
production of similarly highly integrated processes. The most 
reasonable assumption is that the f orm and s tructure which is 
found in the particles of matter is a product of the mind of 
God. 
8. THE PROBLEM OF ENERGY 
If analysis reveals both form and energy in matter, and 
form is attributed to God, what about energy? The energy of 
matter is described by the physicist as the capacity to do work, 
but when traced back to its source is a creation of God and as 
such is a product of God's will. It is potential activity. 
Pure energy is energy that has not been actualized. It is 
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energy which is completely lacki ng in form. There is ·nothing 
in the recordings of science that points to pure energy. It 
can only be deduced from the analysis of the particles . If-
that analysis is accepted as valid , it follows that in some 
manner there must have been a union of form and energy . If 
God imposed form upon energy to produce matter, then such 
energy must have been available t o God, even though it is 
completely absent from any recorded experience of man . Before 
any creation could have taken place the only possible source 
of such energy would be in the very nature of God himself . 
Human experience suggests that some counterpart in God to 
what man designates, the will may be the most coherent explan-
ation for the source of this pure energy. 
The several different kinds of particles of matter point 
to several acts of union of form with energy on the part of God . 
Creation according to such a theory is not just one act but many 
acts . 
Any discussion of the psychology of the Divine can only 
be pursued by means of the analogy to human personality. Matter 
has its origin in God and as such God is the source of both the 
form and the energy which it appears to have . Matter is a 
creative act of God . -
9 . HAS MATTER INDEPENDENT STATUS? 
One of the basic tenets of personalistic idealis m i s that 
human personality is real . It looks_ upon the universe as a 
"society of many selves related by common purposes."l Aside 
from God, these selves are creations. God is their creator. 
~lhatever real status they have has been given them by God. 
To a limited degree they are centers of action being free to 
act as they choose. While dependent upon body yet they have 
an independent status in the area of choice. 
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· some personalists look upon matter as having no reality 
apart from a continuous divine energizing which they attribute 
to God. Matter they say is "·something continually supported, 11 
or ttactivities of a cosmic mind."2 This view of matter is very 
close to that held by a pantheist. One difficulty with such a 
view lies in the picture it presents of a God whose attention 
is directed into so many activities whose uniformity is almost 
mechanical. Furthermore it means that such a God wills every 
status of matter at every moment, and sometimes by his refusal 
to will, problems . of evil might be avoided. Instead of this he 
goes on willing even in such a situation as Brightman describes. 
"Let us not blink the fact that if God be immanent in nature, 
every motion of the murderer 1s, and of his weapon ••• was the deed 
of God's will, whose purpose is supreme value. 11 3 Does not God 
have a responsibility for preventing the act of the murderer or 
1. Brightman, Art. (1946), 372 . 
2. Cf. Bo\vne, MET, 243, and Brightman, NV, 120. 
3. Brightman, ITP, 337-338. 
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shall God be blameless even though such a concept of immanence 
makes God a partner to the crime? 
There is another way for personalists to view matter, 
There is no reason why they could not look upon it as a creation 
of God which carries a definite amount of energy, so definite in 
fact that it can be formulated mathematically . The best term 
to describe this creation is an impersonal entity. It is a 
unit which is capable of self-direc ted activity in a very 
limited sense . It is responsive to its environment and this 
sensitivity makes it akin to the units of a panpsychistic 
system. This energy is not increased so far as each particle 
is concerned. A continuous flow of energy seems to be contrary 
to Einstein's formulation that E : mc2, for a continuous energy 
means an energy which has no breaks and such an energy would be 
infinite, hence, the mass of it would be infinite. The fact 
that each particle can be measured indicates breaks in the 
energy supply . It seems far more consonant with modern physics 
to regard matter as distinct from God in the same way that a 
person is regarded as distinct from God . Matter is packaged 
energy which is definitely formed. It is determined in its 
activity by the very form in which it exists . It is continually 
found in a state in which kinetic energy is revealed through 
laboratory tests. This motion means a spending of energy, and 
indicates a diminishing of the original energy supply. Vlhen 
Einstein's formula E = mc2 is applied to the particle whose 
energy is being used up in kinetic energy the small amount of 
kinetic energy used up in the motion of the tiny particle is 
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well shown by the fact that "one gram of matter transformed 
-
into energy equals 25 million kilowatt hours or about the 
energy of 2,500 tons of burning coal ."l This would be enough 
energy t o light a five watt bulb for over half a million years. 
Matter then, has a time determination where energy is lost 
through ac t ivity but the energy loss is so small in rel a t ion 
to the total energy that is found in the particle that it 
woul d require a time span of some hm1dreds of thousands of 
years to use up this energy. 
~fuat has been said appears to contradict the first law 
of thermodynamics. Experimental verif ication of a process of 
this kind would be difficult if not impossible. Laboratory 
tests of' the law of conservation of energy are not condueted 
on t he sub-atomic level , but in the higher level where the 
particles have already been or ganized into some a t omic struc ture. 
Variations of individuals particles due to energy losses would 
have little effec t on the vast numbers of particles involved 
i n the t est. The exceedingly long time span for energy loss 
would also make these variations relatively slight. 
The equivalence of mass ~~d energy as indicated in the 
formula of Einstein has been prov ed experimentally in the work 
on atomic energy. The report of these scientists is arresting. 
"In other words, thes e experimental results prove that the 
equivalence of mass and energy was correctly stated by Einstein."2 
1. Howe, ITP, 479. 
2. Smyth, AE, 18. 
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The findings of science seem to favor the view of matter 
that regards it as independent of God in much the same way in 
which man is independent of God. :Matt;er is discrete, measur-
. able, and is found to act in certain prescribed ways. As a tool 
to be used by spirit in expressing its purposes, matter is ever 
subject to the actions of those persons who would employ it in 
the creative processes which make for beauty, truth, and good~ 
ness, as well as in what may lead to ugliness, error and evil . 
Matter, then is considered independent of God in the sense that 
it is not being supplied with a stream of energy from God . 
The energy in it is a once-for-all creation of God. 
However, when matter appears in more complex organizations 
than those of the level of particles, atoms, and inorganic 
compounds, the new level of activity cannot be explained as 
due to the form originally given matter by the initial creative 
act of God. The many qualities which appear on the inorganic 
level of matter are due to the p r operties of wholes which are 
brought into existence by the combinations of organization 
arising from the social potentialities of the particles. 
These qualities may all be said to be latent in t he fo r m which 
was given each particle at creation. 
When the organic level of evolution is considered, the 
new qualities which appear cannot be attributed to the proper-
ties inherent in matter on the lower level. New forms have been 
added and these forms are definitely located in a process, or an 
organism. Such forms are self-perpetuating but they depend 
upon a creative ingress of God for their initial presence in 
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the natural order. n1e most satisfactory manner in which this 
takes place is described in the creative evolution of Boodin. 1 
Many creations of this kind have taken place. The most notable 
are: organic compounds, simple forr~ of unicellular beings, 
more complex forms of plant life, more complex forms of animal 
life, and man, having the powers of reason and ability to impose 
his own ideas and forms both upon individual and social 
structures. 
An activity of this kind on the part of God makes him 
immanent in the sense of a continual establishment of new 
f orms in the evolutionary p rocess . There is a further con-
sideration of the subject of forms with respect to what might 
be termed insp iration, creativity; or revelation. There is 
a continual activity of God in the realm of man's thought 
processes where God imparts those creative ideas or forms by 
which man becomes something of a partner with God in bringing 
forth those human products that contribute to the increase of 
value experience. 
10. A VIEW CLOSE TO PANPSYCHISM 
There is a kinship between the view of matter here pre-
sented and that held by the panpsychists. The particles of 
matter are w1ique individuals. They cannot be broken down into 
1. See Boodin 1 s Three Interpretations of the Universe. 
anything of simpler structure. They function in a certain 
manner and obey a law of their own internal nature. They 
likewise enter into organization with other particles and 
produce another order of being with characteristic ways of 
acting. These in turn enter into still higher orders of 
being and always there is a characteristic pattern of action 
which accompanies such organization. It appears that these 
new orders of being emerge like some new being, which employs 
in its organization everything which has been found in the 
lower orders of which it has been constituted, and yet the 
new organization itself is a novelty, not just a composite 
but rather a new being. TI1ere is a sense in which it might 
well be called a new creation. - New qualities appear which 
were hitherto unknown. Some such pattern can be traced through 
the entire structure of the univers e , and the various kinds of 
beings capable of distinctive types of activity represent 
some dynamic power of organization which is constantly at work. 
Nature is composed of some type of organization in every part 
of its existence. There are of course aggregates in nature of 
which the order of activity is just that of the most complex 
organization found in the aggregate. It is important to 
distinguish between an aggregate and what is here designated 
as a new being. The new being is capable of a unique type of 
activity. The aggregate as such has no unique type of activity 
but is just a collection of organization~. A mountain is an 
aggregate capable of no higher action that can be found in the 
various minerals and whatever constitutes the parts of the 
mountain. 
From the standpoint of the problem of matter it is 
necessary to point out that the appearance of a new order of 
being does not in any way involve any changes in the amount 
of the energy which is found in matter . The change is in 
the formal structure , as the change Whfuh comes with an 
entirely new form now governing the energy within the system. 
All novelty as it appears in the new order of being is due 
to a change in form not in energy . Vfuere does this form 
come from? It was not present in the previous components 
which make up the new being . Had it been there the new 
qualities which now appear should have appeared before . 
Hence the problem of where the new form comes from is the 
problem which explains each new being as it emerges . The 
only possible source of this form is some new creation of 
God. This explanation requires a God who is at work in 
nature, i mmanent at each place where organization results 
in a new order of being . 
11 . IS THE WILL OF GOD A CATHOLIC VALUE? 
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Catholic values are those which may be shared without 
suffering any loss to the one sharing them. Religion, truth, 
art may all be classed as catholic values . The musician be-
comes a better singer as he gives his song , and the philosopher 
who attempts to share his ideas becomes a better thinker as 
expression brings to light new ideas and clarifies others . 
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Material things cannot be shared without loss to the one 
in possession of them. If this were the case with God in the 
creative activity in which he engages, then creation would be 
a process in which God would gradually be less and less as 
matter was created. But if the will of God which is the cause 
of the energy in matter is a catholic value then creation does 
not diminish anything in God . 
The question may be raised , how it is possible for 
matter t o be composed of the "ideas" of God and the "will" 
of God and still be independent. This involves the whole 
question of immanence. Personalists who hold to an immanence 
of God in nature and to an independent status fo r human per -
sonality seem to find no difficulty in regarding God as the 
creator of human personality. It would be no more difficult 
for God tc create an independent particle than an independe nt 
person a l ity. If t he will of God under certain conditions of 
formal organization becomes the form-energy which is found in 
the particles of matter, there is no more difficulty in the 
independence of matter than the independence of personality. 
One might illustrate this point by considering how a book is 
written. The ideas of the book are derived from the min d of 
the author but they acquire an independent status in composition 
and printing. Likewise , the will of God is not exhausted by its 
exercise anymore than the mind is exhausted by the exercise of 
thinking , there are just as many thoughts left after sharing 
thoughts all day. The will of God is in no sense exhausted in 
the creation of form-energy. The energy supply is there , and 
the conditions under which it functions are all established . 
It remains for matter to function in this way. The thoughts 
of God are catholic values. Is not the will of God also a 
catholic value? 
12. A QUASI INDEPENDENCE IN NATURE 
Such a view of matter involves a quasi independence of 
nature which on a lower scale than that of man still endows 
nature with the freedom to act within the restrictions which 
God set up in h·is creative work . All such views of nature in 
turn free God from the limitations imposed on Elm by the 
problem of evil which an immanence view of nature requires. 
God is responsible for nature since he created it but the 
evils that are found in nature and the imperfections are 
subject to the correcting influence of God as he freely pro-
jects hi~~elf into nature whenever he wills to do so . If 
nature is treated as independent of God it does not mean 
that God cannot function within nature . Denial of a con-
tinual state of imr~ence within eacl1 particle does not mean 
that God is completely transcendent. He is more like a work-
man whose employment keeps him occupied with certain specific 
problems . This is in accord with Boodin's suggestions about 
creative evolution. Where a new being results from a union 
of lower beings , God is active in establishing the formal 
nature of the new being. The novelty that appears with each 
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higher level of evolution is something which God has created 
or brought about by his deliberate action. 
13 . IS MATTER REAL? 
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The answer to this question depends upon the criterion 
of reality. If the simple test of sense experience is the test 
of reality, then it may be considered real . If the test of 
time requires whatever is real to be eternal, then it is not 
real but in that same sense many other things would also cease 
to be real . If it i s to be considered a first cause or what 
is uncaused by anything else , then it is not real , for matter 
is a creation of God. 
Bowne employs the test of real as anything that "acts 
and is acted upon, and that it is a determining factor in the 
world of change and effects . "l . There is an order of activity 
in matter . It is constantly acting. The action is a directed 
or controlled motion which accords with the laws of its ovm 
formal nature . The laws of the material realm are so well 
knoML that the relations of particles to one - another can be 
predicted before the particles are brought together . True , 
the variety of activity in particles is small and limited in 
scope. However , the result of this activity is increasingly 
complex as one considers the many properties which emerge when 
the particles of matter have been finally viewed in their 
varied organizations as elements and compounds . A complex 
1 . Bowne, MET, 337. 
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chemical compound such as insulin is an example or a type of 
activity which is highly selective, and is surely a "determining 
factor in the world of change and effects."l 
Bowne denies the independent status of matter by con -
cluding that 11power in general is not a thing or an instrument, 
but only an abstraction from the activity or some agent."2 
If this source of power is carried f ,ar enough back it is con-
ceded that it leads to a source in God. But to say that power 
(or energy as is now preferred) is an abstraction is to abandon 
a thorough-going empiricism. Power, or energy is an abstraction 
only when it is thought of, apart rrom form. When in the state 
in which all matter exists, as form-energy it is no abstraction. 
It is what it is, the part of matter which acts subject to the 
control of the formal ractor. A denial of immanence does not 
mean a denial of God as the Creator or matter. 
Matter is real in the sense that it acts and is acted 
upon. Given the right conditions it is a causal factor acting 
from within according to the laws of its own nature or formal 
order. Its reality, however is subject to temporal limitations 
and as it loses energy it is always traveling towards extinction. 
~fuether matter is being created, or has been created rrom time 
to time is difficult to say. That it could be, is not questioned. 
The criterion of reality should be something more than 
ability to act. As first cause, as eternal in nature, as un-
created, what is real should be the ultimate explanation of all 
:l , Bowne , MET, :SJ~7-. 
2. MET, 23. 
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that exists. In this sense matter cannot qualify as being real. 
Everywhere it is subject to some higher order of activity whfuh 
may be termed, life, and in its higher expressions, spirit. Its 
function seems to be entirely instrumental. It is a tool for 
expressing the ideas of the Creator as well as those of man. 
14. THE ORGANIC NATURE OF 1~TTER 
The hypothesis presented so far is only part of the 
definition of matter. It is the result of a more analytical 
attempt at solution. It is more the "snap shot" view instead 
of the "cinematic" view. In the moving drama of process 
matter has become a part of the man, the flower, the house, 
the protoplasm, the enzyme, the star fish, the city, the 
football teru;n, the army, the tear that expresses the sorrow 
of the lonely. It is the storm, the tranquil ocean, the flute 
of the shepherd, the soft fur of the new-born kitten. It is 
the stench of decaying flesh, and the fragrance of the mock 
orange. The capacity for organization and the varied qualities 
which matter betrays in each of t h ese relations is a part of 
the answer of , the nature of matter. 
Matter has potentiality to enter into the organic pro-
cess of living things. Analysis proves it to be the same mat-
ter found in the elementary particles but operating under 
higher orders of organization. Personalism can only explain 
these higher orders as instances in which God has brought 
forth additional forms whereby matter might be organized. 
21.5 
The concept of creative evolution as Boodin sketches it in his 
Three Interpretations of the Universe gives a coherent program 
whereby God has brought forth novelty repeatedly , and creation 
has reached higher levels. Matter is a servant of spirit. It 
is that plastic instrumentality which yields to the beck and 
call of spirit to express some new idea. 
The definition of matter submits to no simple formula. 
Analysis reveals its source in the activity of God. Process 
reveals a kaleidoscopic variety of potentialities. Time levels 
it into an increasing entropy. Spirit molds it into varied 
forms. Men have called it "evil," but a more comprehensive 
-judgment would regard it as the "great instrumental good 11 
whereby the purposes of the Creator find realization. 
15 . CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. Matter can be analyzed into two components, energy 
and form, hence it is dipolar as Whitehead suggests. 
2. The most coherent hypothesis to account for the data 
of mind , matter, and organization is a type of personal ideal-
ism which explains the cause of these data as creative acts of 
II 
a personal being usually designated as God . 
3. The will of God is the cause of the energy in 
matter. 
4. The intellect of God is the cause of the. ·form 
which differentiates the particles of matter. 
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5. Matter is a creation of God, functioning according 
to its inherent nature but not dependent on God for its contin-
ued existence . In this sense it is a free unit very much as 
described by the panpsychists . 
6 . The evolutionary· process whereby new forms have been 
added to those previously held by matter is caused by an in-
gression of God to supply new forms at each movement from a 
lower to a higher level of development . 
7 . The complexity of organization· in which matter. is 
found on the empirical plane suggests axiological consider-
ations in any definition of matter . It is an essential in-
strument in the production of the entire range of values . 
8. Any definition of matter must be related to a 
"process philosophy11 if it is to avoid the half-truths of 
abstraction. 
9. Matter is real in the sense that it acts and is 
acted upon but it is dependent on God for its creation and 
hence is not real in the sense that a Spinozistic substance 
is real. 
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ABSTRACT 
This research is intended to clarify the definition of· 
the term "matter .. ~~" It attempts to determine: the essence of· 
matter~ and ultimately requires a system of metaphysics to 
shovr the relation of matter to what is posited a s real .. 
Much experience is sensory.. Sensations c:ome from wha.t 
i .s c.o.mmonly termed the material wo•rld. The common sense man 
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belie-ves he bas first-hand knowledge of matter.. The discovery 
tha.t appearances are sometimes deceptive led people to pass 
'!' from a na1ve realism to a more critical study of' matter .. 
Sc-ienc·e and critical philosophy have assisted in 
transcending na~ve realism. Science has explained many seeming 
incoherencies in sense· experience.. Philos.ophy require&; that 
sensory experienc.e be· examined bo,th analytically and synopti-
ca:lly. A philosopher must c:ri ticize the· assumptionS' of' sc,ience., 
and raise questions about purpose~ causality, freedom and law. 
A scientist investigates the more immediate data, a.nd is de-
scriptive., rather than interpretive o.r normative.. A compre-
he·nsive metaphysics must explain matter •. Epistemological 
studies sho.:w that matter can never be known directly .. 
Philosophy uses all scientific results·... By reasoning 
i .t mo.ves beyond se:nso.ry experience and atte·m:pts explanations 
by c-onstruction o-f a postulated C;oherent system intended to 
account for all facts.. Explanations of this kind remain ten-
tative. and subject to· ree:onstruction. 
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Definition as here employed means a ttreal definition," 
or one that states the essence of a thing. This requires the 
bui l ding of a metaphysical structure. Issue is t aken with 
logical p ositivists and others who object to metaphysics. A 
£Bilosophical definitiQQ of matter is needed because philosophy 
includes more than science. Philosophers, bec a use of their 
methodology, may discover something scientists have over-
loo k ed. The nature of matter is more i mportant to ph ilosophy 
than to science, for it relates to the fund~1ental problem of 
reality, and hence affects one's entire metaphysics. It is 
nece ssary to revie w t h e different claims of conflicting philos-
op hies . 
At present, scientists hold tha t matter is composed of 
molecules and molecules of a toms. Atoms resemble minute solar 
systems with a certa in number of protons, and usually neutrons, 
in the nucleus, and electrons moving in orbits about the nucleus. 
These particles are the ultima te units of matter. They are 
co mp osed of energy whi ch may be measured according to Einstein's 
f 1 E -- mc2_ ormu a, They also have a certain mass, and many 
have charges of positive or negative electricity. The behavior 
of I!'l.atter has ind icat ed both wave and corpuscul a r characteris tics. 
There ar e ten known particles at present. It is not known 
whether some of them are a part of the structure of the a tom. 
Five additional particles ar e t !iought to exist. 
Interpretations of matter before the t wentieth century 
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show that materialistic thinkers generally gave more comp re-
hensive interpretations of matter than idealists. The a tomic 
theory was propounded by the Vaisesika of India as well as 
Leucippus, Democritus, and Lucretius. Energy theories began 
with Heraclitus, but received more specific attention from 
Descartes, Leibniz, B~chner, Haeckel, and Bowne. Theories that 
stres s ed motion were variations of energy theories. The older 
substan ce theory of w~t ter has been discredited, as well as 
mec han ical explanation s tha t oversimplified the p roblems. 
Aristotle called attention to the relation of form to ma tter. 
The ma jor co n tri butions to the problem were the a tomic theory, 
the stre ss on energy , and Aristotle's recognition of the im-
portance of form. 
Ten philosophers of tbe t wen tieth c entury vrere selected 
f o r special s tudy. Sellars tre a ts matter as the ultimate re-
ality . He portrays an evolutionary development akin to that 
described in lexanderts, Space, Time and Deity . The mean ing 
of matter is best revealed in the complex ac.tivi ties, higher 
organizatirin, and greater adaptive functions~ His claims for 
matter are spe culative rather than empirical. Hi s proof depends 
on coherence. He excludes however i mp ortant evidence from re-
ligious experienc e and history. 
Santayana restricts all knowledge to a kn owledge of 
essences. Matt er itself i s unknowable. Some things are 
knovm about matter . It is in flux, has c au sal efficacy, 
and is dominant in every existing being . He disclaims any 
metaphysical kno·wledge of matter . Santayana's scepticism arises 
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fro m h is epistemolog ical dualism. By animal faith he believes 
in substanc e and exi s·tence , but they are known only through 
essen c es . He does not remain scepti cal. Faith has the last 
word, but Santayana contribute s little to a definition of matter . 
Russell's logical atomism reduces matter to "events" 
related to one another in a "compresence . 11 Collections of 
these compresent events make up a minimal reg ion, from which 
is constructed the four-.dimensional space- time inanifold of 
physics . 'l'hese events resentble the . neutral entities of 
nee-realism. Hi s definition of "eventsM is vague, h inting 
at a dynamic quality. It fails to account for the organization 
an d complexity of nature. At best it only suggests some 
qualit&tive monism. 
Perry exemp lifies the neo-realist position . Analysis 
is carried beyo nd the particles of matter to a realm of sub-
sistence con sisting of "neutral e ntities ." Ma tter i s a complex 
of the s e neutral entities. Th e a nalysis fails to account for 
the properties of whol e s . It does not exp1a in movement, change 
or p rocess, and seems incoherent with the dynamic character or 
na ture. 
Royce g ives the position of absolute ide a lism. :Ma tter 
is k nown in both the World of Description and the World of 
Appreciation. The latter gives the metaphysical clue to the 
ultimate truth. ~.tter is an aspect of the absolute mind . 
His pantheistic tendency leaves the status of matter difficult 
to delineate . 
Bergson traces matter and intellect to the same source .. 
All existence originates in a series of vital thrusts. 
Matter is the inverse of intellect and consciousness. It 
is the contrast to spirit as necessity is to freedom. He 
distinguishes between mind and brain. He approaches an 
organic conception but develops no systematic metaphysics of 
matter. 
Wh itehead r esolves the bifurcation of nature by an organ-
ic view that makes ma tter one part of a dipola r re a lity. He 
provides for movement, cha nge, development, an d energy. His 
views ar e close to pa.npsychism. The scope of his tre a t ment 
a n d bis terminology mru(e it difficult to criticize what appears 
to be increa singly ad e qu a te, t h e more carefully it is examined. 
Boodin stre s ses energy. He defines matter as an energy 
system. His cosmology is organic, cre a tive, a nd everywhere 
co n trolled by spirit. 1he natur e of matter is determined by 
the way it functions. His interpretation seems incomplete. 
Hartshorne's panpsychism reduces everything to a system 
of in dividual beings which oper a te according to the psych ic 
variab les of co gn ition, feeli ng , and volition. Ma tter is low 
grade mind, possessing a lowe r degree of psychic vari ability 
than mind. His stress like Whitehead's on so me inner p rinciple 
of activity in matter seems in a g reement with the way matter 
functions. 
Bri gh t man interpre ts the personalistic position by an 
imma nence theory . Ma tter is an order of t he organ ization of 
t h e experience of God. The activity in ma tter i s t h e activity 
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of God, willed in detail and con tinually energized by the will 
of God. Matter t h en, is a p a rt of the very b eing of God. 
E instein's formula sugg ests t ha t the energy of matter must be 
a definite runount and hence cannot be continuous vrith God'·s 
activity. 
A meta~hysics of matter involves a sketch of a n entire 
system of philosophy. Salient points of this sy s t em a r e here 
pre sented. It may be cl as sed as a type of personal idealism. 
Th e da t a of metap hysics may be reduced to thre e areas of 
emp irical e vidence: mind, matte r, and organization. All 
f a ct s may be placed in one of the se classes. The ep istemological 
position is dualistic, recognizing the part that mind h as in 
the pro duction of k no wledge. :I!,aith in the vali d ity of kno wledge 
i s ba s ed on the coherence found in social intercourse and the 
use of k nowleQge in solving problems. 
The conclusions of this dissertation are as follo ws: 
1. W~tter can be analyzed into two compone n ts, energy 
and form, hence it is dipolar as Wbi te head suggests. 
2. The most coherent hyp othesis to account for the data 
of mind, matter, and organization is a type of personal 
ideali sm which explains the cause of these data as creative 
acts of a personal being usually designated as God. 
3. Tbe will of God is the cause of the energy in matter. 
4. The intellect of God is the c a use of the form which 
differentiates the particles of matter. 
5. Matter is a creation of God, functionin g according to 
its inher ent nature but not dependent on God for its continued 
existence. In this s ense it is a free unit very much as 
described by the panpsychists. 
6. The evolutionary process whereby new forms have been 
added to those previously held by ma tter is caused by an 
ingression of God to supply new forms at each movement from 
a lower to a higher level of development. 
7. · The complexity of organization in which rratter is 
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found on the emp irical plane sugg ests axiological considerations 
in any definition of matter. It is an essential instrument 
in the production of the entire range of values. 
8 •. Any definition of matter must be related to a "process 
philosophy" if it is to avoid the half-truths of abstraction. 
9. Matter is real in the sense that it acts and is acted 
upon but it is dependent on God for its creation and hence is 
not real in the sense that a Spinozistic substance is real. 
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